Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General W. J. Donovan

DATE 1 May 1944

FROM : Charles S. Cheston

SUBJECT:

I think the attached report from Major Henry A. Murray, who has just returned from London and spent considerable time at the S.A.B. school, should be of interest to you.

C.S.C.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

April 25, 44

SECRET

To Mr. Charles S. Cheston
Acting Assistant Director
Office Strategic Services

Dear Mr. Cheston,

I am enclosing the non-technical part of my report on the S.A.B with suggestions for improving the conditions at S so that the standards required in the theatres of operation may be set up & maintained at S. I hope these suggestions will meet with your approval.

Sincerely yrs

Henry A Murray

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET 24 April 1944

REPORT ON THE BRITISH S.A.B. (STUDENT ASSESSMENT BOARD)

With Recommendations for the Improvement of Procedures at S.

A. History of the S.A.B.

Some two years after the outbreak of World War II a small group of military men in England set themselves the task of devising a more reliable procedure for the selection of commissioned officers than that of the conventional Command Interview Boards.

It was known that the German army from about 1926 had used selection methods of selection for officers and specialists, some account of these had been given by military attaches and by Germans themselves.

Experiments were first carried out in Edinburgh on an unofficial basis. Several of the German tests were used, plus an intelligence test and a psychiatric interview. The German tests came out of this investigation without much to be said in their favor, and attention was concentrated on the use of the psychiatric interview and intelligence tests.

In the fall of 1941 as a first experimental trial two groups, totalling nearly a hundred officer subjects at the Company Commanders School in Edinburgh, were interviewed individually (each for about one hour) by two psychiatrists. In addition, each officer was given an intelligence test (M.I.I.P. Group 33), a short questionnaire, and a few short laboratory tests. The findings showed that the psychiatrists could reach an estimate of officer quality which agreed in over 60% of the cases with that made by experienced Army Officers after 4-5 weeks' close contact with the officer under the working conditions of the School.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

It was, however, clear from the beginning that an assessment of personality must be made on the broadest possible basis and that psychiatric interviews plus written psychological tests would not be enough; consequently, at this point several outdoor and indoor "situational tests" were introduced, each of which consisted of a task which must be undertaken and solved by a group of 8-10 men, no leader of the group being officially appointed. These tests were administered by military testing officers (not trained in psychology).

An experimental unit was started in January, 1942 and more intensive investigations were carried out with the result that several additional procedures were included. By March, 1942 a practical scheme for officer selection testing had been worked out to the satisfaction of the War Office and other units were started up throughout the country, so that within a few months every candidate for a commission was required to appear before one of these units, known henceforth as a W.O.S.B. (War Office Selection Board). At present there are over twenty W.O.S.B's. in the United Kingdom and others in operation in the Middle East, North Africa, Italy, and India. The Canadian Army has set up similar boards at home and abroad.

One W.O.S.B. in the outskirts of London is devoted entirely to research and to the guidance of experimentation taking place at other Boards.

Today, after two years' continuous operation, the W.O.S.B's. have proved their worth and are held in high esteem by the majority of British officers. They are one of the new military institutions in which the Adjutant General, Sir Ronald Adam, takes most pride.

The W.O.S.B's are utilized not only in selecting officer candidates but in re-assessing and reclassifying officers who have proved unequal to conditions at the front. Also, from time to time, Boards have been specially allocated to carry out testing of candidates from the armed forces of one of the other Allied Nations and from services and bodies outside the Army.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

Modeled after the W.O.S.B's., though adapted to a somewhat different purpose, is the S.A.B. (Student Assessment Board), which was set up in June, 1943 to test recruits for the S.O.E. Up to date this Board has processed about 55 series of candidates (i.e., about 800 men in 9 months).

B. Constitution of the S.A.B.

The S.A.B. consists of the following technical staff:

1 President (Colonel)

1 Deputy-President (Major)

2 Psychiatrists (Majors)

2 Senior Psychologists (Captains)

4 Military Testing Officers (Captains)

4 Junior Psychologists (Sergeants)

1 Administrative Officer (Lieutenant)

1 Conducting Officer (Lieutenant)

Besides these, there is a maintenance staff of 27: 2 full time secretaries (women), cooks, clerks, orderlies, chauffeurs, etc.

The S.A.B. is located on an 100-acre estate one hour outside of London. The buildings are somewhat more commodious than those at S. There is less crowding.

C. Necessity of Raising Standards at S to Conform to those of the S.A.B.

Without exception, all officers of the London branch of the OSS who were questioned about the worth of the manpower recruited in America for the E.T.O. stressed the importance of quality rather than quantity. Inferior men are worse than useless; they lower the morale and the prestige of the whole organization; there is nothing to do but send them

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

home. Officers of the OSS generally agree that there have been too many "round trip tickets". "Send us", they say, "a few first-rate men rather than a boatload of mediocrities".

Confirming this judgment were the examined records of 42 Americans assessed by the S.A.B. during the month of November (1943). Forty-five per cent of these were failed for one reason or another: deficient physical ability, inadequate motivation, emotional instability, low behavioral intelligence, etc.

From what I was able to observe (1) the candidates coming up before the S.A.B. are slightly better on the average than those recruited for SO in America, and, furthermore, (2) the standard required for passing at the S.A.B. is definitely higher than at S. The S.A.B. rejects about 35 per cent of the recruits.

Since all of our SO men for E.T.O. must pass the rigorous tests at the British schools before being accepted as agents, it is clear that the standards for acceptance at S must be raised to conform to those of the S.A.B. This is especially true today since the S.A.B. will no longer process men who have been passed by S.

Although strictly speaking this conclusion applies only to SO men in the European theater, it might be extended to include all members of OSS who are sent overseas. Our standards should be at least as high as those of the British.

If standards for acceptance at S are to be raised, efforts must be made to increase the accuracy of judgments at S so that recruits are failed only on the basis of substantial evidence and due consideration.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

D. Some Significant Differences between the Administration of S.A.B. and that of S.

The officers of the British SOE have a high opinion of their S.A.B. They have accepted the ruling, for example, that a candidate who has been failed by the S.A.B. cannot be admitted to the Schools except by the special consent of the Brigadier General. It is my impression that the reliability of judgments at S.A.B. is slightly higher than the reliability of judgments at S, and that this superiority of theirs is due entirely to the more favorable conditions which prevail at S.A.B.

The favorable conditions are chiefly these:

1. Besides the four cooks, there is at S.A.B. a staff of 23 enlisted personnel -- orderlies, clerks, secretaries, chauffeurs -- to assist in the everyday operations of the establishment. At S there have been only 2 (and more recently 5) such assistants. Consequently the members of the junior technical staff at S (sometimes assisted by members of the senior staff) have had to devote a certain proportion of their time to scrubbing floors, waiting on table, washing dishes, driving the car, running errands, typing, and a variety of other chores.

2. The candidates spend 3 days and 4 nights at S.A.B. as contrasted with the 2½ days and 3 nights spent by the candidates at S. The S.A.B. has about ten hours more than has the staff at S in which to assess candidates.

3. Under no circumstances does the S.A.B. take more than 18 men at a time. Area S has been asked to take as many as 34 men at a time.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

4. At S.A.B. there is a 10-hour interval (in contrast to the 4-hour interval at S) between the departure of one group and the arrival of another, which allows time for correlation of results, revision of tests, re-examination of principles, etc. The S.A.B. consequently, can produce figures which show the relative validity of each of their tests and are making a permanent contribution to scientific methodology. At S there is no time to work over the valuable data that are so faithfully collected. Up to now nothing has been saved. The staff have acquired numerous impressions, but no substantial facts to validate their methods.

5. Since the S.A.B. is devoted entirely to picking SOE agents, it does not have to include in its schedule of tests some of the procedures which are used at S for measuring abilities necessary for MO and SI operations. Thus, S.A.B. has time for almost twice as many tests designed to measure SO aptitudes. As a result, they have more evidence on which to base their judgments.

6. The S.A.B. is given more information about each candidate by the desks than S is given. The name of the candidate as well as the chief facts of his past history are known to the S.A.B.

7. Whenever possible, the candidate's mission or assignment is specified by the desk so that the S.A.B. can examine each candidate with only one question in mind: "Is this man capable of performing this particular task?"

8. The S.A.B. is not asked to rate twenty abilities or traits, but is expected merely to give an over-all rating on a six-point scale indicating the degree of acceptability of the candidate. Thus, the task facing the final Board Conference is much simpler; there is more time for discussion of each case.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

9. Each group that is sent to the S.A.B. is as homogeneous as possible. For example, one group will be composed entirely of Frenchmen, and in this case all the tests are given in French. Another time the candidates may all be Poles or Norwegians. When, as occasionally happens, the S.A.B. is asked to process MO personnel (script writers, radio announcers, etc.), the Board sets up a special schedule of tests designed to measure just the abilities useful in performing these special tasks.

Summary. From this we see:

(a) that the technical members of the S.A.B. have no domestic or maintenance tasks to perform and can therefore devote all their energies to their proper functions. As a result, the work at the SA.B. runs very smoothly, in a regular and orderly fashion, in sharp contrast to the impromptu, confused, and in-the-end tedious manner of proceeding at area S;

(b) that the S.A.B. is presented with a relatively homogeneous group of candidates to be judged in respect to their capacity to perform a more or less specified task. (It will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish comparable conditions at S since the S staff must test for all the abilities involved in SI, MO and X-2 operations as well as those required of SO agents.)

(c) that the S.A.B. have more time in which to assess fewer candidates, and also have a full day between groups in which to tabulate and correlate their results. The S.A.B. works in a methodical, scientific fashion and is producing results which will be of permanent value to their organization.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

In brief, the administration of the S.A.B. is clearly superior to the administration of S. That the total performance at S is equal to that at S.A.B. is due, in my judgment, to the facts (1) that Dr. Hamilton and the others have created at S an atmosphere of congenial informal hospitality which is much more conducive to free expression on the part of the candidates than the formal military atmosphere at S.A.B.; (2) that the staff at S is definitely more competent than the S.A.B. and they work about six hours more per day; and (3) that some of the tests used at S are more revealing than those used by the S.A.B.

E. Recommendations.

1. Adopt the S.A.B. schedule. This allows for three groups of 18 men per fortnight:

a. Monday P.M. to Friday A.M.

b. Friday P.M. to Tuesday A.M.

c. Tuesday P.M. to Saturday A.M.

Instead of getting off every weekend for one night (Saturday) the staff gets off every other weekend for two nights (Saturday and Sunday).

This change in schedule is of crucial importance. As things stand now the staff at S is very much overworked, their judgments and ratings are by necessity hurried and impressionistic, they have no time to examine and correlate their findings, and to improve (on the basis of these results) the efficiency of their methods.

It should be borne in mind that the original reason for setting up a selection board in the country was (1) to present candidates with outdoor physical tasks and problems, and (2) to observe the

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

effectiveness of candidates as members of a functioning group. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that a Board which is set up to assess recruits for action in the field is necessarily not prepared to assess simultaneously research analysts, policy makers, administrators, filing clerks, stenographers, telephone operators, radio announcers, opera singers and what-not.

Therefore it is suggested that two separate screening systems be established:

S screening for those who are to work in the field or hold important administrative posts overseas;

W screening (one day of testing in Washington) for those who are to work in offices (here or overseas) in subordinate positions.

A team of 3 or 4 psychologists could easily assess 16 candidates a day, 160 a fortnight. Combined with S screening, it would thus be possible to process 214 recruits every 2 weeks.

Members of the S staff could be assigned to W screening in rotation, each team (2 seniors and 2 juniors) working for a period of 2 weeks in town (followed by about 6 weeks in the country).

The important thing is not to further embarrass the work at S (which is already overcrowded) by the business of W screening.

(In this connection it might be pointed out that some of the tests used at S can be administered just as well, if not better, by men experienced in the fields of activity in which an appreciable number of the recruits will be engaged. Rather than getting many more psychologists, it would be better to procure, let us say, a disabled army officer, a script writer, a former agent, etc.)

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

2. Install a maintenance staff of about 6 enlisted men and 2 full-time secretaries at S.

3. Provide the staff at S with all the information on each candidate that is available -- his name, possible assignment, etc.

4. If possible, arrange it so that the groups which are sent to S are as homogeneous as possible. It would be desirable to have all SOs one time, all MOs another, etc.

5. Have the staff at S rate each candidate on each of the chief functions which OSS agents are called upon to perform (rather than upon a list of abstract abilities and traits). This will be most helpful to whoever must ultimately decide upon the proper assignment for each graduate.

6. The reports from S should accompany the candidate to the theater of operations. Every officer of the OSS in London stressed this point. The desks need all the information that is obtainable if they are to make proper assignments.

F. Technical Recommendations.

A number of recommendations having to do with the arrangements, the scheduling, the staff conferences and the specific procedures at S have been presented to Dr. James A. Hamilton.

Submitted by

Henry A. Murray

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

To: Lt. Col. Doering

Please show Gen. Magruder, Col. Robinson and Lt. Col. Bigelow the attached report of Col. Vanderblue, and recommend that the necessary action be taken by the branch heads to correct the conditions complained of by Col. Vanderblue.

W.J.D.

Director's Office

(3308)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Gen. Donovan CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Colonel G.Edward Buxton DATE: 1 May [illegible]

FROM : Charles S.Cheston

SUBJECT: Col.Vanderblue's Report of Inspection of Area "S"

Arrangements have been made locally to set up a day school here in Washington to take care of the one-day evacuation of personnel. This will relieve the congestion at "S".

With the personnel now at the School, the mess and other housekeeping requirements can be adequately taken care of by the civilian help. In addition, the Captain now in charge of "M" has been detailed to run the administration of "S", which should materially help clear up some of the difficulties under which the School has been operating.

C.S.C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Date 4/24

TO: ~~Mr Chester~~

~~Gen Donovan~~

To Col Buxton

Re

Recommend ... 10-14 are now under consideration ...

Office of the Executive Officer

now on dated ...

(30449)

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

In Chiefs.

This report is chiefly concerned with improving the mess at the S Shop. GEB

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

It recommends placing mess under Hdqrs Commandant at Area A or C.

22 April 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Report of Inspection of Area S

1. On Monday and Tuesday, April 17 and 18, in company with Lt. Col. John Williams, Special Funds Section, I visited Area S. We arrived at 1030 and departed at 2100. Lt. Hamilton, under whose direction Area S is operated, met us and had us conducted over the grounds. In the afternoon we saw the outdoor obstacle course, the bridge building and the construction test sections. Each of these is used to test students to determine their particular qualities of leadership, physical stamina, willingness to assume responsibility, handling of subordinates and other related qualities. In the evening we observed what are termed stress tests, made to determine ability to improvise, think under stress, and to maintain security. We had lunch and supper with the station personnel. The students and the instructors messed together.

2. After lunch we discussed the work being done at S with Lt. Hamilton and key members of his staff. Each was extremely interested and anxious to have information on field operations. Practical experience was sought after. The staff wishes to know the conditions in the field and the qualities desired in agents and in staff or office personnel. The interest of the staff impressed me as being very sincere in trying to find out exactly what was required in the field for successful OSS performance in all categories of work.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

3. Col. Williams and I drew liberally from our experience and observations. It appeared that our comments were extremely interesting to the staff as testified by the remarks made to us by several individuals just before our departure. These people, including Lt. Hamilton, stated they had received much useful information from our discussions that afternoon on conditions under which operatives and other CSS personnel work and on the basic requisite qualifications of these individuals.

4. Although I spent but a few hours at Area S, I saw enough constructive work being done that can be of immediate benefit to the field to fully justify the Area and the personnel engaged. Much valuable service can be given to OSS by Area S in its evaluation of personnel. It appears to me that the evaluation can be effective because the special and somewhat out-of-the-ordinary qualities required of OSS personnel, particularly of operatives, makes psychiatric evaluation practicable. On the assumption that the evaluation report, or sufficient information from it, goes into the field with the individual, the Strategic Service Officer will be greatly aided in handling and placing the individual. And, when emergency situations arise, as they always do in actual military theaters, the information will help to select individuals who have the best prospects of successfully handling the emergency jobs.

5. From my discussions with Lt. Hamilton and his staff, I gained the distinct impression that more basic information of the work the individual is to do would be of immense help in making the

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

evaluation of the candidate. The information now given Area S is very sketchy. More complete job descriptions can be prepared, I am sure.

6. Perhaps it is difficult for the desks in Washington to do this because the turnover of personnel during the past year has not left experienced individuals in the positions in Washington to prepare complete job descriptions as desired. Therefore, it appears necessary to go to the field to get this information. This can be done by having each desk head require the chief of the desk in the field in each theater to prepare complete descriptions of the key jobs in all categories of work under the direction of that branch chief. These job descriptions should be based on the experience of both OSS and its British counterpart agencies gained during the past 6 to 9 months. To go back further would be questionable as conditions have changed, so much so that some operations which were carried on a year ago could not be done successfully today.

7. I learned further that it would be immeasurably helpful to Lt. Hamilton and his staff if they could interview people who have been in the field, particularly those who have operated in enemy or enemy occupied areas and also those who have been closely associated with these agents and the clandestine activities in some responsible capacity such as desk heads or chiefs of sections. To permit Area S to see the complete picture, any individuals who are returned home because of unsatisfactory performance in the field should be made available to Lt. Hamilton and his staff for examination.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

8. From the discussions with the staff I gathered that the language qualifications requirements, which are so strongly emphasized by the branches in their specifications for personnel, present serious problems for the work of both the Personnel Procurement Branch and the candidate evaluation done at Area S. It was stated to me that extremely inferior material for responsible OSS jobs is being sent to S at this time. Undoubtedly this reflects a situation existing in the field and may be taken as an indication of the short supply of capable individuals with language qualifications. This is something on which I feel Area S can be expected to shed the first light and since the reported situation may be more serious than indicated, it is appropriate that this condition be brought to the attention of the Director. I feel this is necessary in order that the facts can be reviewed and whatever consideration necessary be given to making such revisions as are required in the programs for personnel recruitment and training.

9. My personal observation of the grounds and the buildings showed these to be in good condition and well adapted to the work being carried on. However, considerable improvement in the mess can be made. The food is prepared and served in a sanitary manner, but not in the most appetizing. Complaint on the mess, undoubtedly, has not been made because, first, the students are at Area S not longer than 3 days and many for only one day; and second, the staff is so engrossed in its work that it has suffered the conditions of the mess without complaint. However, the condition may become annoying to the staff and make itself felt in other ways than expressions of complaint.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

10. The effort being made by Lt. Hamilton to run the mess with only four colored civilians and three enlisted men is commendable, and his concern about the use of military manpower for menial tasks is understandable. However, there is a marked contrast between the mess at Area S and the several messes at Area A. At the former there are no table cloths. The tables have painted wooden tops and there is a variety of chairs. The dishes are clean and the mess hall is kept tidy.

11. The food is served country style -- that is, from large bowls and platters placed on the table from which each person helps himself. The food is brought to the table by the enlisted mess attendants but as they have more work than they can handle, individuals jump up and run for replenishments. Upon completing his meal, the individual, student or instructor, gathers together his utensils and carries them to the kitchen. The dish washing detail is drawn by roster from the station personnel. The senior staff personnel is exempted from the dish washing and mess hall tidying up.

12. At Areas A an entirely different picture is presented. There, table cloths are used for the officers and for the students. The enlisted personnel of the station complement mess in cafeteria style with the standard army stainless steel partitioned tray. Food is served to the officers and the students individually by mess attendants. Serving bowls are not used. The preparation of the food is much better than at S, and although I had but two meals there, I felt the menus were not balanced or well planned.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

13. It is recognized that Lt. Hamilton is understaffed on housekeeping personnel. Because of the nature of his work, he should be relieved of this responsibility. The headquarters commandant at Areas A or C should take over the operation of the mess and the other housekeeping details. It is believed security considerations can be met equally as efficiently under this arrangement as are now being realized.

14. By operating the mess at Area S in the recommended manner, several economies might be effected. Among these are the saving of personnel and time in drawing rations, planning meals, distributing food and possibly better utilization of facilities. If the mess is operated by the mess officer from Area A, better balanced diets will be had. For example, it may be possible to supply Area S with pastries prepared at A or C, leaving the preparation of the basic food to be done at S.

15. Summary.

In summary, my observations of Area S were:

That the work being done there is a very necessary function in making OSS more efficient and the program should be assisted by having the various branches furnish more complete job descriptions and make available to S any personnel returned from the field;

Consideration should be given at this time to the reported low calibre of available personnel having language qualifications in order that this situation can be recognized by the appropriate OSS officials;

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

And finally, that the operation of the mess be placed under the Headquarters Commandant at Area A or C.

C. S. Vanderblue

C. S. Vanderblue
Colonel, Signal Corps

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

5/31/44

To: Colonel Buxton

For your information.

C.S.C.

Director's Office

(3308)

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Assessment School 14,277
x Area S

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Cheston

DATE: 30 May 1944

FROM: Colonel Connely

SUBJECT:

Attached is a memorandum from Major Ross giving his observation on the "S" school. I have already handed you Major Culp's thoughts and I believe you will find this of interest.

E.F.C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Assessment School 14, 227
X Area S

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Colonel E. F. Connoly DATE: 29 May 44

FROM : Major Walter M. Ross

SUBJECT: Station "S"

According to instructions and arrangements previously made I reported to Major Murray at "S" on Wednesday morning 24 May 1944 at 10:00 and remained at that point on duty as an observer until 0900 27 May 1944. The class in attendance at this 42nd school consisted of 22 men from various branches which included MO, X-2, SI, SO, S & T and Communications.

I was quite well impressed with the staff which is most ably directed by Maj. Murray. Aside from the fact that they are all specially trained in the field of psychology and psychiatry they are well balanced, most have good practical viewpoints and they all demonstrate great patience with the students. They work hard, do their duties conscientiously and give the impression of wanting to bring everyone thru the course successfully. They are not, however, influenced by sympathy and neither are they impressed by grandeur of reputation.

It was my opinion that most of the tests were well designed and well executed. One test seems to have lost a lot of its value if the scores and ratings made by the students mean anything. Ratings are from 1 to 5 and nearly everyone taking the test scored extremely low which might reflect there is something wrong with either the gradings or the test itself. I am going to mention this point to Major Murray when I see him next week.

Another point which I have already mentioned to Major Murray is the possibility of shortening the term of the school for those who on the first 1½ days amass such consistently good ratings that it is obvious they are going to breeze thru the course in good shape. The same thing might apply to those who are in the same length of time obviously not going to be approved. Letting such men go after perhaps 36 or 48 hours would hardly permit substituting others for that course but it would permit closer study of those in the middle group on whom quick decisions are not possible. The type of job for which a student is being assessed would enter into this matter and in some cases it might be desirable to keep a man for the whole course even thouhg he looks at the outset to be outstanding.

A suggestion was also made to Major Murray that on the so called "stress" test somewhat better results might be accomplished with a slightly more plausible story and he seemed to feel the same way about it.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT: Station "S" (cont'd)

It is well to mention that the tests are varied and changed from time to time and therefore they cannot become too stereotyped or too well known. The members of the staff are constantly introducing new ideas and suggestions and one entirely new test was introduced during this school.

Major Murray is a fine leader, greatly respected by his staff and by the students. It seems a little unfortunate that he has to concern himself to a great extent with the administration and physical details of the school which now take up a lot of his time. It might be well to consider giving him another staff member who would take all of that detail off him. He made no point of this himself but it is obvious he is working some 16 to 18 hours a day trying to look after the entire set up.

It is important that the branches in OSS show on the "blue" sheet to the school the proposed duties and assignment for each student assigned. This is of great importance and with such information in the hands of the staff members it will aid considerably in the final decision. It might, in some cases, conceivably mean the difference between approving a man and rejection. Major Murray says that some improvements have been made by the branches in this respect lately but even more information is desirable.

My personal opinion is that the school is excellent and serves a good purpose. I do not think that any good men will ever be rejected mistakenly. On the other hand it will cause some unqualified or unstable people to be rejected and for those in the middle it will serve very well to measure suitability for service with OSS. It was of value to me to have the experience and I highly recommend that the other PPB officers be given the same opportunity.

W.M.R.
W. M. R.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OSS Form 1084b

DATE May 30, 1944

TO: Col. G. Edward Buxton

Please note the attached memorandum from Dr. McConaughy re Major Culp's report on "S".

Charles S. Cheston

Noted
GEB

SECRET

FROM:

(32816) EXT.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Assessment School 14,877
x Area S.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Schools and Training Branch
2324 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

29 May 1944

SUBJECT: Major Culp's Report on S, 25 May 1944.

TO: Mr. Cheston

1. Schools and Training has sought a job description from each Branch; these have not been forthcoming. Schools and Training is now preparing such statements which will be submitted to each Branch for comments, revisions, etc.

2. We are anxious to add to S (and, if possible, to W, and, soon, to the West Coast) a businessman, or an officer. The staff is anxious to avoid any tendencies to "impractical" ratings.

3. It is urged that Personnel and Procurement Branch keep the S staff informed of procurement "swings", i.e. which type of skills are hardest to locate, and which may have a surplus. Such information should be forwarded to S regularly.

4. I do not approve shortening the present period at S. "Job Specifications" will not, in my opinion, be clear enough, to justify this. (In very many cases, the students' type of job is not sure when he goes to S).

5. By 6 June, 1944, W will be able to care for 6 to 8 more per day than now.

James L. McConaughy
JAMES L. McCONAUGHY

Attachment

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

SECRET

Originator E.F. Connery
Date 26 April 1944
Addressee Mr. Cheston
Date Rec'd

Subject MAJ CULP'S ATTENDANCE AT THE ASSESSMENT SCHOOL.

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
Dr. McConaughy	4 School Bldg.		May 30	J.L.McC	For your information (to be returned to Mr. Cheston)
Col. Buxton	Adm. Bld.				"
Mr. Cheston	Adm. Bldg.				

F. J. Putnell, Jr.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Assessment School 14,277

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Cheston

DATE: 26 April 1944

FROM: Colonel Connely

SUBJECT: Major Culp's attendance at the assessment school.

At the invitation of Major Murry, Major Culp attended the "S" school as an observer. His report is attached herewith, which I believe will be of interest to you and Colonel Buxton. He makes several worth-while suggestions, one that a job description by the using branch would facilitate appraisal for the assignment. The test that would apply to a non-commissioned officer for an overseas job, could not be used in appraising a highly specialized and administrative job. On the other hand to use standards that would appraise a job of large proportions would be totally unfair to the non-commissioned officer.

Major Culp states quite definitely that one day's time could be saved by better planning and since this school runs 4 nights and 3 days, one day saved would permit taking care of 50% more people in the same length of time.

E.F.C.

Col Buxton might be interested in seeing this.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

Assessment School 14,377

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

X Area S.

TO : Colonel E. F. Connely.

DATE: 25 May 1944.

FROM : Major C. W. Culp.

SUBJECT: Assessment School.

In accordance with instructions, I was on duty as an observer at Station "S" from 1630, 19 May, to 1030, 23 May. The class (S-41) in attendance during this period consisted of seventeen (17) men and two (2) women, candidates from at least seven (7) different branches.

The school is well organized and smoothly operated. The instructors seem to be well qualified for their assignments, get along well among themselves, and were well liked by the students. Complete control of the class was maintained throughout, time schedules were followed closely, and the students were kept busy from 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. and later each day. Working hours for the staff are quite long and irregular, due to the nature of the work.

The general plan in testing and examining students is to measure all key character traits and abilities in a sufficient number of different situations to provide a reasonably accurate measure of their behavior. This examining and testing is planned to provide a general appraisal, rather than an evaluation in terms of a specific job.

It is recommended that the staff be given, in every case, a statement or job description and a list of the qualifications which the branch considers important in the specific job to which each student will be assigned. The staff gets an indication of this in some cases, and gives it consideration in making up final reports. The information received is not adequate, and the staff concurs in the desirability of more detailed statements.

If such information was provided, it is suggested that certain tests and examinations could be eliminated, and each student measured in all character elements, but in only those situations pertinent to the job to which he is assigned. Such a scheme presents administrative and scheduling problems, but might save a day or more in the course. The reaction of the staff to this idea is not known. The argument for it is even stronger, in that more and more of the students will be OSS personnel with the organization for some time, being sent through the school preparatory to going overseas.

Tests and examinations are being constantly revised, created, and eliminated, on the basis of experience with them. This is healthy. Several of the current tests did not simulate very real situations. These were criticized to the staff.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

The preparation and form of reports to the branches need the application of some horse sense to temper the academic tone and make a spade a spade. The staff is conscious of this, and is doing something about it, but more is needed. This is only one general impression of several less tangible ones, leading to the suggestion that an intelligent, practical business man or experienced officer be added to the staff to leaven the bread. One is enough, provided he can swing some weight around. Actually, the staff was quite receptive to suggestion, and encouraged criticism and participation on the part of an "unprofessional" observer. They seemed to welcome a practical slant, which is surely a credit to their intellectual honesty and inherent sense of balance.

It is highly important that the staff be kept currently advised of the relative scarcity of certain types of personnel; for example, radio operators, boat mean, etc. The supply of persons with such scarce skills varies from time to time, depending upon the current "ground rules" on procurement of military personnel. Consideration of this factor should be given some weight in final evaluations. This is now being done to a very limited extent. The staff should have more information on this score.

It is recommended that every officer of the Personnel Procurement Branch be sent through the School as an observer. It gives the officer a chance to measure his skill in evaluating persons abstractly against a scientific measure. In addition, it sharpens perception in spot interview appraisals. It also suggests some good tactics in drawing out interviewees on basic questions.

C. W. C.

CWC:GLM

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

STUDY OF CASES ASSESSED AT AREA S
COMPARED WITH RECORD OF THEIR SERVICE IN ETO

To test the validity of "S" assessment, Major Murray studied, late last summer in ETO, the records there of 137 cases assessed at Area S from January to May, 1944.

Area S assessed 415 cases who were designated for ETO. 34% were dropped or resigned, 5% stayed in Washington, 21% were transferred to other theatres, and 40% (168) were sent to ETO.

The 34% whose services were not used included those not recommended by S, those refused for medical reasons, and a large number who, though rated favorably by S, were not employed chiefly due to inability to reach agreement as to salary or assignment. (If these matters had been settled first, S would not have been so severely overloaded last spring; present regulations require agreement on these matters before enrollment at S. This eliminates the previous bad situation of men acquiring some knowledge of OSS operations, but not joining OSS.)

168 individuals were sent to ETO. Major Murray secured appraisals on 137 (some were enroute, some had arrived too recently to allow accurate judgments of their usefulness). The appraisals were made by interviews with the branch chief or personnel officer; most appraisals were based on the judgment of more than one individual. Care was taken to eliminate entirely the S record when these theatre ratings were being secured. Three grades were used; S records had, earlier, been distributed into three grades.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

In the 137 cases studied the results were as follows:

	Low	Medium	High
"S" Ratings	6%	62%	32%
Theatre Ratings	8%	61%	31%

11 individuals were rated inferior in the theatre; 3 had been thus rated by S (under present regulations they would not have been allowed to go). 6 MO cases were rated satisfactory at S, and unsatisfactory in ETO. This is due to the fact that MO London encountered great difficulties in its early program. Men recruited for specific tasks were transferred to other branches for which they had no fitness, and failed. Some Hollywood talent wilted under the grind of war conditions and frustrations. Some reputed to have specific language abilities (untested at S) proved incapable of satisfactory performance in German or French. Some of the failures were Europeans; the S staff leaned over backward in judging foreign nationals.

S reports were not promptly available in the theatre (as they are now), so S's evaluation could not be used in making assignments.

2 SO men, rated satisfactory at S, failed in ETO. One failed due to melancholia; this is the only case of mental breakdown in the group rated satisfactory at S.

2 SO men were disapproved for agent work by S. They were, however, sent over; they failed, but were satisfactory when assigned to other branches.

3 men from R&A, rated satisfactory at S, failed in the sedentary assignments given them; 2 transferred to SI were then rated "outstanding"; one, transferred to SO, was rated "high average".

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Some men approved at S were also assessed and trained in the British schools. The later records of these men show a higher percentage of accurate assessment at S than at S.A.B.

In 88 of 137 cases, S rating and performance rating agreed. In 24 cases, S rated a man higher than his performance justified; in 23 cases, the S rating was lower.

In the efficiency of S to "spot" failures, it was low in March and high in May. (March was a month of heavy overloading, the staff was "stale" and overtired. In late April, S was reorganized, procedures were changed to permit adequate sleep, and evaluation methods improved).

Major Murray has been interviewing all overseas returnees at Area F. By theatre records, 20% of these who had never been assessed (i.e., left prior to January 1944) were unsatisfactory. (Assessed personnel in ETO showed 7% failure).

As a result of Major Murray's study, the following changes in assessment have been made:

(1) Men are not assessed unless prior agreement has been reached as to salary, general assignment, etc.

(2) Assessment reports are pouched to the theatre, to arrive before the individual.

(3) In addition to Major Murray's trip to ETO, Lt. Gardner has been sent to MEDTO.

(4) There is a much closer understanding between the branches and the assessment staff. All recruiting, etc., personnel in PFB are going through assessment themselves.

(5) Assessment reports now rate a candidate in one of four categories (formerly two): "highly recommended" (superior); "recommended" (average); "doubtful"; and "not recommended". In "doubtful" cases the branch may request overseas transportation if it believes its knowledge of theatre conditions (usually greater than that of S staff) or of the individual so justifies.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

This study indicates that S ratings proved correct in over 80% of the cases studied. This percentage may now be higher. Intangible results of assessment are not and cannot be measured: the high opinion of assessment generally expressed by those assessed; and the respect for OSS almost universally evoked from this first experience with OSS — even if the candidate fails.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1945

Major Murray Validation Report

Mr. Charles S. Cheston

1. I am sending you herewith a copy of the report prepared by Major H. A. Murray, MC, Executive, Assessment Staff, Schools & Training Branch, which is an attempt to analyze the experiences of OSS assessment covering 415 cases in ETO.

2. The report appears to be quite lengthy and you may be tempted to lay it aside because of the time required to read same. However, I feel strongly that you should read the report and assure you that it will be time well spent. I would like to call your attention particularly to paragraph G, "Evaluation of Results", and paragraph H, "Recommendations".

3. I would appreciate your advice, after you have read the report, as to how far we should go in distributing same to other branches and separate offices within OSS. I would also very much appreciate your reactions to Major Murray's recommendations.

4. I feel that Major Murray should be commended for the very excellent job he has done in submitting this report, particularly since it has been done during his off duty hours and while he has been under considerable pressure at Area F.

H. L. ROBINSON
Colonel, FA
Chief, Schools & Training

1 Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

With Spec Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7 theatre.

A. Introduction.

This report constitutes one attempt to test the validity of the procedures used at S in assessing OSS personnel during the first five months of its existence (the experimental period when techniques were being changed from session to session). The method adopted was that of comparing the records of individuals in the field with the predictions made at S. It was expected that the errors of prediction would call the staff's attention to their own shortcomings, to defects in their principles or procedures, as well as to certain unforeseen conditions likely to be encountered by OSS personnel overseas.

B. Distribution and Disposal of the 415 Cases.

1. Proportion of assessed personnel that were recruited for the ETO. Of the total number of 951 cases assessed at S during the first five months of 1944, 415 (44 per cent) were designated (on the blue sheets which accompanied them on their arrival at S) as having been recruited for the ETO. This figure, however, is neither very accurate nor very significant. In the first place the blue sheets, it was discovered later, were not always correct and in the second place 86 (20 per cent) of the ETO recruits were subsequently transferred to another theatre. Since there is no record available at the moment of the individuals from other theatres who were ultimately transferred to the ETO, the present report is necessarily confined to analysis of the 415 assessed cases originally classified as ETO recruits. From now on we shall speak of these only.

2. Distribution of ETO recruits among the Branches. The 415 assessed cases were distributed among the branches according to the figures given below. The first column shows the original distribution, the second shows the destribution after a number of interbranch transfers had taken place.

MO	106 (25 per cent)	107
SI	47 (11 per cent)	50
SO	73 (18 per cent)	77
X2	80 (19 per cent)	78
R & A	32 (8 per cent)	31
Misc.	77 (19 per cent)	72
		415

3. Disposal of ETO Recruits. By August 1944 the 415 cases had been disposed of as follows.

Resigned or Dropped	140	(34 per cent)
Retained in Washington	19	(5 per cent)
Transferred to Other Theater	88	(21 per cent)
Sent Overseas	168	(40 per cent)
	415	

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

1. Method of rating the assessed recruits. S was started in a great hurry and throughout the winter the staff were continually occupied with the routine of assessment. Spare time was devoted to devising new tests and improving old ones.* There was no opportunity to design a form for summarizing the conclusions on each case in such a way as to permit the systematic validation of these conclusions at a later date. Consequently, the first thing this investigator had to do was to read through the 951 reports written in the first 5-months' period and on the basis of

i, the ratings given on the 20 or more variables (traits, abilities) of personality and

ii, the final evaluation note,

assign each recruit to one of these three classes:

a) High (Superior) - Outstanding; a person of exceptional ability and merit; should be successful in accomplishing his assignments.

b) Medium (Average) - Dependable; suitable for the type of work required; achievement should be satisfactory.

c) Low (Inferior) - Abilities below average, or very questionable; probably not suitable for the type of work required; achievement may fall below standard.

Ratings made in this way from written reports are without doubt much less representative of the judgment of the staff than they would have been if they had been arrived at by a consensus of the raters at the time that the case was being reviewed. Here, therefore, was one source of error.

2. Distribution of ratings among the 951 recruits and among the 415 ETO recruits: Over-all and by Branches. At the end of the above described procedure it was found that the percentage of recruits which fell into each of the 3 classes was as represented in Chart 1. The distribution of the 415 ETO cases is almost identical: Low 21%; Medium 53%; High 26%. Thus, according to S measures, the men recruited for the ETO were neither better nor worse than those recruited for the other theaters combined.

Distribution of Ratings among the 951 Cases
Assessed at S from January to May (inclusive) 1944



CHART 1

* N.B. In retrospect it seems clear that much waste motion and many errors could have been avoided by devoting two weeks at the start to plans and preparations.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

High 26%), and from the Miscellaneous Branches [illegible] 80%, High 22%) were not very different from the distribution of all ETO recruits assessed. But the ratings of the recruits from SO were in general somewhat lower; whereas the ratings of the recruits from MO and from R & A were relatively high. This is shown in Chart 2.

Distribution of Ratings among the ETO Recruits of the SO, MO and R & A Branches



CHART 2

At first it was thought that these findings might reflect nothing but the constitutional and occupational preferences of the S staff. Psychologists, as a body, resemble least the individuals recruited for SO, and resemble most the individuals recruited for R & A. Perhaps the S staff were merely underrating men they were not prepared to appreciate and overrating those whose talents they respected more. It was found however, after comparing the S ratings with the appraisals in the theater, that the S staff had a slight tendency to overrate the SO recruits and to underrate the R & A recruits. Thus, the above hypothesis does not hold, and one must conclude that, in general, the SO recruits who came to S were less well qualified for their assignments than were the R & A recruits for theirs.

In the case of the MO recruits, comparison with the theater appraisals showed that men from this branch were apt to be overrated by S; a fact which can be attributed in some measure to the tendency on the part of the S staff to give foreigners (who constituted a relatively large proportion of MO recruits) a special dispensation - the benefit of the doubt.

3. Distribution of Ratings among the recruits who were dropped or who resigned. According to the reports received from the several branches only 25 (6 per cent) of the 415 ETO recruits were dropped because of unsatisfactory S reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Because of Unsatisfactory S Reports

	No.	Per Cent
MO	3	3
SI	3	6
SO	11	15
X2	1	1
R & A	0	0
Misc.	7	10
	25	6%

TABLE 1

Examination of Table 1 reveals that the SO branch and the Miscellaneous branches (mostly Services) were the only ones that were guided to any extent in their rejections of recruits by the findings of the assessment staff. The assessment process was evidently of little service to X2 or to R & A. The high figure (15 per cent) for SO was due to a special regulation set down in April, 1944, to the effect that SO was not to send overseas any agents that were not recommended by S. This rule covered all recruits for WETO assessed during March, April and May. If it had not been for this the over-all percentage of rejects based on unsatisfactory S reports would have been no higher than 4 per cent. (There is a striking contrast between this figure and 35, the percentage of recruits rejected by the British SAB.)

In addition to four men who were rejected because of unsatisfactory School reports, there were 111 (27 per cent) dropped for other reasons: either no agreement as to salary or assignment could be arrived at between the branch and the individual, or, in a few cases, the individual was disqualified for medical or for security reasons. The distribution of the ratings of the 111 recruits who were thus dropped or who resigned is shown in Chart 3.

Distribution of Ratings of Recruits who were Dropped for Reasons other than that of having received an Unsatisfactory S Report



CHART 3

(60719)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

there were 12 per cent more inferior men rejected than superior men (indicating that the S report may have played a part in the elimination of some), 70 per cent (52 - 18 per cent) of the individuals who were dropped were good prospects, either average or superior, according to S measures. From this, it appears that about 1/5 of the men who went to S were destined to be rejected by the desks even though they were judged to be satisfactory by the assessment staff. One explanation for this is that many recruits were sent to S without being told what assignment or salary the organization proposed to offer them. If this informative interview had been scheduled for each candidate before he was asked to go to S, an appreciable number of men (possibly 20 per cent) would have been eliminated at the very start, without their acquiring the impression that most candidates at S receive of the nature of OSS operations. Also, such an interview would save the S staff a great deal of wasted effort. This does not apply to the R & A branch which dropped no men after assessment at S, nor to the SI branch which dropped only 5; but it does apply to X2, which dropped 35, and especially to MO which dropped 42. Chart 4 shows an even distribution of ratings for the 42 MO candidates (40 per cent) who were dropped for various reasons, the inference being that the S report played no role in deciding which candidates were eliminated.

Distribution of Ratings of MO Recruits who were Dropped for Reasons other than that of having received an Unsatisfactory S Report



CHART 4

4. Distribution of ratings among the recruits who were sent overseas. By the end of the summer, 1944, 168 (40 per cent) of the original 415 ETO recruits had been sent overseas. The distribution of the ratings of this group is shown in Chart 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7



CHART 5

The difference between this chart and Chart 1 illustrates the effect of selection by the deskmen -- influenced to a greater or less extent by the findings and judgments of the assessment staff.

Although 168 individuals were sent overseas only 137 could be appraised in the theater, because at the time of this investigator's temporary duty in Europe (August, 1944) 31 of the group were either on their way across the Atlantic or had arrived so recently that no just estimate of their usefulness was possible.

D. Appraisals of Personnel in the Theatre

1. Method of obtaining appraisals in the theater. A list of all men recruited for the ETO and assessed at S (from January to May inclusive) was taken to London where the personnel officer of each branch checked the names of those who had reported for duty before August 1 (as well as the names of those who were on their way), and opposite each name wrote the individual's place of work and his immediate chief or commanding officer.

An appraisal in each case was obtained by interviewing the given chief or commanding officer and, if possible, several of the individual's associates. After explaining the reason for the interview and stressing the need for accurate records, the investigator asked:

"What has X been doing since his arrival in the ETO?" and then:

"Have these jobs been routine tasks requiring nothing but the efficient execution of orders, or have they called for initiative, resourcefulness and imagination?" and then:

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

"How would you appraise X's over-all usefulness to the organization - outstanding, high average, low average, or unsatisfactory?"

At this point the 3 categories for rating were defined more precisely:

a) Outstanding - all in all he has shown exceptional ability in the performance of his duties; has manifested initiative and resourcefulness; has cooperated well with others and lifted the morale of his unit.

b) Average, high or low - he has been useful to the organization; efficient and cooperative for the most part; is a dependable worker but he has not displayed or has not had the opportunity to display, much ingenuity or imagination.

c) Unsatisfactory - has not been useful for one reason or another; has manifested but little ability, or shirked, or disturbed the organization with his complaints or outbursts of emotion, caused friction, lowered morale.

If the appraiser's rating did not seem to fit the account he had just given of the individual's performance, or if his rating did not agree with that given by other appraisers, he was questioned further and asked to give concrete instances to support his judgment.

Over sixty men (appraisers) were interviewed. Some of them (branch chiefs, for example) were in a position to appraise as many as 25 men, whereas others were able to appraise no more than one. Although for most individuals it was possible to obtain ratings from 3 or 4 appraisers, some could be rated by a single appraiser only, for instance, a secretary who had done all her work for one officer and had had little contact with others.

2. Sources of error in the ratings made by theater officers. Most appraisers had a fairly good opportunity to estimate the individual's usefulness to the organization and in most instances the ratings obtained from the different observers were in accord. Nevertheless, the investigator never lost sight of the following sources of error and, if necessary, corrected for them:

a) By putting his questions or defining his categories in a certain way, stressing this or that factor, it is possible for an investigator to influence the rating of the appraiser one way or the other.

(Here it might be thought that this investigator, having already rated the 951 S reports himself, would be inclined to seek for confirmation of these ratings in the theater. But i) only the student names were known when the S reports were rated, whereas in the theater real names were used exclusively. In a few cases only did the investigator realize at the time that the "Smith" who was being appraised was student "Bill" of the assessment school. Also ii) the 951 S ratings were left behind in Washington and it was impossible for the investigator to recall accurately more than a few of them by the time he arrived in England. And finally iii) although the investigator tried to be impartial at all times, the inclination he was dimly aware of was not that of seeking confirmation of S judgments but rather the reverse, that of revealing errors, because only through the discovery of errors, could the techniques at S be made more valid.)

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

no, a trained observer, not honor bound to inhibit his likes and dislikes, the degree to which the recruit appeals to him, positively or negatively, is almost bound to influence his judgment. Several appraisers, who were well aware of this factor, said something of this sort: "Yes, X is a very efficient officer, but I don't like him. He's not my kind of guy." The factors which operated most often to divide individuals and so give rise to prejudiced judgments were these: nationality; civilian vs. military; military rank; social status (middle vs. upper class); unimaginative practicality vs. imaginative impracticality; operational job vs. desk job; different attitudes towards order, regularity and discipline; phlegmatic vs. sanguine temperaments; drinking habits; preferences for this or that type of woman (e.g. the operation of sex appeal, positively or negatively, in a secretary).

c) Appraisers will naturally vary a great deal in respect to the standards of achievement they demand and their ability to size up people and estimate merit. Some are acute and accurate, others are dull and vague. Some are inclined to criticize and others to praise almost everyone in their unit indiscriminately.

(Here the investigator is forced to ask for illustrative instances of good or bad work, as the case may be, and make a certain correction for any obvious tendency to underrate or overrate.)

d) The nature of the assigned task is the biggest factor in determining the indivdual's rating. Some jobs consist of little more than mechanical routine, offer no opportunity for outstanding accomplishment; under these conditions the best rating the individual can receive is <u>average</u>. Other tasks are entirely unsuitable; they do not call for the talents the individual has used and perfected in the past. Therefore, even though the rating he receives is a just estimate of his usefulness to date, it is apt to be a poor estimate of his potential usefulness. Some recruits were judged to be <u>unsatisfactory</u> at one task, or in one branch, and later rated as <u>outstanding</u> in another task, or in another branch.

e) The element of Chance also operates prominently at another point; the level of purposefulness and efficiency of the unit to which the individual is assigned. If the unit is well administered and the duties of each member clearly defined, it will not be difficult for a reasonably competent person to find his proper place and function usefully. Under these conditions he is almost bound to be rated at least <u>average</u>. On the other hand, many individuals who are assigned to units that are badly administered will almost necessarily become disoriented, perplexed, irritable and discouraged. The chief of the unit may be inclined to blame his subordinates for the confusion that exists. Thus a good average man is liable to be rated <u>unsatisfactory</u>.

3. <u>Distribution of S ratings and theater ratings among those appraised in the ETO</u>. Chart 6 shows that the distribution of ratings of the 137 ETO recruits obtained from the S reports and the distribution of ratings of the same individuals obtained in the theatre are almost identical. There was no general tendency on the part of the S staff either to overrate or to underrate the candidates.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Distribution of Ratings among the 137 Individuals Who were sent Overseas, as given in the S Reports, and as given by the Appraisers in the Theater



CHART 6

The distribution of the theater ratings among the personnel in each Branch is given in Table 2.

Branch		Low	Medium	High
MO	45	9	26	10
SI	20	0	13	7
SO	34	2	25	7
X2	13	0	4	9
R & A	17	0	10	7
Miscellaneous	8	0	6	2
	137	11 8%	84 61%	42 31%

TABLE 2

From this it may be seen that there were 11 individuals who were rated inferior and unsatisfactory in the theater, and therefore should not have been sent overseas. Since only three of eleven were judged to be inferior and unsatisfactory by the staff at S. the screening process failed in 8 out of 137 cases.

4. Examination of the 8 assessment failures. Six of the failures were in MO, two in SO. There were not failures among the personnel recruited for SI, X2, R & A and the Miscellaneous Branches.

a) Six failures in the MO Branch. The detailed record of each of these 6 cases will be presented in the Appendix. Here we shall confine ourselves to the enumeration of certain general factors which, in some measure, might account for the failure of the S staff to screen out these 6 unsatisfactory individuals. These facts were reported by various members of the MO Branch in London.

 CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

a disadvantageous position in the total organization of agencies concerned with psychological warfare. Many of its projects were held up, curtailed or vetoed by those responsible for the over-all Anglo-American policy. Some of its best men were transferred to PWB, SHAEF. Relations with this organization were not always smooth. Anyhow, the fact was that many MO projects, after getting under way, had to be abandoned for one reason or another; and this gave rise to a feeling of frustration and futility which pervaded the membership despite efforts to counteract it.

Aii. According to reports several specific projects had to be scrapped because of changes in Allied strategy and in consequence individuals who were recruited specially for these projects arrived in London to find that their proposed assignments no longer existed and they were compelled to turn to undertakings for which they were not suited. For example, one of the six failures was a Hollander recruited for a Dutch prospect which collapsed before he arrived in England.

Aiii. Many of the men recruited for MO were "idea" men with but little experience in administration and insufficient knowledge of how to implement a program of psychological warfare. They were only too apt to spend time on projects which eventually turned out to be impractical. Instead of recruiting men skilled in political conflict (e.g. labor leaders etc.) the MO branch looked with special favor on Hollywood talent and men experienced in publicity and advertising. A fair proportion of the personnel were prima donnas who expected a corps of assistants or other special privileges. Some were much affected by the flying bombs. Most of them had only the sketchiest idea of teamwork. There was a large proportion of foreigners. As a result of these and other factors the members of the MO branch formed an aggregate of individuals who were rather hard to govern, a body whose morale underwent constant fluctuations. It is not easy for an individual to adapt to a situation of this sort.

Aiv. A misunderstanding existed in the minds of the deskmen in Washington in respect to language qualifications. In calling for men who could write in German or in French the London office expected to get creative writers. Instead they got a number of men who could do no more than write an ordinary letter in the given language. These, it has been said, were as useless to the organization as a comparable number of Americans who could merely write correct English would be to the editorial staff of the New York Times. Useless men are potential generators of dissatisfaction.

(Since responsibility for testing fluency in a foreign tongue does not fall within the S School's province, and since the S School was not informed of the need for creative writers, blame for sending men deficient in verbal skills can hardly be laid at the door of the S School.)

Av. Finally, this investigator was told, there were several MO men who, called out of lucrative positions in Hollywood or elsewhere, were given a great build-up before leaving for England, and as a result arrived with extravagant expectations of the importance of the role that they would play in winning the war. Each was destined to be the brilliant verbal strategist who would persuade the German people to lay down their arms forever. Finding on his arrival in London that there was no one to meet him, that his was to be a small desk in an uncarpeted and unfurnished room, with one secretary to be shared with several others, and, finally, that there was nothing for him to do at the moment, his enthusiasm dropped to zero and he became a morale problem over night.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Avii. The S reports were not sent to London so as to be there before the recruits' arrival, i.e. in time to help the deskman in making his assignments (see later). As a result the deskman was less successful in finding the proper niche for a new recruit than he would otherwise have been. The number of frustrated misfits in MO was relatively large.

It is against this setting that one must interpret the failure of the six men approved by S.

After reviewing the reasons for failure in each case as given by the appraisers (see Appendix) the follwing determinants seem worthy of mention here:

B i. All of the 6 failures were Europeans (some of whom were American citizens of short standing). The disposition of the S staff to lean over backwards in judging candiates of foreign extraction (especially if they had difficulty in expressing themselves in English) has already been mentioned.

B ii. Two men failed because they lacked creative ability (see A iv).

C iii. One was a Hollander recruited for a Dutch project which was abandoned before he arrived in the ETO. Not caring for the substitute assignment he spent most of his time in pubs (see A ii).

C iv. The other 3 men were judged to be satisfactory at the assessment school largely because they had been very successful in civilian life. But they all proved to be misfits in the London set-up.

b) Two failures in the SO Branch. One of the men classified as unsatisfactory was an individual who had been assigned the task of writing the history of SO operations in the ETO. After several months of intelligent conscientious effort, during which he won respect and friendship of his commanding officer as well as his associates, he succumbed to a mental depression which in a few weeks incapacitated him entirely. Being no better able to perform his duties after a short leave of absence he was sent back to the United States. Before the onset of his illness this individual's achievement would have been judged superior (high, outstanding), but the emergence of melancholia, due neither to the flying bombs nor to any stresses incident to the situation in London, destroyed his usefulness.

It should be noted that this man is the only case of nervous breakdown among the 137 cases appraised in the ETO. A later re-examination of his S record - he was among the first men assessed at S - showed that on one test this candidate clearly revealed the hidden self-abasive and depressing tendency which became obvious for the first time 5 months later; but since this test was being used in a new way, its results could not, at that early date, be given much weight in arriving at the final estimate of his character.

The second failure was a vigorous and determined young officer who was recruited as an agent to operate in occupied French territory. He proved, during his course of training at the British schools that he was temperamentally unqualified - too egocentric,

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

was certainly lacking in insight. What appeared to them in the short three-day session as youthful energy, engaging exuberance and passionate conviction, became, after several weeks in a British setting, obtrusive exhibitionism and intolerable self-assertion.

5. Three men who were unsuitable to their original, but suitable to their subsequent assignments. Two men recruited by R & A, discovered soon after their arrival in the ETO, that research and a sedentary existence were uncongenial to them. They wanted to feel the throb of action. The work they did for R & A was fairly competent, but, disliking it as they did, they could not conceal their displeasure and for a while they exerted a disintegrating influence. Finally, both men transferred to SI and from then on only good reports of them were received. They were rated as high average, if not outstanding.

The third man was recruited by SO for agent operations in France. He was entered in the British schools and at first made a rather favorable impression; but after a few weeks it became apparent that he was not a soldierly type, and he was taken out of training. A month later it was reported that he was doing extremely well as clerk at SO branch headquarters. His performance was rated high average.

All of these three recruits were men of merit who ended by being valuable to the OSS abroad. The first two, according to reports, would have been useful to R & A if they had been satisfied to remain in that branch, since they had the necessary ability. Hence they can scarcely be classed among the failures. Subsequently they did outstanding work for SI in France. The third case, however, is debatable. It was known at S that this individual was recruited to serve as an agent, and although the assessment report did not specifically recommend him for such work, it did not, on the other hand, state that he was unfitted for it. Consequently we are inclined to include this excellent young man among the failures of assessment, making a total of 9 failures out of 137 candidates (approx. 7 per cent).

6. Two SO recruits who did not become agents. Two men who were not recommended as agents by S, though rated average, were nevertheless sent to England, the implication being that they were agent material. Arriving in London in July, both received unfavorable reports after an interview with a member of the British SAB. One was transferred to Communications and when last heard from was working satisfactorily in France; the other was sent to the British Schools, despite the SAB report, and after a few weeks his deskman heard that he was doing very well. On one occasion, it was said, he showed "amazing leadership." But, since it was already September and most of our agents in France had been overrun, this man was taken out of school and sent to France on another assignment. According to second hand reports, he was considered satisfactory. Since these men were not recommended as agents by S, the fact that they were judged to be unqualified for such work by the SAB interviewer confirms, rather than contradicts, the original verdict. And since there is nothing to indicate that they have not succeeded in performing the tasks assigned to them, they cannot, at this date, be classed among the failures.

The fact that two men could have arrived in London in the guise of agents and been assessed by the British SAB after receiving S reports which recommended them in general but not as agents in particular requires some explanation.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

following qualifications: a) ability to speak French, b) physical stamina and daring, c) practical intelligence, 4) leadership ability, and, in the case of some, 5) aptitude for radio. It was considered desirable that these men be able to pass as Frenchmen. As it turned out young Frenchmen or French-speaking Americans with sufficient intelligence, dash and daring were very difficult to find at that time in America and the candidates sent to S were not of very high calibre. A rather large percentage of them were turned down as unsuitable. But the need to comply to the request from London, and constant pressure from the French desk, finally led to a reluctant lowering of the standard set up at S. As a result several candidates of questionable worth were recommended with reservations. Generally it was stated in the report that the man would be useful in some capacity but probably not as an agent in France.

Looking back on the situation it now appears that the S staff was wobbling indecisively on this issue, trying to effect a compromise whereby the burden of the responsibility for sending a doubtful man abroad would be carried by the deskmen. The staff came to feel that it could not turn down one recruit after another when the deskmen were in a state of exasperation at their own inability to meet demands that were so urgent.

All of this is applicable to the two men described above. As was the case with all the other agent candidates, these two were interviewed by a member of the British SAB in London. The brief assessment had been introduced as a routine because the S reports never reached London until after the arrival of the recruit - too late to be of any help in deciding whether the man was suitable for a hazardous mission. One of the original reasons given for establishing the screening process near Washington was that it was more efficient to have Americans assessed in America by Americans than it was to send them overseas to be assessed by Englishmen. And yet 7 months after S had been established, the British were still assessing SO personnel, merely because the S reports were not sent overseas in time to give the deskman in London the required information.

In view of the evidence that has accumulated in favor of the supposition that it is difficult for men of one culture to size up men of another accurately, one cannot place too much reliance on the conclusions by a member of the British SAB as to the fitness of an American recruit. Not counting the two men above mentioned (since one did not go to the schools because of the SAB's unfavorable report, and the other was not permitted to finish), the SAB examined 18 men who had been passed at S, all of whom were sent to schools regardless of the SAB's opinion. Two of these 18 recruits, who were considered by the SAB to be "wholly unqualified" to act as agents, received excellent reports at the schools, were rated superior by their deskmen, and ultimately went to France on paraclute missions. Another man who was approved by the SAB did very poorly at the schools and was finally transferred out of the organization. Thus the SAB in London, having been all-too-humanly mistaken in their judgments on 19 per cent of the candidates, cannot be considered an infallible standard against which the conclusions of the S School can be unhesitatingly measured.

In this connection it is not without interest to note that the FFI (Maquis), encouraged on D-day to take action, turned out to be much more formidable in numbers and in daring, and hence more helpful to our agents, than anyone had anticipated; and, in

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

could not pass as Frenchmen, and had not even undergone the rigorous training prescribed in the British schools. With a fair knowledge of weapons, military organization and guerrilla tactics, numbers of these OSS agents succeeded in being very useful to the Maquis. The undertaking proceeded more smoothly if one member of the team of agents spoke French, but in some areas this was unnecessary since there were Frenchmen in the outfit who could speak English and so act as interpreters. Thus, as it turned out, the standards set by the British SAB and the training schools were unnecessarily high in the case of men dropping into occupied country after D-day.

E. A Comparison of S Ratings and Theater Ratings.

In Table 3 is shown the amount of correlation that was found between the S and the theater ratings. The encircled figures indicate the number of cases in which there was perfect agreement: High-High, 24 cases; Medium-Meduim, 61 cases; Low-Low, 3 cases; Total, 88 cases (64 per cent). The S ratings were one category higher than the theater ratings in 24 (6 + 18) cases (17.5 per cent); the theater ratings were one category higher than the S ratings in 23 (5 + 18) cases (17 per cent). In 2 cases (1.5 per cent) the S ratings were 2 categories higher than the theater ratings.

S RATINGS	LOW 11	MEDIUM 84	HIGH 42
HIGH 44	2	18	(24)
MEDIUM 85	6	(61)	18
LOW 8	(3)	5	0

THEATRE RATINGS

(80719)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Roughly speaking, one might say that the S ratings (made during the first 5 months of the assessment school's existence) would be confirmed in the field in two-thirds of the cases. In the one-third of the cases the S rating would be one category too high or too low. In about 2 cases out of a hundred an individual who was classified as superior at S would prove to be inferior in the theater, due to some unsuspected failing. But in no case would a candidate who was judged to be inferior at S prove to be more than average in the theater.

F. Changes in the Efficiency Score of S with the Progress of Time.

If we accept the percentage of correct S ratings (i.e., ratings that agree with the theater ratings) as the simplest measure of the efficiency of the screening process, we can represent the general success of the techniques used over any period of time by a single number and show the changes in efficiency that have occurred at different times under different conditions.

Since the period of S activity reviewed in this report covers the first 44 classes of "students," it can be conveniently divided into 4 equal periods of 11 classes each, approximately 5 weeks being the length of each period. Chart 7 shows the efficiency score of S for each of these periods. Apparently there was a decline of efficiency after the first month of work and the level remained low for about two months, and then in the spring there was a sharp rise. Although one should not attribute too much significance to these figures (since they are based on only 21, 30, 46 and 40 cases respectively) they are perhaps indicative of trends, trends which depend on factors that may be indentified.



CHART 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

the 4th period.



STUDENT CLASSES

CHART 8

As determinants of the drop of efficiency that occured after the first 5 weeks the following factors are worth mentioning:

a. Fatigue. The staff was overworked from the beginning, but mental staleness did not set in, let us say, for several weeks. At the start the assessors were fresh and their impressions vivid.

b. Snafu. As time went on the number of test-situations which had to be observed and scored increased faster than the development of any orderly program of procedure or of any convenient system of handling the data. This resulted in an increasing state of confusion marked by slapdash decisions.

c. Increase in load. The total number of students assessed rose from 161 (1st period) to 182 (2nd period) to 342 (3rd period). It is not possible to compare this last figure with the others, since 40 to 50 per cent of the candidates during this 3rd period were so-called "Specials" or "Quickies," whose assessment lasted less then a day, instead of the conventional three days. Also, the additions to the staff, both seniors and juniors, kept pace with the rise in the number of recruits assessed, so that the ratio of recruits/staffmen did not increase noticeably.

d. Embarrassment of data. As time went on an increasing amount of information pertaining to the psychological make-up of each candidate was obtained, which forced upon the attention of the staff numberless complexities and contradictions of personality.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

rare moments under stress. The fact that the staff's efficiency score in assessing the Specials and the Quickies in one day was a little higher than their efficiency score in assessing the Regulars in three days supports this conclusion. On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the fact that the individuals who were classified as Specials and Quickies were the recruits whose eligibility seemed less questionable than that of the Regulars, or whose proposed assignments were less stressful or whose personalities appeared less complicated. The Specials and Quickies, in other words, were the candidates who could be rated with some assurance; whereas the Regulars were "problems." Consequently, one would anticipate more correct predictions in assessing the former than in assessing the latter.

As determinants of the rise of efficiency that occurred in the last period the following should perhaps be listed:

a. During May a thorough reorganization of the installation at S and of the program of procedures took place, which substituted order for disorder, relieved the staff of certain irksome duties, permitted a proper amount of sleep and an interval of a few hours between classes, doubled the amount of time devoted to the discussion of findings, introduced a revised list of variables to be rated and a better system for handling the data, raised the standard of the evaluation notes and modified some of the existing techniques. It is possible that the rise in efficiency score can be attributed to some of these improvements.

b. Decrease in load. The number of recruits assessed dropped from 342 (3rd period) to 266 (4th period). After the middle of the last period no more Specials and Quickies were assessed at S. To handle these a new Board of one-day assessments was established at Station W in Washington.

c. The effect of experience. Although no validation studies were undertaken during these 5 months, the members of the staff were certainly becoming more expert in interviewing, observing, rating and interpreting; and it is highly probably that their judgments became more reliable as time went on.

It is possible that none of the above mentioned factors was of determining significance, but that the changes in efficiency scores were due to variations from one period to the next of the proportion of individuals who were difficult to assess correctly.

Finally, to mention one more factor that might account for some of the variation, the make-up of the staff at S changed from week to week, new men were taken on and others departed temporarily or permanently. Since the assessor who interviews the recruit is the one who writes the evaluation note and has the most to say in rating him, it is of interest to compare the efficiency scores of the different interviewers.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Interviewer	Number of Cases	Per Cent Correct
A	18	89%
B	13	77%
C	13	77%
D	19	63%
E	19	58%
F	26	42%
G	8	38%

During the 4th period, interviewers A, B and C did relatively more interviewing and E, F and G relatively less than they did in previous periods. This might account for some of the increase in level of efficiency.

G. Evaluation of Results.

Since there are no figures available in any literature, scientific or otherwise, with which these results can be compared, it is not possible to say whether they indicate a relatively effective or relatively ineffective screening process, whether they do or do not justify the expenditure of personnel, time and energy involved in involved in maintaining S. Unfortunately no study has been made of comparable group of unassessed OSS personnel to use as a control. Of the 143 unassessed returness recently interviewed at F, 29 (20 per cent) were considered unsatisfactory in the theater. (Compare this with 7 per cent failures among assessed personel.) The British SAB concluded in 1943 that 45 per cent of the unassessed SO recruits from America were not qualified to be agents in occupied France, whereas in 1944 the comparable figure for assessed recruits was 31 per cent. (It has been pointed out that the standard set by the SAB was unnecessarily high.) These figures are of little value but no others are available.

Nothing is known, of course, about the 25 candidates (3 per cent) who were dropped because of unsatisfactory S reports. Some of these might possibly have performed creditably in the field. Of the 8 low men selected by the desk to go overseas, 5 were rated average in the theatre, 3 were rated low.

The results reported in this section neither cheer nor depress the S staff. They are not particularly good, but, on the other hand, they do not seem particularly bad. Encouragement might have been gained from observing the rise of efficiency in the last period, but recent reports from the field suggest that the high level reached in the spring of 1944 has not been consistently maintained. Also there are indications that the percentage of failures in the MTO and in the FETO has been as high as in the ETO, or higher.

A small fraction of the discrepancy between S ratings and theater ratings may be due to errors involved in the technique of rating. The liklihood of errors in scoring the S reports has already been mentioned (end of C 1), and the sources of error in the ratings made by theater officers have been listed as well (D 2). What remains to be enumerated are the chief sources of error in predicting human behavior under existing conditions. These are:

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

mental health and vigor. Some are in the pink of condition after 12 weeks of commando training, others are pale and flabby after months of exhausting deskwork. Some are depressed by some temporary affliction, others have reason to be elated. Anyhow, the state of mind in which a candidate comes to S is often not typical or permanent.

2. Recruits arrive with different conceptions of what S is all about. Some have been informed of every detail of the procedure, others do not even know the purposes of OSS. Thus, many feel at home immediately, whereas others are bewildered. Some have been tactfully "softened up" by the deskman, others arrive bristling with antagonism at the idea of having to undergo an examination.

3. In the past the staff was rarely given an adequate description of the job for which the candidate was recruited. Either the theater officers did not provide it or, when they did, the deskman in Washington did not forward it to S. Consequently, the staff was given the impossible task of deciding whether a certain man was suitable to perform an unknown function.

4. Conditions in the theater vary from month to month and are not predictable with a high degree of accuracy by anyone. Branches vary in the amount of snafu that prevails. New and unforeseen tasks and responsibilities are continually arising. The original job description may be as precise as anyone could wish, but the chances of a recruit's being assigned exactly that job on his arrival in the theater are not great. Often a man is recruited to perform one special function and that only (run a printing press, write limericks, teach parachuting, etc,), but by the time he has arrived in the theater the necessity for that function no longer exists. The printer is asked to serve as a minor executive, the limerick writer becomes a despatching officer, etc.

5. In assessing a man for a position in the field the assessor will commonly think of 30 or 40 situations which the candidate is likely to encounter. If it seems that the latter is capable of meeting four-fifths of these in an effctive manner he will be recommended for service. (No man can be effective in all types of situations.) It may come to pass, however, that the conditions which the man is actually compelled to face are not among those (the four-fifths) for which he is prepared and trained, but among those for which he is unfitted. This is a matter of luck and no genius can fortell the turn of fortune.

One uncertain factor is the personality of the chief or commanding officer under whom the recruit will do his work. There are some officers, for example, who do not get on with subordinates whose abilities are comparable to theirs, but prefer inferior men who are obediently receptive and compliant. As everyone knows there are numberless other varieties of incompatible relationships.

6. On the technical side the greatest problem has been that of devising a program which will test all qualities required by all branches of the OSS. The British SAB, by limiting itself to the selection of operators for resistance groups, has been able to develop a homogeneous unified program. The S School, on the other hand, is more or less expected to pass judgment on administrators, photographers, finance officers, map-makers, political scientists, typists, saboteurs, filing clerks, parachutists, interrogators, secret service agents, instructors in demolitions, cartoonists, radio operators, actors, script writers, policy-makers, printers,

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

when a candidate falls down in the theater because he does not possess the required ability, he is checked as an assessment failure - by the staff at S as well as by the deskmen. Four of the MO men, for example, failed primarily because they were incapable of accomplishing the specific tasks assigned to them. To illustrate: one of them was rated inferior by MO and a month after being transferred was rated superior by R & A. If the matter of specific ability were left out of the validation study, S's record of achievement would be very much better.

7. When S was started not a single member of the staff had been to a single theater of operations. Consequently all that the the assessors had to go on were secondhand reports - often indefinite and conflicting.

8. There was no opportunity for research or for validation studies until this one was undertaken in August and reported to the S staff in October. Thus the assessors had to proceed for more than nine months without knowing whether they were hitting the target or not.

H. Recommendations.

Specific technical recommendations for the benefit of assessment staffs at S, W and WS, are included in the Appendix. Here will be listed only those suggestions which might concern some members of the administration. It is recommended:

1. That every new candidate be given some idea of the nature of the proposed assignment and his probable salary before he is sent to the assessment school. Also, that a short preparatory talk describing the purposes of S (along the lines suggested in a recent Memo addressed to all branch chiefs and deskmen) be given to each candidate before he is sent to S.

2. That theater officers be asked to write precise job descriptions to accompany each call for more personnel; and that copies of these job descriptions be forwarded to S, W, and WS. (One of the members of the assessment staff in the theater might assist in writing the job descriptions.)

3. That the staff be periodically informed of new developments in overseas theaters by deskmen and returnees.

4. That provision be made for sending the S reports to the theater officers by pouch so that they will arrive before the candidate and thus be of use to the deskman in assigning the candidate tasks that he is fitted to perform.

5. That a different member of the assessment staff be sent every three months to one of the three chief theaters of operation in order (1) to obtain appraisals of the cases studied at S, W and WS; (2) to report on the requirements for more personnel and assist in writing job descriptions; (3) to help in the assessment of personnel in the theater; (4) to examine, diagnose and decide on the disposal of individuals who develop psychoneurotic symptoms in the field; and (5) to return to his duties in the U.S. better equipped because of the firsthand impressions acquired in the theater.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

a. Highly recommended for overseas service (which will be equivalent to the category superior, i.e., high or outstanding, as described in the body of this paper)

b. Recommended for overseas service (which will be equivalent to average)

c. Doubtful

d. Not recommended for overseas service

The two latter categories will be equivalent to inferior, i.e., low or unsatisfactory, as described in this paper.

At present there are only 2 categories: i, Recommended for overseas service and ii, Not recommended for overseas service. If a candidate is placed in the second of these by the S staff he is not eligible for overseas duty, unless he is granted special dispensation by the executive office, and this rarely occurs.

It is suggested here that this ruling apply only to the fourth category (d. Not recommended for overseas service) proposed above, and that the third category (c. Doubtful) to be taken to mean: "This candidate has not demonstrated that he possesses the qualities necessary for his proposed assignment overseas, but if the branch chief or deskman is convinced, for sufficient reasons, that he does possess these qualities he may send him overseas on his own responsibility."

The chief reason for adding this new category is that the Branch knows more than the S staff does, as things stand now, about conditions in the theater and very often knows more about the past history and character of the candidate. If, on top of this experience and this personal acquaintanceship, the deskman has the benefit of reading the S report, he is in the best position to make a judicious judgment. The S staff does not attempt to pass on the language fluency of the candidates and should not be expected to pass on a great variety of special skills (ability to set type, write skits, pilot a plane, keep accounts, etc.). Personnel Procurement and the Branches are chiefly responsible for seeing that these requirements are satisfied. Therefore, in doubtful cases, where the decision seems to hang on the amount of talent possessed by the candidate, the deskman should make the final decision and take the responsibility.

The findings in this first validation study do not support the hypothesis that S is incapable of making mistakes and until it is shown that its efficiency score has remained on the high level (80 per cent correct) that it attained in May, 1944, it would be better not to act on the assumption that it has.

In this paper no attempt has been made to give an over-all appraisal of S School. Attention has been focussed almost exclusively on its relatively few mistakes. Nothing has been said of the frequency with which its predictions have been precisely varified in the theater, nor of its function as an

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] have expressed [illegible] errors of assess[illegible] that the staff would learn more from its failures than from its successes.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Appendix

The appendix, which is of interest to the assessment staffs only, is published separately.

Submitted by

Henry A. Murray, Major, M.C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

25 April 1944

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Evaluation Reports from Assessment School

TO : All Concerned

At a meeting of the OSS Training Board, held Friday, 14 April 1944, the following procedure was adopted for the purpose of protecting the evaluation reports on students as rendered by the OSS Assessment School.

(1) Each Chief of Branch, or head of an independent office of OSS, to submit at once to the Security Office the name of the individual designated to receive and be responsible for the evaluation reports. The responsibility for the safeguarding of the information contained in the "S" reports rests entirely upon the Chief of Branch, or head of independent office, and the designation of the handling and care of the reports to another person in no way absolves the Chief of Branch from said responsibility.

(2) The Chief of Branch, or head of independent office of OSS, shall also furnish at once to the Security Office a list of those individuals within the branch who it is requested be permitted to have access to the evaluation reports.

(3) All individuals authorized by the Security Office to have access to the evaluation reports must indicate by signing the report that they have read same.

(4) Each evaluation report rendered by the Assessment School shall be numbered serially and shall have the following instructions stamped or typed upon the report blank:

> SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE SHOWN TO INDIVIDUAL ASSESSED. OFFICIAL TO WHOM THIS REPORT IS ENTRUSTED IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. HE MAY SHOW IT ONLY TO PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SECURITY OFFICE WHO MUST SIGN FULL NAME ON REVERSE. REPORT MUST BE RETURNED TO SECURITY OFFICE 60 DAYS FROM DATE TYPED HEREON. NO PART MAY BE COPIED.

(5) After the expiration of 60 days from the date typed upon the evaluation report, it shall be the responsibility of the branch chief or head of an independent office of OSS to return the report to the Security Office.

(6) In order to assist the instructors at the Assessment School in making a fair evaluation of all persons reported upon, the information on the student's Blue Sheet pertaining to his intended employment by OSS shall be as complete as possible consistent with overall security.

WESTON HOWLAND
Chief, Security Office

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

26 January 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Pvt. Ira Ashley

SUBJECT: Orders

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to London, England, where you will report to the Strategic Services Officer, European Theater of Operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Strategic Services Officer, European Theater of Operations.

W. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

P

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

MRS. MALCOLM JOHNSON
BOGWOOD LANE
LOCUST VALLEY, L. I.

Dear General Donovan

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

I don't know who to turn to exec-
the very famous Bill Donovan -
Would it be possible for [illegible]
give him an appointment [illegible]
time after Thursday June 2[illegible]
when Aubertain returns [illegible]
I shall be in Baltimore and [illegible]
accompany him unless [illegible]
are interpreter in your office
his english is not perfect.
My love to Ruth & hoping [illegible]
[illegible].

Cordially

[illegible]

June 2[illegible] 1945

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Mrs Whitridge

c/o MRS MALCOLM JOHNSON
DOGWOOD LANE
LOCUST VALLEY, L. I.

Tel Glen Ca.

Monsieur Maurice Aubertain
c/o Mr Jules. DIERCKX.
136. West 16th Street. N.Y.

Otto Thursday - June 28th
Any odd. c/o Horatio Whitridge
Equitable Trust Co.
Baltimore Md. Tel. [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

MRS. EMORY WHITRIDGE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Mrs. Emory Whitridge

17101
Aubertain, Maurice
& Whitridge, Wm.

c/o MRS. MALCOLM JOHNSON
LOCUST VALLEY, NEW YORK

My dear General
Got a typical fruch letter from Aubertain saying he had not been able to reach you and asking me to 'beard these papers to you so here they are —
Have my passport and expect to sail the 1st part of November
Do look me up if you come over
My place is next to Bullitts in the Parc de Chantilly and

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

45 kilometres from Paris -
Hoping to have the pleasure
of seeing you

Cordially

W Emory Whitridge

Aug 21 - 1945 -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

17101
Aubertin Maurice
X Whitridge, Mr

CURRICULUM VITAE

Maurice Aubertin - 59 ans, Français - né à Château-Thierry (Aisne)

Ingénieur A et M (Lille 1905)

a occupé successivement tous les postes dans les Sociétés productrices de tubes :

1903 a participé à la fondation de la Fabrique de Tubes de Solesmes, fondue depuis dans le Groupe Vallomec

1911 Ingénieur chef de fabrication, Société des Tubes de Louvroil (Vallomec)

1914 Campagne de guerre - 3 blessures.

Puis fabrication d'obus et tubes pour la guerre.

1918 Recrée l'usine de Louvroil (Vallomec)

1925 Directeur des Tubes de Valenciennes qu'il a transformé de fond en comble (Vallomec)

New York, 11 août 1945.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

NOTE

SUR LES POSSIBILITES DE MONTAGE D'UNE USINE A TUBES EN FRANCE

Dans les plus belles années, la production de tubes d'acier en France a été:

En tubes rapprochement : 55.000 à 60.000 tonnes (noirs et galvanisés)
En tubes sans soudure : 65.000 tonnes
En tubes soudés électriquement : 20.000 tonnes

Nous pouvons nous attendre, dans les années qui vont suivre, à une augmentation de la consommation du fait de la nécessité de relever les ruines accumulées en France. Les chiffres ci-dessus seront donc dépassés dans l'avenir. Toutefois, ils comportaient 25 à 30% d'exportation qui pourront être obtenus à nouveau, car les colonies françaises vont nous fournir un champ d'action considérable.

Il n'y a en France actuellement que deux grandes sociétés productrices de tubes d'acier:

La Société Escaut et Meuse, à Paris et à Anzin (Nord)
Le groupe Vallourec comprenant la Société Louvroise Montbard Aulnoye et la Société des Tubes de Valenciennes et Denain.

La Compagnie Française des Métaux possède un seul laminoir sans soudure dans son usine de Deville-les-Rouen. Le reste ne constitue que de petites usines négligeables. Il nous paraît qu'il y a place actuellement en France pour une usine à tubes supplémentaire.

Nous présentons le projet d'une usine pouvant produire 25.000 tonnes par an (10.000 tonnes de rapprochement et 15.000 tonnes de tubes soudés électriquement, remplaçant le sans soudure). L'enquête industrielle à laquelle nous venons de nous livrer aux Etats-Unis nous a fait conclure que le tube soudé électriquement tend de plus en plus à remplacer le tube sans soudure.

Nous avons le concours assuré du Gouvernement Français et n'avons pour seul adversaire que le Cartel des tubes français qui va déployer tous ses efforts pour empêcher une nouvelle usine de se créer.

Le Gouvernement Français a déjà envisagé la possibilité de nous confier une usine de la Sarre ayant appartenu à l'Allemagne et faisant retour à la France, pour l'exploiter et la développer. Nous allons travailler la question dès notre retour à Paris.

Nous voudrions obtenir l'aide du Gouvernement Américain pour qu'il nous cède du matériel supplémentaire de ses usines devenu inutile du fait de la cessation des hostilités. On sait, en effet, que le Gouvernement Américain a payé l'équipement de nombreuses usines et loué le matériel à ses industriels.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

En somme, nous préconisons l'installation en France ou en Sarre d'une société de vente et de fabrication de tubes d'acier puisant ses capitaux :

1) Par un apport français de 150 millions de frs. 1939;

2) Par un apport américain de machines seulement pouvant s'élever à 1.500.000 Dollars (65 millions de Frs actuels). - L'apport américain ne serait constitué que par des machines qui seraient payées en 20 ans par exemple, sous le régime du Lend-Lease.

En attendant que l'usine soit montée, nous voudrions vendre du tube américain en France par la création d'un dépôt chargé de la partie commerciale de l'affaire et dont le coût d'installation sera d'environ 30 millions. Le seul effort américain serait de nous fournir des tubes qui seraient payés dès leur vente en France, c'est-à-dire que nous voudrions obtenir un crédit de 6 mois environ après le départ de la marchandise des Etats-Unis.

La vente de ces tubes sera provisoirement très rémunératrice, et nous connaissons à fond le marché français. Il s'agit cependant d'obtenir l'accord du Gouvernement Français et nous allons y travailler.

Nous envisageons la fabrication et la vente de :

Par mois : 1.000 tonnes de tubes soudés par rapprochement (buttwelded) noirs et galvanisés
1.200 tonnes de tubes soudés électriquement et remplaçant le sans soudure.

Cette production serait obtenue, au début, par les envois de tubes d'Amérique et lorsque l'usine serait installée, c'est-à-dire dans le délai d'une année, car :

4 petites soudeuses électriques dont une irait jusque 8";
2 grosses soudeuses électriques dont l'une irait de 4" à 18";
étirage à froid peu important;
matériel de finissage;
galvanisation.

Peut-être le gouvernement Américain pourrait-il envisager la cession à notre société d'un train sans soudure "Plug Mill" complet, en supplément du crédit ci-dessus,- ce qui nous permettrait de fabriquer du tube sans soudure pour compléter la production de tubes soudés électriquement.

....

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Le devis d'installation de l'usine serait :

4 petites condenseuses : 3,5 x 4	14	millions de Francs
2 grosses condenseuses 50 x 2	100	" " "
Terrains et bâtiments	15	" " "
Matériel électrique	10	" " "
Etirage à froid	5	" " "
Machines de finissage	6	" " "
Galvanisation	4	" " "
Fonds de roulement	30	" " "
Création d'un dépôt de vente	30	
TOTAL	217	millions de Francs

Cette somme serait formée par un apport de 150 millions de Francs Français et 75 millions qui resteraient en Amérique puisqu'ils nous viennent à payer les marchandises fournies par les Etats-Unis. 5 millions, soit 81.[illegible]

Le transfert des dividendes en Amérique serait assuré par nos soins avec le Gouvernement Français.

Le bénéfice minimum à attendre d'une pareille usine serait de :

Par mois : Tubes rapprochement 1.000 x 550" = 550.000 Frs
Gros Tubes 1.200 T. x 1.000 " = 1.200.000 "
TOTAL .... 1.750.000 Frs par mois

En comptant seulement une production de dix mois, nous obtiendrions un bénéfice annuel de Frs: 17.500.000.-

L'usine serait totalement amortie en [illegible] ans

Nous sommes persuadés, d'ailleurs, que les bénéfices seront supérieurs à ces chiffres mais les impôts seront à supporter [illegible] aurons à prélever un certain pourcentage de participation à verser au personnel sur les bénéfices. C'est la compétition lancée par le Gouvernement Français pour nous aider.

Fait à [illegible], le 11 août 1945.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

4 July 1945

Mr. Maurice Aubertin
136 West 16th Street
New York 11, New York

Dear Mr. Aubertin:

Mrs. Whitridge's letter arrived in the absence of General Donovan who has not yet returned to the country.

I, therefore, do not think it will be feasible for you to have an interview on the 6th or 7th. It is my suggestion that you call me at EXecutive 6100, Extension 2261, some time during the 9th or 10th. I may, by that time, be in a better position to advise you concerning General Donovan's plans.

Sincerely,

Robert Thrua
Lieut. (jg), USNR
Assistant Executive
Officer

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Aubertin, M.
12
Zone II

1, PLACE TENIERS
ANTWERP, BELGIUM.
PHONE 375.53 - 355.01
CABLE ADDRESS
DIERCKX-TENIERSPLAATS-ANTWERP

136 WEST 55TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y., U. S. A.
PHONE WATKINS 9-3434
CABLE ADDRESS
DIERCKX - NEW YORK

JULES DIERCKX

July 2, 1945

Genl. W. J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Sts. N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

No doubt you have heard from Mrs. Whitridge who is sponsoring me for an interview with you.

According to my present plans, I expect to be in Washington July 6th to 11th and will appreciate it if I can see you during that time, preferably on the 6th or 7th.

Will telephone you from Washington for an appointment.

Very truly yours,

MAURICE AUBERTIN

FC

ALBERTO URIBE LONDOÑO & CIA.
BUENOS AIRES, ARG.

SIMON M. AISENBERG
MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY

CHAMBERSBURG ENG. CO.
CHAMBERSBURG, PA.

LYON-RAYMOND CORP.
GREENE, N. Y.

MIDWEST TOOL & ENG. CO.
DAYTON, OHIO

SIEBENMANN ENG. CO.
DAYTON, OHIO

SHULTON, INC., TOOL DIV.
HOBOKEN, N. J.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

25 June 1945

Mrs. W. H. Whitridge
c/o Mrs. Malcolm Johnson
Dogwood Lane
Locust Valley, L. I.

Dear Mrs. Whitridge:

Your letter to General Donovan arrived in his absence from the country. He will not be back on the 29th. However, we expect him within a reasonably short time thereafter and when he does get back your letter will have his attention.

Sincerely,

Robert Thrun
Assistant to the
Executive Officer

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

15 March 1945

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I enclose a letter from Admiral Auphan to you, which was transmitted to us by Commander Cassady of our Paris Office.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Admiral William D. Leahy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander-in-Chief
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 14 March 1945

FROM : W. H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Attached letter from Admiral Auphan to Admiral Leahy

I send herewith the original of the above described letter, (transmitted to us by Commander Cassady via the OSS Paris Office) for such disposition as you may wish to make of it.

Also a translation. My own view is, that even though the Admiral finds French difficult, it would be better (contrary to Horton's view) not to send him the translation. The Admiral might be offended to think that this personal letter had been worked over by a translator, or indeed by anyone else.

W. H. S.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OSS Form 2202

FROM:

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. E-001-307

Date Rec'd SA MAR 13 1945

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Hall	1254	MAR 13 1945	MAR 14 1945	BWH	By HAND Also "By Hand"
2. Chief	1212				
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(40446)

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

APO 887

7 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter for Admiral Leahy

TO : Mr. Whitney Shepardson, Chief, SI,
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

1. Attached is a letter from Admiral Auphan, Secretary of State for Navy in the Vichy Government from April 1941 to November 1942, to Admiral Leahy, which the former handed to Commander Casady with the request that we transmit it to Admiral Leahy in Washington. At Commander Casady's suggestion, we have prepared a translation to accompany the original since we understand that Admiral Leahy does not read French easily. In view of the personal character of the communication, as well as its obvious import, we are naturally not making any use of it whatsoever.

PHILIP ALTON
Chief, Reports Board/FE

Attachment as cited.
2 copies of translation.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

27 February 1943

Admiral,

Since you have been so kind as to ask for news of me from time to time, and to inquire what has happened to me, I am taking advantage of the opportunity offered me to open a discreet correspondence with you in order to express to you my respects, to assure you I have not forgotten you, and to explain to you my feelings at the present time.

How much has happened since I had the honor of my last interview with you at Vichy! - that city as sad for you as for us, for you because of the bereavement which you suffered there, for us because of its memories of the difficult period of the occupation.

You are certainly aware of what I tried to do there in November 1942. If I had been apprised of your African plans, the business might have turned out otherwise. Since I was not, I did my best to end the struggle as soon as possible. It was, to tell the truth, I who sent the mysterious telegram to Admiral Darlan, which, despite an official denial demanded by the Germans, gave him the secret consent of the Marshal to his negotiations with you, to his release of the officers from their oath, and so to the cooperation of the French Army in Africa with the Allies. At the same time I tried to bring about a change of policy in metropolitan France, but M. Laval frustrated me because of his fear of the Germans and I resigned as soon as I saw the futility of my efforts. Unable to secure the escape of the fleet, I confirmed for the last time in writing my order to it to sink itself in case of threat, and then I "made a deep dive" as submarine officers say, to escape the reaction of the Gestapo.

Politically alienated from the Marshal after November 1942, I nevertheless saw him at long intervals, to try to "pry off" M. Laval, France's evil genius, and to change the direction of the Vichy policy. Concerning these attempts, the Marshal received a letter from Hitler in April 1943, bringing up the "intrigues which were being woven at Vichy against the policy of the Head of the Government", and forbidding him to try another "coup of December 13", that is, to dismiss M. Laval. Unable to get rid of Laval as First Minister, the Marshal desired at least that he should not be his successor in case he himself should be prevented from carrying out his duties through death or imprisonment. You know that in November 1943, he wished to promulgate a democratic decree resigning his powers to the National Assembly (and not to M. Laval) in case of his death. The Germans prevented his issuing the decree. For some time, the Marshal considered himself a prisoner, but after another German threat, he was obliged to take up his painful duty once again. The Germans took advantage of his great age and of his weakness to force upon him associates whose appointments he refused to sign but whose presence he had to endure in silence. After this time he no longer attended meetings of the Council of Ministers and signed nothing any more.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

I know that he several times received American emissaries. [illegible] his memories of the faithful friendship which he cherished for you, those memories encouraged him in his attitude. So it was that a short time before the Allied landing in Normandy the United States Military Attache in Switzerland sent him a message of encouragement and asked him merely not to try to arouse public opinion hostile to the Allies at the moment when war was again to break out on French soil. This desire inspired his public proclamations forced upon him at the time of the landing.

You, who know the complexity of French internal politics, know how certain the Gaullist "Resistance" appeared under the occupation, for the pretended excuse of war against the Boches often concealed less disinterested ends. However, contacts established with leaders of metropolitan resistance in 1944 revealed the desire of certain ones among them to come to an understanding with the legal sovereignty held by the Marshal. Honest French men [illegible] felt on the eve of the liberation, the supreme concern [illegible] ing its unity. So it was that the Marshal was led to [illegible] imposed by Hitler and give me in writing on 11 August 1944, extensive powers making an arrangement with General de Gaulle and [illegible] a general reconciliation in the handshake of the two leaders. After this the Marshal had agreed to hand over all his powers [illegible] efface himself completely for the higher interests of the country.

The day after his arrival in Paris, General de Gaulle [illegible] of this offer. It received no answer. At the same time the [illegible] wished to come to Paris in order to avoid being involved in M. Laval's and the Germans' last-minute intrigues, was arrested and taken away into captivity.

This refusal of reunion and reconciliation in full [illegible] the main cause of the great discontent now prevalent in France. You, who have lived in Vichy, know very well that all the people who at close and far at a distance, worked in the administration of occupied France, were not "traitors" had sold themselves to the Germans. This, however, is what we are [illegible] to make the country believe, for their own political ends. All good republicans, all "men of order", who had served the Marshal's government in disciplined resistance (and who were, furthermore, ready to serve General de Gaulle in the same spirit from the moment when he held the reins of power) are being pursued, persecuted, imprisoned, assassinated. All the administrations have lost their chiefs, have been "purged" as the saying goes. Despite the General's fine speeches, an implacable hatred animates the communistic elements of disorder against the [illegible] order, who are accused en masse of being Hitlerites because they are not communists. Now, without the "men of order" France will not be remade and France - the true France, devoted to the things of the spirit, democratic, and christian - will be missing from that concert of the nations who are making ready to organize the world of tomorrow.

Despite the cares of your high duties of the moment, I am certain that your experience in European affairs has already shown you the situation as I represent it to you in a letter the length of which I beg you to excuse. I profoundly admire the way in which your great country has given itself completely to this pi-

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

gantic war, but this elan and the success which has been its reward, impose responsibilities upon your country before the judgment of History. The restoration of order in France, the place which you chose for your landings in 1942 and 1944, is one of those responsibilities. I certainly understand that you do not wish to interfere in our internal affairs, just as you understand the impossibility of a true Frenchman's wishing to involve a foreigner therein, even though that foreigner be an ally. Nevertheless, it is important that you know that French discontent will not be removed until the "men of order", those who served their government loyally (at least through the period prior to November 1942, when you yourself recognized it) shall be allowed to regain their place and their rank in the country.

There will be no true peace in France - and in Europe - so long as the good Frenchmen of the "Resistance", with General de Gaulle at their head, refuse to place their hand in the hand of the good Frenchmen whose merit it was to watch over our patrimony during the occupation, with Marshal Petain at their head. If this general reunion does not take place, if the "men of disorder" continue to ignore the "men of order", the communistic elements in the country will try to drag it into the Slavic sphere of influence, into the heart of the "Soviet United States of Europe." But France is an old country, with a comfortably well-off middle class, which does not desire this solution. Not ten percent of us are communists. The mass of the people is overwhelmed by the moral and physical suffering of the occupation. It is terrorized by the communists who have seized all the reins of power. It will perhaps be so cowardly as not to vote against them, through fear of machine guns. But sooner or later it will recover for the country of Christianity and of Liberty, which refused to accept Nazi materialism will no more accept the communist dictatorship.

- - - - - - -

I beg your pardon, Admiral, for this long letter, poured all at once from my thoughts and typed by myself to avoid any indiscretion. If your present responsibilities still allow you leisure to think of France, you will find in this letter, as food for your reflections, the thoughts of a Frenchman who has no other ambition than that of serving his country. How I regret that the measures taken with respect to me leave me not even the honor and satisfaction of fighting at your side.

I beg you to be entirely discreet concerning this letter and offer you my wishes for a speedy victory, the assurance that I shall never forget you, and my deepest respects.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

27 February 1945

Admiral,

Since you have been so kind as to ask for news of me from time to time, and to inquire what has happened to me, I am taking advantage of the opportunity offered me to open a discreet correspondence with you in order to express to you my respects, to assure you I have not forgotten you, and to explain to you my feelings at the present time.

How much has happened since I had the honor of my last interview with you at Vichy! - that city as sad for you as for us, for you because of the bereavement which you suffered there, for us because of its memories of the difficult period of the occupation.

You are certainly aware of what I tried to do there in November 1942. If I had been apprised of your African plans, the business might have turned out otherwise. Since I was not, I did my best to end the struggle as soon as possible. It was, to tell the truth, I who sent the mysterious telegrams to Admiral Darlan, which, despite an official denial demanded by the Germans, gave him the secret consent of the Marshal to his negotiations with you, to his release of the officers from their oath, and so to the cooperation of the French Army in Africa with the Allies. At the same time I tried to bring about a change of policy in metropolitan France, but M. Laval frustrated me because of his fear of the Germans and I resigned as soon as I saw the futility of my efforts. Unable to secure the escape of the fleet, I confirmed for the last time in writing my order to it to sink itself in case of threat, and then I "made a deep dive" as submarine officers say, to escape the reaction of the Gestapo.

Politically alienated from the Marshal after November 1942, I nevertheless saw him at long intervals, to try to "pry off" M. Laval, France's evil genius, and to change the direction of the Vichy policy. Concerning these attempts, the Marshal received a letter from Hitler in April 1943, bringing up the "intrigues which were being woven at Vichy against the policy of the Head of the Government", and forbidding him to try another "coup of December 13", that is, to dismiss M. Laval. Unable to get rid of Laval as First Minister, the Marshal desired at least that he should not be his successor in case he himself should be prevented from carrying out his duties through death or imprisonment. You know that in November 1943, he wished to promulgate a democratic decree restoring his powers to the National Assembly (and not to M. Laval) in case of his death. The Germans prevented his issuing the decree. For some time, the Marshal considered himself a prisoner, but after another German threat, he was obliged to take up his painful duty once again. The Germans took advantage of his great age and of his weakness to force upon him associates whose appointments he refused to sign but whose presence he had to endure in silence. After this time he no longer attended meetings of the Council of Ministers and signed nothing any more.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

I know that he several times received American emissaries. Together with his memories of the faithful friendship which he cherished for you, these emissaries encouraged him in his attitude. So it was that a short time before the Allied landing in Normandy the United States Military Attache in Switzerland sent him a message of encouragement and asked him merely not to try to arouse public opinion hostile to the Allies at the moment when war was again to break out on French soil. This desire inspired his public proclamations forced from him at the time of the landing.

You, who know the complexity of French internal politics, know how confused the Gaullist "Resistance" appeared under the occupation, for the praiseworthy excuse of war against the Boches often concealed less disinterested ends. However, contacts established with leaders of metropolitan resistance in 1944 had revealed the desire of certain ones among them to come to an understanding with the legal sovereignty held by the Marshal. Honest Frenchmen of either fringe felt on the eve of the liberation, the supreme concern of the country in realising its unity. So it was that the Marshal was led to by-pass the Laval government imposed by Hitler and give me in writing on 11 August 1944, extensive powers for making an arrangement with General de Gaulle and giving the French the example of a general reconciliation in the handshake of the two leaders. After this gesture the Marshal had agreed to hand over all his powers to General de Gaulle and to efface himself completely for the higher interests of the country.

The day after his arrival in Paris, General de Gaulle was faithfully informed of this offer. It received no answer. At the same time the Marshal, who had not wished to come to Paris in order to avoid being involved in M. Laval's and the Germans' last-minute intrigues, was arrested and taken away into captivity.

This refusal of reunion and reconciliation in full legality is, in my opinion, the main cause of the great discontent now prevalent in France. You, who have lived in Vichy, know very well that all the people who at close hand or at a distance, worked in the administration of occupied France, were not "traitors", who had sold themselves to the Germans. This, however, is what some are now trying to make the country believe, for their own political ends. All good Frenchmen, all "men of order", who had served the Marshal's government in disciplined fashion (and who were, furthermore, ready to serve General de Gaulle in the same spirit from the moment when he held the reins of power) are being pursued, persecuted, imprisoned, assassinated. All the administrations have lost their chiefs, have been "purged" as the saying goes. Despite the General's fine speeches, an implacable hatred animates the communistic elements of disorder against the men of order, who are accused en masse of being Hitlerites because they are not communists. Now, without the "men of order" France will not be remade and France - the true France, devoted to the things of the spirit, democratic, and Christian - will be missing from that concert of the nations who are making ready to organise the world of tomorrow.

Despite the cares of your high duties of the moment, I am certain that your experience in European affairs has already shown you the situation as I represent it to you in a letter the length of which I beg you to excuse. I profoundly admire the way in which your great country has given itself completely to this gi-

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

gantic war, but this elan and the success which has been its reward, impose responsibilities upon your country before the judgment of History. The restoration of order in France, the place which you chose for your landings in 1942 and 1944, is one of those responsibilities. I certainly understand that you do not wish to interfere in our internal affairs, just as you understand the impossibility of a true Frenchman's wishing to involve a foreigner therein, even though that foreigner be an ally. Nevertheless, it is important that you know that French discontent will not be removed until the "men of order", those who served their government loyally (at least through the period prior to November 1942, when you yourself recognized it) shall be allowed to regain their place and their rank in the country.

There will be no true peace in France - and in Europe - so long as the good Frenchmen of the "Resistance", with General de Gaulle at their head, refuse to place their hand in the hand of the good Frenchmen whose merit it was to watch over our patrimony during the occupation, with Marshal Petain at their head. If this general reunion does not take place, if the "men of disorder" continue to ignore the "men of order", the communistic elements in the country will try to drag it into the Slavic sphere of influence, into the heart of the "Soviet United States of Europe." But France is an old country, with a comfortably well-off middle class, which does not desire this solution. Not 10 percent of us are communists. The mass of the people is overwhelmed by the moral and physical suffering of the occupation. It is terrorized by the communists who have seized all the reins of power. It will perhaps be so cowardly as not to vote against them, through fear of machine guns. But sooner or later it will recover for the country of Christianity and of Liberty, which refused to accept Nazi materialism will no more accept the communist dictatorship.

- - - - - - -

I beg your pardon, Admiral, for this long letter, poured all at once from my thoughts and typed by myself to avoid any indiscretion. If your present responsibilities still allow you leisure to think of France, you will find in this letter, as food for your reflections, the thoughts of a Frenchman who has no other ambition than that of serving his country. How I regret that the measures taken with respect to me leave me not even the honor and satisfaction of fighting at your side.

I beg you to be entirely discreet concerning this letter and offer you my wishes for a speedy victory, the assurance that I shall never forget you, and my deepest respects.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

16,438

27 February, 1945

Admiral:

Since you have been so kind as to ask for news of me from time to time, and to inquire what has happened to me, I am taking advantage of the opportunity offered me to open a discrete correspondence with you in order to express to you my respects, to assure you I have not forgotten you, and to explain to you my feelings at the present time.

How much has happened since I had the honor of my last interview with you at Vichy! – that city as sad for you as for us, for you because of the bereavement which you suffered there, for us because of its memories of the difficult period of the Occupation.

You are certainly aware of what I tried to do there in November, 1942. If I had been apprised of your African plans, the business might have turned out otherwise. Since I was not, I did my best to end the struggle as soon as possible. It was, to tell the truth, I who sent the mysterious telegrams to Admiral Darlan, which, despite an official denial ~~[illegible]~~ demanded by the Germans, gave him the secret consent of the Marshal to his ~~[illegible]~~ treating a reflection with you, to his releasing the officers from their oath, and so to ~~permitting~~ the cooperation French Army in Africa ~~[illegible]~~ with the Allies. At the same time I tried to bring about a change of policy in metropolitan France, but M. Laval frustrated me ~~[illegible]~~ because of his fear of the Germans and I resigned as soon as I saw the futility of my efforts. ~~[illegible]~~ to ~~[illegible]~~ the fleet, ~~[illegible]~~ I confirmed for

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

the last time ~~my~~ in writing my order to it to [illegible]
threat, and then I "made a deep dive" [illegible]
to escape the reaction of the Gestapo.

Politically alienated from the [illegible]
I nevertheless saw him at long inter[illegible]
M. Laval, Francis evil genius, and to [illegible]
Vichy policy. Concerning these attempts, [illegible]
from Hitler in April 1943, bringing up [illegible]
being woven at Vichy against th[illegible] of
and forbidding him to try a no[illegible] of
dismiss M. Laval. Being [illegible]
Minister, the Marshall desired at [illegible]
successor in case he himself [illegible]
out his duties through death or im[illegible]
in November 1943, he wished to promu[illegible]
restoring his powers to the National Assem[illegible]
in case of his death. The Germans prevented [illegible]
For some time, the Marshal considered himself a[illegible]
another German threat, he was obliged to take up [illegible]
once again. The Germans took advantage of his gr[illegible]
his weakness to force upon him associates whose app[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~ refused to sign but whose presence he had to [illegible]
After this time he no longer attended meetings of the [illegible]
and signed nothing any more.

I know that he several times received American e[illegible]
Together with his memories of the faithful friendship [illegible]
cherished for you, these emissaries encouraged him [illegible]
attitude. So it was that a short time before the Allie[illegible]
Normandy the United States Military Attaché in Sweden [illegible]
him a message of encouragement and asked him mo[illegible]
try to raise public opinion hostile to the Allies at [illegible]
when was was again to break out on French soil, th[illegible]
inspired his public proclamations forced from him a[illegible]
the landing.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

the last time ~~[illegible]~~ in writing my order to it to sink itself in case of threat, and then I "made a dry line" as submarine officers say, to escape the reaction of the Gestapo.

Politically alienated from the Marshal after November, 1942, I nevertheless saw him at long intervals, to try to "pry off" M. Laval, France's evil genius, and to change the direction of the Vichy policy. Concerning these attempts, the Marshal received a letter from Hitler in April, 1943, bringing up the "intrigues which were being woven at Vichy against the policy of the Head of the Government," and forbidding him to try another "coup of December 12," that is, to dismiss M. Laval. Being unable to get rid of ~~[illegible]~~ as First Minister, the Marshal desired at least that he should not be his successor in case he himself should be prevented from carrying out his duties through death or imprisonment. You know that in November, 1943, he wished to promulgate a democratic ~~[illegible]~~ decree restoring his powers to the National Assembly (and not to M. Laval) in case of his death. The Germans prevented his issuing the decree. For some time, the Marshal considered himself a prisoner, but after another German threat, he was obliged to take up his painful duty once again. The Germans took advantage of his great age and of his weakness to force upon him associates whose appointments he ~~[illegible]~~ refused to sign but whose presence he had to endure in silence. After this time he no longer attended meetings of the Council of Ministers and signed nothing any more.

I know that he several times received American emissaries. Together with his memories of the faithful friendship which he cherished for you, these emissaries encouraged him in his attitude. So it was that a short time before the Allied landing in Normandy the United States Military Attaché in Switzerland sent him a message of encouragement and asked him merely not to try to raise public opinion hostile to the Allies at the moment when war was again to break out on French soil. This desire inspired his public proclamations forced from him at the time of the landing.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] who know the complexity of French internal politics, know how confused the Gaullist "Resistance" appeared under the Occupation, for the praiseworthy excess of war against the Boches often conceded less disinterested ends. However, contacts established with leaders of Metropolitan Resistance in 1944 had revealed the desire of certain ones among them to come to an understanding with the legal ~~[illegible]~~ sovereignty held by the Marshal. Honest Frenchmen of either fringe felt, on the eve of the liberation, the supreme ~~advantage~~ concern of the country in realising its unity. So it was that the Marshal was led to by-pass the Laval government imposed by Hitler and give me in writing on 11 August, 1944, extensive powers for making an arrangement with General de Gaulle and giving the French the example of a general reconciliation in the handshake of the two leaders. After this ~~[illegible]~~ gesture the Marshal had agreed to hand over all his powers to General de Gaulle and to efface himself completely for the higher interests of the country.

The day after his arrival in Paris, General de Gaulle was faithfully informed of this offer. It received no answer. At the same time the Marshal, who had not wished to come to Paris in order to avoid being involved in M. Laval's and the Germans' last-minute intrigues, was arrested and taken away into captivity.

This refusal of reunion and reconciliation in full legality is, in my opinion, the main cause of the great discontent now prevalent in France. Yeu, who have lived in Vichy, know very well that all the people who, at close hand or at a distance, worked in the administration of Occupied France, were not "traitors," who had sold themselves to the Germans. This, however, is what some are now trying to make the country believe, for their own political ends. All good Frenchmen, all "men of order," who had served the Marshal's government in disciplined fashion, (and who were, furthermore, ready to serve General de Gaulle in the same spirit from the moment when he held the reins of power) are being pursued, persecuted, imprisoned, assassinated. All the administrations have lost their ~~[illegible]~~ heads — been "purged," as the saying goes. Despite the General's fine speeches,

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

an implacable hate animates the communistic elements of disorder against the men of order, who are accused en masse of being Hitlerites because they are not communists. Now, without the "men of order" France will not be remade, and France, - the true France, devoted to the things of the spirit, democratic, and Christian - will be missing from that consort of the nations who are making ready to organize the world of tomorrow.

Despite the cares of your high duties of the moment, I am certain that your experience in European affairs has already shown you the situation as I represent it to you in a letter the length of which I beg you to excuse. I profoundly admire the way in which your great country has given itself completely to this gigantic war, but this élan and the success which has been its reward, impose responsibilities upon your country before the judgment of History. The restoration of order in France, the place which you chose for your landings in 1942 and 1944, is one of those responsibilities. I certainly understand that you do not wish to interfere in our internal affairs, just as you understand the impossibility of a true Frenchman's wishing to involve a foreigner therein, even though that foreigner be an ally. Nevertheless, it is important that you know that French discontent will not be removed until the "men of order", those who served their government loyally (at least through the period prior to November, 1942, when you yourself recognized it) shall be allowed to regain their place and their rank in the country.

There will be no true place in France - and in Europe - so long as the good Frenchmen of the "Resistance", with General De Gaulle at their head, refuse to place their hand in the hand of the good Frenchmen whose merit it was to watch over our patrimony during the Occupation, with Marshal Pétain at their head. If this general reunion does not take place, if the "men of disorder" continue to ignore the "men of order", the communistic

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

elements in the country will try to drag it into the Slavic sphere of influence, into the heart of the "Soviet United States of Europe." But France is an old country, with a very comfortably well-off middle class, which does not desire this solution. Not 10 per cent of us are communists. The mass of the people is overwhelmed by the moral and physical suffering of the Occupation. It is terrorized by the communists who have seized all the reins of power. It will perhaps be so cowardly as not to vote against them, through fear of machine guns. But sooner or later it will recover, for the country of Christianity and of Liberty, which refused to accept Nazi materialism, will no more accept the communist dictatorship...

- - - - -

I beg your pardon, Admiral, for this long letter, pour it all at once from my thoughts and typed by myself to avoid any indiscretion. If your present responsibilities still allow you leisure to think of France, you will find in this letter, as food for your reflections, the thoughts of a Frenchman who has no other ambition than that of serving his country. Now I regret that the measures taken with respect to me leave me not even the honor and satisfaction of fighting at your side.

I beg you to be entirely discrete concerning this letter and offer you my wishes for a speedy victory, the assurance that I shall never forget you, and my deepest respects.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[redacted]

Date: 6 Feb 1975

To: Col. Quinn

1. For your information.

2. Should this be returned for the Director's files?

P. F. Pugliese
1st Lt, AUS

Office of the Secretariat

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

2-1-45

SUBJECT: Capt Paul Aynarey

TO : ~~(1)~~ Statistical Officer, Headquarters #1 [illegible]

~~(2)~~ Security Office, Att'n Mr. Presoott, Rm 136 South.

~~(3)~~ U.S. Theater Office, Rm

~~(4)~~ OSS director & directors' Branch Personnel Office, Rm

FROM : Personnel Procurement Branch, Rm 106, North Building.

Candidate is not available for transfer into OSS (correspondence attached). We are closing our file.

For the Director:

E. F. Connely

E. F. CONNELY,
Colonel, FA,
Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch.

Action of Board

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OSS FORM 8.. Rev. 74 ..

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ...

PERSONNEL

TO: CHIEF, PERSONNEL ...

16 Jan 45
Date

1. FROM OSS Director & Director's Staff Requisitioning Officer or Desk

2. THRU: CHIEF (or Area Operations Officer) _____ BRANCH, BY _____

3. THRU: PERSONNEL OFFICER _____ BRANCH, BY _____

4. THRU: OSSTO--

5. NAME	6. SERIAL NO.	7. GRADE
Paul Aznarez	0-363505	Captain

8. BRANCH OF SERVICE (Inf., Eng., Ord., Etc.)	9. DATE OF BIRTH (Essential)	10. Physically qualified for:
Air Corps	18 April 1918	☐ Gen'l ☐ Lim.O'seas ☐ Lim. ...

11. OFFICIAL ARMY ADDRESS & ASSIGNMENT -- (Must be accurate and complete-if inductee, give Local Board No., Order No., and Board Address)

555th AAF Base Unit,
5th Ferrying Gp, Dallas, Texas.

12. INTENDED ASSIGNMENT (Full job description essential) ____ Overseas (specify, i.e. ...) ___X___ U.S. ___ SEAC.

Pilot for OSS Director & Director's Staff. Sufficient age to meet requirements for permanent station in Washington, D. C. Rated pilot currently on flying status. Must hold current instrument card.

13. LANGUAGE FACILITY (Indicate degree of proficiency)

None

14. NAME OF INTERVIEWER	15. PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT (SAIs) REQUESTED	16. SECURITY CHECK OBTAINED
Lt. Col. Quinn (Date of Interview _____) per Major Culp	☒ Yes ☐ No	☐ Yes ☒ No

17. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS OF SUBJECT FOR INTENDED ASSIGNMENT: (if not sufficient space ... Memo)

See item 12 above.

18. ADDITION TO ___ ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZED
For the Director Date 19/1/45
Lt. Comdr. USNR
Sig.
ANDREW G. CAREY Chief, PACS--DDpP

19. APPROVED, OSS MILITARY PERSONNEL BOARD. (Required, if Officer)

_____ Sig. _____ Date

20. SECURITY OFFICER RECOMMENDATION

21. CONCURRENCE IN RELEASE GRANTED BY

22. OSS Form 801 CONTROL NO.

DD-F No. 1017 2.PPB (copy)

Note--Branch Signs Original only.

(66296)

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Jeeps	8
Trucks	43
Weapons carrier	1
Motorscooters	2
Tractor	2
Trailer	2
Total	66

Detachment "F"

Staff cars	4
Jeeps	5
Trucks	25
Busses	3
Ambulance	1
Total	38

New York

Staff cars	1
Truck	1
Total	2

California

Staff cars	2
Jeeps	3
Trucks	6
Total	11

Jeeps	17
Trucks	1
	9
Total	27

Detachment "C"

Staff cars	3
Jeeps	10
Trucks	27
Busses	2
Ambulance	1
Total	43

Bethesda

Jeeps	2
Trucks	4
Total	6

Florida

Staff cars	1
Jeeps	4
Trucks	3
Weapons carrier	1
Total	9

SUMMARY

Staff cars	35
Jeeps	33
Trucks, all descriptions	118
Weapons carriers	2
Motor scooters	2
Busses	5
Ambulances	2
Tractors	1
Trailors	1
Total Military Vehicles	199

CIVILIAN CARS, GOVERNMENT LICENSE AT:

Washington, D.C.

Motorcycles	3
Passenger cars	32
Trucks	7
Total	42

New York

Passenger cars	4

San Francisco

Passenger cars	4

Hollywood

Passenger cars	1

UNDERCOVER CARS, D.C. AREA

Total	20

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Automobiles 13,561

x Congress

x Cost

29 April 1944

The Honorable Harry F. Byrd,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator Byrd:

I understand from our Services Branch that you have made a telephone inquiry concerning the operational cost of motor vehicles operated by the Office of Strategic Services during the fiscal year of 1943.

There is attached a tabulation which I hope will give to you the information required.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton,
acting Director.

Bens:plc

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

COST OF ALL MOTOR VEHICLES OPERATED
BY O.S.S. DURING FISCAL YEAR OF 1943

	Gals. of GASOLINE	MILEAGE	Total Cost of OPERATION for Fiscal Year 1943
MOTORCYCLES: 2 EACH	425	13064	$ 75.18
TRUCKS: 2 EACH	1460	13744	305.68
PASSENGER CARS: 26 EACH	23095	270602	8905.50
Total	24980	300410	$ 9286.50

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

23 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT,
JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Vehicle Abuse, Office of Strategic Services

Since my return, I have made a complete inquiry into the subject matter of a memorandum sent to you under date of 10 February 1944. Each item contained in the memorandum has been carefully investigated with respect to cause, and corrective action has been taken.

Wrecked Vehicles. With one exception, the vehicles referred to were damaged while on convoy duty on icy highways during a period of exceptionally bad weather. The exception was an accident involving one of our ambulances struck by a street car in Washington.

The location, conditions and type of service involved in the operation and maintenance of vehicles is a problem to which we have given much attention because certain locations of necessity are remote and many of the roads are rough in character. I do not state this as an excuse but only as a fact in presenting the diffi-

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

culty of the problem. With respect to the damage to vehicles because of accidents, disciplinary as well as remedial action is being taken. All holders of military operators' permits are in the process of re-examination by the Examining Board of this Agency, and those who cannot measure up to the standard are being replaced.

Dirty Vehicles. The dirty vehicles were those that had come in from areas outside the District of Columbia over muddy roads. One of them was towed from our Motor Pool to the Ft. Myer garage through slush and snow. In order to remedy the conditions complained of, we have obtained supervisory personnel who will be alive to the unusual character of our transportation problems. Maintenance shops are being set up in our outlying areas for the operation, proper repair and maintenance of vehicles in those areas, as well as for those vehicles at the termination of runs from our office in Washington.

I have also directed that all vehicles in continental United States be placed in a single pool under the control of the Chief of our Services Branch.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the Secretariat,
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He will be responsible for their administration, operation and maintenance.

As a result of these measures, I believe that we shall remove the conditions which justified your criticism.

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OSS Form 4151

Date 25 Mar 41

To: General Donovan

Col. Strong has read this letter. He thinks it good, but believes the single most important constructive element has not been stated: By the order which you signed last week, all vehicles in or around Washington have been pooled under a single officer charged with motor pool administration, maintenance and repair. Col. Strong thinks inclusion of a paragraph to this effect is desirable.

Office of the Executive Officer RT

(30449)

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT,
JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Vehicle Abuse, Office of Strategic Services

Since my return, I have made a complete inquiry into the subject matter of a memorandum sent to you under date of 10 February 1944. Each item contained in the memorandum has been carefully investigated with respect to cause, and corrective action has been taken.

Wrecked Vehicles. With one exception, the vehicles referred to were damaged while on convoy duty on icy highways during a period of exceptionally bad weather. The exception was an accident involving one of our ambulances struck by a street car in Washington.

The location, conditions and type of service involved in the operation and maintenance of vehicles is a problem to which we have given much attention because certain locations of necessity are remote and many of the roads are rough in character. I do not state this as an

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

excuse but only as a fact in presenting the difficulty of the problem. With respect to the damage to vehicles because of accidents, disciplinary as well as remedial action is being taken. All holders of military operators permits are in the process of re-examination by the Examining Board of this Agency, and those who cannot measure up to the standard are being replaced.

Dirty Vehicles. The dirty vehicles were those that had come in from areas outside the District of Columbia over muddy roads. One of them was towed from the motor pool to the Ft. Myer garage through city streets. In order to remedy the conditions complained of, we have obtained supervisory personnel who will be alive to the unusual character of our transportation problem: maintenance shops are being set up in our outlying areas for the operation, minor repair and maintenance of vehicles in those areas, and relief for those vehicles at the termination of runs from our office in Washington.

~~As a result of these measures, I believe that~~

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

we would remove the conditions which [illegible] criticism.

William J. Donovan
Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Automobiles, 13,567

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

23 March 1944

TO: The Director, OSS

SUBJECT: Memo 10 February 1944 from JCS

1. Attached hereto is a draft of a proposed reply to the above memo. This was prepared as the result of your suggestions to Col. Strong and me.

2. Col. Strong and I both feel that the Deputy Chief of Staff should not be concerned beyond the statement from you that you have taken the necessary corrective or disciplinary action.

3. As to our position with respect to the Military District of Washington, I hope you can take time to read Major Ball's memo of 22 March 1944 to Lt. Col. Doering.

C. M. Sears, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, Services

cc: Col. Strong

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary,
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Vehicle Abuse

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 12 February 1944 to the Director of Strategic Services, enclosing a memorandum dated 10 February 1944, from the Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. Each item referred to in the basic memorandum has been thoroughly investigated and additional corrective action taken.

2. This organization operates approximately two hundred military vehicles in Continental U. S. About seventy-five per cent of the total is assigned to widely scattered confidential training areas which, of necessity, have been located in remote regions. Road conditions in the winter months are extremely bad. It has been most difficult to establish adequate garage and parking areas.

3. Since November 1943, special action has been taken to provide additional maintenance personnel and facilities at these installations.

4. With respect to the 6 vehicles classified in the report as wrecked, 4 were damaged due to road accidents while on necessary hazardous convoy or similar duty over bad, icy roads in stormy weather. They represent 4 accidents out of a considerable number of vehicles out on convoy and similar duty involving many passenger and ton miles.

The wrecked ambulance was caused by a collision with a streetcar, probably due partly to bad judgment on the part of its young operator; but adjudged primarily as the fault of the streetcar operator.

The minor carryall wreck reported involved one of the camps which has been receiving special attention from this Headquarters.

5. Necessary disciplinary action has been taken wherever required.

William J. Donovan
Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Automobiles, 13, 761
x Plans
War Dept.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 23 March 1944

FROM: Lt. Colonel Doering

SUBJECT: Military District of Washington - Complaint re Motor Vehicles.

1. The attached two memoranda were written by Major Ball, in connection with the growing number of difficulties we have been having with the Military District of Washington in regard to the use and care of motor vehicles and related matters.

2. The first memorandum outlines the type of difficulties and indicates Major Ball's belief that there is a regular campaign by the Military District in this connection. The second memorandum is an interesting and rather convincing argument why the Military District has no jurisdiction over OSS.

3. Major Ball advises me that Colonel Strong has designated Captain Trewatrola, of Services, to investigate the handling of vehicles at each area and to report to Colonel Strong. I asked Major Ball to be sure that Colonel Strong sends you copies of these reports. It seems to me that we are heading for more difficulty with the Military District and that a thorough and comprehensive report should be made.

O. [illegible]

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 March 1944

Memorandum for: Colonel O. C. Doering, Jr.

Recently there has been evidence of a campaign by the Military District of Washington to harass operation and administration of the Office of Strategic Services.

There have been several flagrant instances concerning the employment by this Agency of Government vehicles. In each case alleged violations of Army Regulations are called to the attention of OSS by a delinquency report sent to this Agency "By Command of" Major General Lewis, Commanding General of the Military District of Washington.

One recent case involved two of our civilian employees in an OSS civilian truck being stopped and investigated (including interrogation as to the nature of their business) by Military Police of the Military District of Washington. A delinquency report was forwarded to the Commanding Officer, Headquarters Detachment, by Command of Major General Lewis.

There has also recently been received by the Commanding Officer, Headquarters Detachment, a report calling his attention to present regulations prohibiting the use of government transportation by civilian employees unless accompanied by an officer. This is an Army Regulation concerning War Department motor pools and has no application to O.S.S. We were specifically called to task for transporting two civilian typists in a civilian OSS vehicle. This communication concluded with the sentence "If improvement is not made, it will be necessary for this headquarters to take positive and direct action in future cases".

Our position is that the Commanding General, Military District of Washington, through his Provost Marshal has an absolute right and duty to send to this Agency reports of delinquency on the part of our military personnel. The authority and duty of MDW stops at that point and what, if any, action is to be taken upon investigation of the reported delinquency is up to the Director of Strategic Services. We are an exempted station and beyond the command of the Commanding General of the Military District of Washington.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

The attached facts and arguments have been prepared in this office and are forwarded for whatever worth and use they may have.

For the Chief - Services:

Frank L. Ball, Jr.
FRANK L. BALL, JR.
Major, A.U.S.
Executive Officer.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM: Concerning assumption of jurisdiction over OSS by the Military District of Washington.

The Office of Strategic Services was established by Military Order of the President of the United States on 13 June, 1942.

By the same order, OSS was placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff, a committee without statutory status, appointed by the Commander in Chief as an advisory staff and composed of the Chief of Staff to the President, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commander of the United States Fleet and the Commanding General of the U. S. Army Air Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not have any Service identity as such, but as a committee, represent all the United States Services. In the case of OSS, they constitute the supervisory committee through which, by order of the President, OSS answers to the Commander in Chief.

The Director of Strategic Services was, at the time of his appointment by the President, a civilian without Army or Navy identification. Since his appointment he has been called to active duty as a general officer, but remains a direct appointee of the President of the United States. As such he can be replaced only by the Commander in Chief. The authority to appoint the Director of Strategic Services has never been delegated by the President, the Director of Strategic Services being responsible to him through the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

OSS is an agency to which Army and Navy personnel have been assigned for duty by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The Service personnel retain their Service identity and administrative records are maintained by the War and Navy Departments. However, for purposes of duty, Service personnel on duty in OSS are governed only by the spirit of directives of the War and Navy Departments. When these directives do not interfere with the special duties assigned to the Director of Strategic Services, they are complied with by OSS Service personnel of the respective services.

It is obvious that the Secretary of War can exercise no authority over Navy or civilian personnel of OSS; the Secretary of Navy can exercise no authority over the Army and civilian personnel of OSS, and the Civil Service Commission can exercise no control over the Service personnel in OSS. The only properly

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

constituted authority to exercise control over the entire Agency is the President of the United States, and, by delegation by the Commander-in Chief, the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.

The secret directive to OSS by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the special secret missions assigned to the Director of Strategic Services by the President and Commander in Chief, require special activities not contemplated by either Army or Navy regulations. The unusual character of the training, equipping, administration and of the actual personnel in many cases are distinctly apart from any activities carried on by the War or Navy Departments. These activities are intended to be separate from the Army and Navy, the intention being reflected by the activation of the Office of Strategic Services by the Commander in Chief. The number of personnel to be furnished from each Service and the equipment to be furnished by each Service is directed by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. Congress has enacted separate OSS appropriation legislation distinct and apart from Army and Navy appropriations and in the same manner as the appropriations for other executive agencies.

In War Department Circular No. 5, issued 4 January 1944, the Chief of Staff of the Army, by order of the Secretary of War, grouped former War Department overhead personnel into five groups. OSS was placed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff group, with the Munitions Assignment Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat and others of mixed identity. This is the only group not definitely placed under the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff or the War Department. The issuance of this Circular is interpreted to be in support of the contentions in this memorandum.

The OSS Catalogue of Requirements for supplies and equipment is prepared separate and apart from the Catalogues of the Army and Navy, although many items included are also Army and Navy items. When approved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff, it constitutes a directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Army and Navy to furnish the Army and Navy items included in the OSS Catalogue. There is no discretion on the part of the furnishing Services after approval by J.C.S., except the variations of internal Army and Navy priorities.

Once the item is delivered to the Office of Strategic Services, title is at that time vested in OSS and the expenditure and use of the item is controlled by the OSS appropriation language, the directives of the President and pertinent Federal Statutes, rather than Army and Navy regulations governing the expenditure of Army and Navy equipment or supplies. The Office of Strategic Services has been charged for the items so furnished, the amount having been charged against the OSS appropriation. Within the past few weeks, the Army has agreed to forego reimburse-

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

ment for the items furnished OSS in compliance with an OSS Catalogued requisition. The agreement to forego reimbursement in no way affects the transfer of title at the time of delivery, and War Department responsibility for accounting for the property so delivered ceases upon delivery to the Office of Strategic Services.

Within a Theater of Operations, the Installations and operations of the Office of Strategic Services come directly under the Theater of Operations Commander. As an activity of the Theater Commander, the Strategic Service operations are employed in the execution of the strategic or tactical plan for the particular theater in which we are operating. However, though under the direction of the Theater Commander, the Office of Strategic Services, even in the field, does not become an agency of the War or Navy Departments. On the contrary, OSS Detachments execute special operations or programs not accomplished by the War or Navy Departments or the Army or Navy. It is often necessary to disregard completely all Army or Navy regulations to accomplish a given special task, even though the OSS personnel utilized in the accomplishment are Army Officers and enlisted men who have been transferred to OSS. In a Theater of Operations it is often necessary to use Army, Navy and civilian personnel on the same project, side by side, as individuals or members of small units.

Supplies and equipment for OSS installations and operations within a Theater of Operations are furnished by OSS, directly from Washington, or are obtained from Army or Navy supply sources in the Theater on requisition by OSS for equipment and supplies included within the OSS Catalogue. Responsibility for the property furnished by the Army or Navy is terminated when it is delivered to OSS, and OSS may dispose of the property without regard to Army and Navy regulations, restricted only by the Directives of the President of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the language of the Appropriation Act for OSS. The disposition is always made under the direction of the Theater Commander.

The Office of Strategic Services is bound only by the language of the Appropriation Act in its expenditure of funds appropriated for OSS directly by Congress. Army and Navy regulations and most civilian regulations and Acts of Congress concerning expenditure of Government funds, by the language of the OSS Appropriation Act, have no application. Such funds are accounted for solely upon the certificate of the Director of Strategic Services and are not subject to inspection by the War and Navy Departments.

In the matter of Service personnel for the Office of Strategic Services, the numbers and grades and ratings are directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a practical matter,

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

the Army and Navy are consulted before allotments of personnel from the respective Services are made, but once allotted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting under authority delegated by the Commander in Chief, the Army and Navy exercise no discretion in the number of personnel so furnished.

The title to Government vehicles furnished by the Army or Navy to the Office of Strategic Services is vested in OSS upon delivery. They cease to be Army or Navy vehicles as such and become OSS vehicles, for which the Army and Navy are no longer responsible. The complete responsibility for the operation, maintenance and deployment of such vehicles is upon the Director of Strategic Services. The vehicles could be painted another color and put to any use which, in the discretion of the Director of Strategic Services, is necessary in the execution of the program of this agency. The only proper authority to determine what constitutes proper use of OSS vehicles is the Commander in Chief, the Congress and the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

The special appropriation language contained in the Act of Congress by which OSS funds were appropriated clearly reflects the intent of Congress that OSS should have freedom and flexibility not enacted for any other agency.

Command functions cannot be assumed over OSS by the War or Navy Departments or by the Army or Navy within the Continental U.S. Overseas, within a Theater of Operations, by directive of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, OSS operations are under the direction of the Theater Commander, whether the Theater Commander be an Officer of the Army or Navy or of an Allied Foreign Power.

Because of the fact that Army and Navy personnel on duty with OSS continue, in most cases, to wear the uniform of the Service from which they are transferred, the Director of Strategic Services has directed that they be administered as nearly in accordance with the regulations of their respective Services as is practicable. It is often necessary for OSS to have on duty in Army uniform officers and men who have never had basic training and who have recently entered the United States. In such cases the importance of the individual to the accomplishment of the program of OSS is not affected by his failure to understand and appreciate the regulations or the customs of the Service to which he has been assigned. Indeed, in many cases, subsequent reflection of American Military or Naval mannerisms might cause the failure of an important strategic or tactical operation, the success of which an Army Commander may be relying upon for his next large scale operation.

When, why and what we are directed to do cannot be disclosed to personnel not required or authorized to have such information in connection with the project or program. We cannot open our secret training areas for inspection by the Military

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

District of Washington and we cannot explain the unusual use of some vehicles to every officer in the Military District of Washington. We do not attempt, nor could we ever approach compliance with the rules of the War Department motor pool in the use of our vehicles. Much of our activity within Continental U. S. is actual tactical training of special units, which, upon completion of their training are despatched directly to the front over which they will operate.

Likewise, how OSS is to accomplish its program is and must be in the discretion of the Director of Strategic Services. Anything else would make him responsible for the success of the Agency without the authority to direct its accomplishment.

AG 400 is a directive to all War Department Activities, the Air Forces, Army Commanders and Service Commands, setting forth an agreement between OSS and the War Department as to the manner in which Army items are to be furnished OSS. It is noteworthy that, though the directive was issued by order of the Secretary of War, the Adjutant General did not include OSS among the addresses of the directive, indicating again that the War Department claims no authority over OSS.

Also by agreement and included in the provisions of AG 400, the Army undertook responsibility for repairs on OSS vehicles. Service Commands have been ordered to accomplish necessary repairs to Standard equipment assigned to the Office of Strategic Services by order of the Secretary of War. (Par. 5c (4) AG 400)

On 8 November 1943, Headquarters Military District of Washington issued a directive to the Office of Strategic Services directing that OSS immediately effect a reduction of the number of vehicles for administrative use by 20%. The directive required that a report, listing the number of vehicles turned in in compliance with its terms, be made to Headquarters, Military District of Washington, by 13 November 1943. This directive was signed by H. B. Rumsey, Major, AGD, Adjutant General, by command of Major General Lewis.

OSS immediately took up the question of assignment of OSS vehicles with the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 of the War Department, suggesting that the OSS requirements were fixed in the OSS Catalogue by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff and could not be reduced by a Service Command, in this case the Military District of Washington.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department agreed with the suggestion of OSS and issued a secret memorandum to the Commanding General, Military District of Washington, stating that the Catalogue of OSS Requirements had been approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and that the motor vehicles set forth in the

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

revised Catalogue and "will be supplied" in accordance with the provisions of AG 400. This memorandum was issued by order of the Secretary of War.

It is obvious from the directive of AC of S, G-4 that the War Department does not contemplate any refusal of the Commanding Generals of Service Commands to comply with the provisions of the Directive of the Secretary of War included in AG 400. They have been directed to perform repairs, not to question the use of vehicles by the Office of Strategic Services.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

6 March 1944

Brigadier General O. L. Nelson
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
Room 3E940, Pentagon Building
Washington 25, D. C.

THRU: The Secretary
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

My dear General Nelson:

Upon my return, I find your letter of 10 February 1944 relating to the subject of the [illegible] activities of this organization.

[illegible] report was prepared for my signature. I have delayed sending it, however, until I can inquire personally into the matter. You ought to hear from me within the next two or three days.

Sincerely

William J. Donovan
Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

DSS FORM 40013



Date 2 March 1944

To: General Donovan

Re: Vehicle Abuse

CONFIDENTIAL

The attached has been re-written by Colonel Sears' office in order to meet your objections to the prior memorandum.

C. A. Bane

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Secretary

[illegible] -4

[illegible]

[illegible] herewith re-written [illegible] in answer to [illegible] chief of Staff, subject: "Vehicle Abuse", which [illegible] re-written in compliance [illegible] telephone conversation.

[illegible], Jr.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, SERVICES

2620A1

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Automobiles 13,561

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES **CONFIDENTIAL**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 March 1944

Draft - Not Sent

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary,
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Vehicle Abuse

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 12 February 1944 to the Director of Strategic Services, enclosing a memorandum dated 10 February 1944, from the Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. Each item contained in the memorandum of the Deputy Chief of Staff has been thoroughly investigated with respect to cause and corrective action taken.

2. With one exception, the wrecked vehicles were damaged while on convoy duty on icy highways during a period of extreme bad weather. The exception was an accident involving one of our ambulances struck by a streetcar in Washington.

3. The items concerning dirty vehicles, contained in the memorandum of the Deputy Chief of Staff, applied to vehicles which had come into Washington from our areas located outside of the District of Columbia. They travelled over mud roads and were splattered with dirt and mud in transit. One of these vehicles was towed from our Motor Pool to the Ft. Myer garage through slush and snow and was apparently in a very dirty condition at the time it reached the Ft. Myer garage.

4. We have been deeply concerned about the administration, operation and maintenance of the motor vehicles under our jurisdiction. The location, conditions and type of service involved in their operation and maintenance, are unusual. Locations, of necessity, are remote and the terrain and roads are rough in character.

5. With respect to the damage of vehicles because of accidents, disciplinary as well as remedial action is being taken. All holders of military operators permits are being re-examined by an Examining Board of this agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Competent supervisory personnel who understand the unusualness of our transportation problem are in charge and motor vehicle operation and maintenance will improve accordingly. Justifiable future criticism is expected to be obviated.

William J. Donovan,
Director.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Draft Not Sent.

Automatic 131561
Abuse

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary,
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Vehicle Abuse

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 12 February 1944 to the Director of Strategic Services, enclosing a memorandum dated 10 February 1944, from the Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. Careful consideration has been given to the data presented in the Memorandum of the Deputy Chief of Staff and each item has been thoroughly investigated.

2. Vehicles assigned to this Office are required to be used in a manner not usual to vehicles employed in the Military District of Washington. Their main purpose is the transportation of men and materials between Washington and outlying training centers and among such training centers. These centers lie in remote and isolated areas, for the most part, and the roads and terrain are undeveloped and rough in character. The deleterious effect on vehicles regularly employed in such transportation is apparent.

3. In addition, during part of the period cited by the Deputy Chief of Staff as one in which a number of vehicles were wrecked, weather conditions were particularly bad in Washington and outlying districts. Of the cases cited, every vehicle except one was damaged while on convoy duty in stormy weather and on icy or slippery roads.

4. Attempts are being made, however, to establish adequate maintenance shops in the outlying areas. When such shops are in operation, proper repair and maintenance for those vehicles utilized among outlying areas will be possible, as well as for vehicles at the termination of runs from OSS, Washington. At that time it is expected that any lack of first and second echelon maintenance existing in the past will have been corrected.

William J. Donovan,
Director.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

19 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretariat,
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Memorandum 10 February 1944
from Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. Careful consideration has been given to the criticisms made in the basic memorandum. Each item has been thoroughly investigated. The Office of Strategic Services is and has been deeply concerned about the administration, operation and maintenance of the motor vehicles under its jurisdiction.

2. Of special concern is the location, conditions and type of service involved in their operation and maintenance. Locations have of necessity been remote and the terrain and roads, rough in character. Facilities at camps have been lacking and those which are available are crude and not suitable for good winter operation and maintenance.

3. Difficulty has been encountered in building up a competent supervisory organization and establishing adequate training in pools and outlying detachments.

4. The organization is being perfected. Competent supervisory personnel who understand this problem are in charge, and motor vehicle operation and maintenance are improving accordingly. Justifiable future criticism is expected to be obviated.

5. With respect to the vehicles damaged because of accidents, all except the ambulance were involved while on convoy duty in stormy weather, and on icy or slippery roads under adverse conditions. There is some question as to who was at fault in the ambulance accident. All are being investigated and proper disciplinary as well as remedial action will be taken.

For the Director:

CONFIDENTIAL

O. G. Doering, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Carter Files 13,561
x Abuse
x Washington

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Vehicle Abuse.

1. Enclosed herewith for your information and necessary action is a memorandum, WDCSA 451 (10 Feb 44), from the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 10 February 1944, reference above subject.

2. It is requested that you submit to this office a report of the action taken by you in regard to the abuses set forth in the enclosure.

F. B. Royal

F. B. ROYAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

12 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Vehicle Abuse.

1. Enclosed herewith for your information and necessary action is a memorandum, WDCSA 451 (10 Feb 44), from the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 10 February 1944, reference above subject.

2. It is requested that you submit to this office a report of the action taken by you in regard to the abuses set forth in the enclosure.

F. B. ROYAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WDCSA 451 (10 Feb 44) 10 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT, U. S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Vehicle Abuse, Office of Strategic Services.

The following data indicate an apparent lack of preventive maintenance and the abuse of vehicles which are assigned to detachments of the Office of Strategic Services:

Although organizations are responsible for their own first and second echelon maintenance, the O.S.S. turned in to the repair shops of the Military District of Washington, during a one-week period, five of their vehicles which indicated a lack of organization maintenance as follows:

U. S. Reg. No.	Type	Abuse and Lack of Maintenance
W2037277	¼-ton Truck	Handling; dirty; daily maintenance chart not up to date; exhaust system in need of repair; starter loose; wheel bearings in need of adjustment.
W256009	⅓-ton Weapons Carrier	Handling; lack of lubrication; daily maintenance chart not up to date; speedometer cable, foot brake, and steering required adjustment; battery carrier loose; oil filter dirty. clutch pedal free play in need of adjustment.
W330430	1½-ton Cargo	Dirty.
W3153284	1½-ton Cargo	Dirty.
W20112224	¼-ton Truck	Dirty.

The number of wrecked vehicles turned in to the Military District of Washington repair shops by the Office of Strategic Services during the past several weeks, with the estimated cost of repairs, are as follows:

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

18 December 1943	W601633	2½-ton Cargo	Wrecked front and side	$575.00
24 December 1943	W352222	1½-ton Cargo	Wrecked left front and side	539.35
13 January 1944	W711131	3/4-ton Ambulance	Wrecked beyond repair	969.88
15 January 1944	W2054631	¼-ton Carryall	Wrecked left rear fender and wheel	58.74
20 January 1944	W3282870	1½-ton CS&P	Wrecked front and side	114.15
20 January 1944	W3282889	1½-ton CS&P	Wrecked front end	114.35
				$2,371.97

The Deputy Chief of Staff desires that the Secretariat, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff forward these data to the Office of Strategic Services for their information and necessary action, and for report of action taken to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:

O. L. NELSON,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff.

CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

WDGDS
AMcI
72488

WDGDS 8725

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON:
(Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4).

Through: Commanding General, Army Service Forces.

Subject: Motor Vehicle Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

1. The Catalogue of Estimated Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services, Calendar Years 1944-1945 (revision of 1 December 1943), as amended by this Division, has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Approved copies of these requirements are being furnished the various interested agencies of the War Department.

2. The allowances of motor vehicles sent forth in the revised Catalogue represent approved requirements and will be supplied in accordance with the procedure outlined in War Department letter, file AG 400 (30 June 1943) OB-S-D-M, subject: Supplies and Equipment for the Office of Strategic Services, dated 6 July 1943.

By Order of the Secretary of War:

R. L. MAXWELL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

mhn

M. K. BARROLL, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief, Program Branch.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CONFIDENTIAL

ocpy

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Washington 25, DC

SPWSC 400.8 (8 Nov 43)
X 451

8 November 1943

SUBJECT: Reduction in the Allowance of Administrative Transportation to Conserve Rubber.

THRU:

TO: Commanding Officer,
Headquarters Detachment,
Strategic Services Training Unit
Room 2039, Temporary "Q" Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

1. Letter, Adjutant General's Office, file SPX 451 (26 Oct 43) OB-S-SPDDA-M, dated 26 October 1943, states that due to the critical shortage of tires the Army will only receive approximately fifty percent (50%) of its anticipated requirements. Accordingly, drastic action is necessary to reduce the use of tires to meet this situation by a reduction in the number of vehicles used and the number of miles travelled.

2. Effective immediately a reduction of twenty percent (20%) will be made in the number of vehicles assigned for administrative use.

3. This reduction will apply to gasoline driven vehicles only and will not apply to bicycles, trailers, etc.

4. The type and capacity of vehicles withdrawn, in compliance with this directive, will be optional with the commanding officer of the organization holding accountability.

5. Reports will be submitted to reach this headquarters by 13 November 1943 listing the vehicles to be turned in thru subject reduction, with a request for disposition.

By command of Major General LEWIS:

(signed)
H. B. RUMSEY,
Major, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CIRCULAR No. 5

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 4 January 1944.

WAR DEPARTMENT OVERHEAD—REASSIGNMENT.—1. Pending revision of AR 345–5, 15 April 1942 (par. 10*e*), the following five groups are established to replace War Department overhead:

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff Group, which will include all Army personnel working on full time duty with boards or committees which report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Secretary of War Group, which will include all Army personnel on duty in the Office of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries of War, and such other activities as may be placed in the Office of the Secretary of War.

c. Chief of Staff Group, which will include all Army Personnel on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff, and the War Department General and Special Staffs, and such other activities as may be placed in the Office of the Chief of Staff.

d. Miscellaneous War Department Activities Group, which will include all Army personnel on duty with War Department Boards, Military Missions, the Navy Department, the Office of the Military Aide to the President, Office of the General of the Armies, and other miscellaneous activities under War Department control but not assigned to other agencies.

e. Miscellaneous Civilian Activities Group, which will include all Army personnel on duty with civilian agencies not under War Department control but which have military personnel assigned to them.

2. A detailed listing of the present composition of the five groups follows:

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff Group.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat.
(2) Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
(3) Munitions Assignment Board.
(4) Joint Production Survey Committee.
(5) Army-Navy Petroleum Board.
(6) Joint Security Control.
(7) Joint Communications Board.
(8) Inter American Defense Board.
(9) Army Navy Staff College.
(10) Joint Communications Coordination Committee.
(11) Office of Strategic Services.

b. Secretary of War Group.

(1) Office, Secretary of War.
(2) Secretary of War's Personnel Board.
(3) Bureau of Public Relations.
(4) Office, Under Secretary of War.
(5) Office, Assistant Secretary of War.
(6) Office, Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

c. Chief of Staff Group.

(1) Office, Chief of Staff.
(2) Assistant Chief of Staff, G 1.
(3) Assistant Chief of Staff G 2.
(4) Military Intelligence Service.
(5) Assistant Chief of Staff G 3.
(6) Assistant Chief of Staff, G 4.
(7) Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations.

566301°—44—A(W) 3a

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

(8) Legislative and Liaison Division.
(9) Civil Affairs Division.
(10) Budget Division.
(11) Special Planning Division.
(12) War Department Manpower Board.
(13) New Developments Division.
(14) Office, The Inspector General.

d *Miscellaneous War Department Activities Group.*
(1) Army Industrial College.
(2) Office, Military Aide to the President.
(3) Office, the General of the Armies
(4) Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission.
(5) Army Retiring Board.
(6) Inter Allied Personnel Board.
(7) War Department Decorations Board.
(8) United States Typhus Commission
(9) United States Soldiers Home
(10) Battle Monuments Commission.
(11) Special Mission to Iran.
(12) Special Mission to U. S. S. R.
(13) Historical Section, Army War College
(14) Navy Department.
(15) Army Group.

e *Miscellaneous Civilian Activities Group.*
(1) Selective Service System.
(2) Office, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
(3) Office of Civilian Defense.
(4) Office of Censorship
(5) Petroleum Administration for War
(6) War Production Board
(7) Office War Relocation Authority
(8) Office of War Information
(9) Office of Engineer Commissioner
(10) Bureau of the Budget
(11) Federal Security Agency.
(12) Department of Labor
(13) Office for Emergency Management
(14) Combined Production Resources Board.
(15) Division of Cultural Relations China, State Department.
(16) War Manpower Commission
(17) Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program.
(18) United States Maritime Commission.
(19) Office of Scientific Research and Development.
(20) Office of Lend Lease Administration
(21) Special Committee on Communications.

[A G 0 0 0 (27 Dec 43)]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

AGO 88

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1944

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

January 25th, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO MR. GORDON AUCHINCLOSS

SUBJECT: ORDERS

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to New Delhi, India, where you will report to the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, Southeast Asia Command, to act under the instructions of the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, Southeast Asia Command.

[redacted]
Acting Director

APPROVED:

Morton Bodfish
Deputy Chief, MO

APPROVED:

J. M. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

Lt. (jg) George Demas
Acting FE Theatre Officer

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET

15 October 1945

MEMORANDUM TO MR. GORDON AUCHINCLOSS, 2nd

Subject: Orders

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to London, England, where you will report to Colonel David K. E. Bruce, AC, Strategic Services Officer, European Theater of Operations. You are, thereafter, to act under Colonel Bruce's instructions.

William J Donovan
Director

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Doctor Rogers

I just had word from General Deane that Mr. Hugh Cox, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, has been designated as the representative from the Department of Justice.

General Deane suggests that the inadvertence can be corrected simply by putting him on the Advisory Committee.

W.J.D.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee 9740 E
x Planning Grp.
x Justice Dept.

PC not returned

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1943.

SECRET

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have your letter of February 13 informing me that Mr. L. M. C. Smith was proposed as a member of the O.S.S. Planning Group from the Department of Justice.

On February 8 I wrote the Attorney General requesting that Mr. Smith be designated as his representative on the Planning Group of the O.S.S. On February 11 the Attorney General replied designating Mr. Hugh Cox, Special Assistant to the Attorney General.

Regardless of whether their man is to be Mr. Smith or Mr. Cox, I feel that you can make the necessary assignment of duties either to the Planning Group or the Advisory Committee without any further reference to the Attorney General's Office. If this is not possible, please let me know and I shall take further action.

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee 9740 P.
" Planning Group
" Justice Dept.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1943.

Col. Wm. J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
25th and "E", N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

With reference to my letter addressed to you on February 8, concerning the appointment on your Planning Group of a representative from the Department of Justice, I have received this date a letter from the Attorney General stating that he has designated Mr. Hugh Cox, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, as the representative from the Department of Justice on the Planning Group of the Office of Strategic Services.

Sincerely yours,

John R. Deane

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

SECRET

February 13, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Deane,
The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Leane:

Through inadvertence the name of Mr. [illegible] from the Department of Justice was proposed for the Planning Group. This should have been the Advisory Committee. I send you this note so that you can make the necessary correction.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee 9740 B.
x Planning Gp.
x Justice Dept -

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1943.

SECRET

Col. Wm. J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
25th and "E", N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Reference is made to your letter dated February 6, in which you request that the Attorney General be asked to name a member of the Department of Justice as a representative on the Planning Group, preferably Mr. L. M. C. Smith. A copy of my letter to the Attorney General is enclosed herewith for your information. You will be informed as soon as a reply is received.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary

encl. 1-Copy ltr. to
Att'y Gen.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

JCS
TWH

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1943.

SECRET

The Honorable,
The Attorney General,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 22, 1942, approved a new directive concerning the functions of the Office of Strategic Services. The new directive provides for the establishment of a Planning Group in the Office of Strategic Services which will prepare plans for psychological warfare, with a view to integrating such activities with the military program.

It is now found that the Planning Group will have need of fairly frequent consultation with a representative of the Department of Justice. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Department of Justice appoint a representative on the Planning Group of the Office of Strategic Services. The name of Mr. L. M. C. Smith has been suggested as he has already conferred with some members of the Planning Group on psychological warfare matters. It is requested that you inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to whom you wish to appoint as your representative.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

bls
Distribution:
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
O.S.S.
Capt. Royal
CCS Records
Stayback

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee 9740 E
Planning Group
x Justice

SECRET

February 6, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Deane
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Deane:

You will recall that the Directive on the functions of the OSS provides that there shall be an Advisory Committee to the OSS Planning Group, consisting of representatives of certain government agencies "and from time to time representatives of such other agencies as may be called upon to serve...." /JCS 155/4/D-paragraph 7-(b)-(3)/

The Planning Group has found that it will have need of fairly frequent consultation with a representative of the Department of Justice. The Group has suggested the name of Mr. L. M. C. Smith who has already conferred with some of the Group members on matters of this sort.

If you agree to this addition, will you be good enough to request the Attorney General to name a member of the Department of Justice as representative on the Planning Group, preferably Mr. Smith.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Colonel William J. Donovan

Subject: Advisory Committee Meeting

I am postponing a meeting of the Advisory Committee for a few days as there are some hints of possible conciliation with OWI through John Wiley.

The Group voted to ask the Attorney General to designate a member for at least occasional consultation on the Advisory Committee, suggesting Mr. L.M.C. Smith who has been in conferences with me. Suggest this might be handled informally as he would only occasionally be called on.

J.G.R.

To Col. Donovan —

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

February 19, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Deane,
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Deane:

In order to complete your collection I thought you might want to have a copy of Elmer Davis' letter of February 11th to Jim Rogers. Rogers had sent him a note expressing the hope that he was going to have a representative with us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Strained Relations Ease

Washington, Daily News 2-2-[illegible]

OWI Corrals New Power in Victory on Policies

By CHARLES T. LUCEY

A sharp behind-the-scenes contest between the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services over control of America's world-wide propaganda and psychological warfare has been settled, on President Roosevelt's order, in favor of OWI.

Under Elmer Davis, OWI has set up a world-wide press-radio network, to tell wartime America's story. But about two months ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an executive order which appeared to give the OSS considerable latitude in propaganda to weaken enemy resistance. The Chiefs of Staff set up a psychological-warfare planning group, headed by an OSS official, in which OWI and other agencies were to be represented. But Mr. Davis' agency, fearing the OSS sought to invade its field refused to name a man to the planning committee.

OSS officials have contended there was no controversy, but the conflict was considered a very real one by OWI, and the issue was taken directly to the President.

STATE DEPARTMENT BOWS

There were three other important developments today affecting OWI:

A somewhat strained relationship between OWI and certain sections of the State Department appeared to have been eased with the granting of passports to 14 OWI overseas representatives, which OWI officials had believed unnecessarily delayed.

A comprehensive reorganization of the Overseas Branch, headed by Playwright Robert Sherwood, became effective.

The resignations—long rumored—of Edgar Ansel Mowrer, former foreign correspondent, who had an important niche in the OWI Overseas Branch, and William Dwight Whitney, head of OWI's Intelligence Service, were disclosed to have been accepted.

An important factor in the resignations, according to friends of Mr. Mowrer and Mr. Whitney, was their disagreement with White House-State Department policy in North Africa, particularly the appointment of Peyrouton as governor-general of Algeria.

There has been much disagreement with this policy in higher OWI circles

DECORATED FOR SERVICE TO THE ENEMY.

This type of warfare is not entirely but most of the dissenting officials are said to recognize that it is essential that OWI foreign operations be strictly within the framework of established policy.

The State Department by refusal to issue a passport, recently blocked a North African assignment for Mr. Mowrer.

HOLDS "VETO" POWER

The stakes in any contest over conduct of foreign propaganda and psychological warfare are sizable. OWI has outposts stretching from London to Johannesburg and from Dublin to Chungking.

new to the U. S. Government, but past efforts have been puny in comparison to the present OWI campaign. There never has been anything like [illegible] this country.

At home, too, OWI has become influential in establishment of Government policy, and exercises what at times comes close to being a veto power on decisions made elsewhere in Washington.

Growing to such importance OWI has stepped on official toes and has had opposition in Washington and in faraway outposts. Reports sharply critical of OWI foreign operations have come back here from certain State Department representatives. Secretary Hull is said to have been deeply concerned about this.

OWI officials say the State Department has modified much of its opposition, and they instance the passport clearances granted OWI representatives.

Reorganization of OWI's Overseas Branch centers all policymaking functions on overseas operations in Washington, under an Overseas Planning Board, of which Mr. Davis is chairman and Mr. Sherwood vice chairman. The New York office under Joseph Barnes becomes a strictly operational unit.

Mr. Barnes becomes a member of the over-all planning board under Mr. Davis and Mr. Sherwood, who is still director of Overseas Operations.

World-wide operations are broken down into nine regional divisions, each including a number of countries and headed by a specialist in the affairs of the countries.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Comm. Ltr 9740 A
x OSS
x JES
x Planning Group
x OWI
x REW
x CIFA

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Colonel William J. Donovan

Subject: OWI Representative on Advisory Committee

The Planning Group thought that General Deane should be sent a copy of Elmer Davis' letter to me of February 11, copy of which I sent to you. This would seem to me wise.

The policy on the OWI problem is constantly being discussed with the Officers in the Staff and it would seem unnatural to them if all the material was not in the Joint Chiefs' office.

Will you attend to it!

JGR

J.G.R.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee 9740
×OSS
×JCS
×CIAA
×OWI
×BEW
×P. Gp.
file

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Washington

Office of the Director

February 11, 1943

Mr. James Grafton Rogers
Chairman, Planning Group
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jim:

I am sorry that on account of my absence in New York a reply to your letter has been so long delayed. However, I feel that no damage has been done to the business about which you write, since I do not see that we could usefully be represented on the Advisory Committee.

Some of the functions with which the Planning Group is charged by the Chiefs of Staff directive are functions assigned to us by the President, who can hardly be overruled by lesser authority. Since presumably our participation in the Advisory Committee would deal only with those functions, I don't believe that any particular purpose would be served by our giving advice to another group with regard to functions which we are under obligation to formulate and execute.

There are of course many fields in which OWI and OSS must cooperate in the performance of their allotted functions. I trust that working arrangements for that may be continued in spite of this current difference of opinion about more comprehensive activities.

Cordially,

/s/ Elmer Davis
Director

COPY

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Mr. Murphy:

Colonel Donovan wrote a longhand note to Dr. Rogers, advising him of Mr. Stone's designation from BEW to the Advisory Committee.

ED T

but made no reply to Leahy

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee 9740 H
x OSS
x JCS
x OWI
x BEW
x C/H

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
~~ECONOMIC DEFENSE BOARD~~
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

JAN 6 1943

Admiral William D. Leahy
Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy
The White House

Dear Admiral Leahy:

In accordance with the request contained in your letter of December 22, 1942, I have designated Mr. William T. Stone, Assistant Director in charge of our Office of Economic Warfare Analysis, to serve as the BEW member on the OSS Advisory Planning Committee for psychological warfare.

I should like to express my appreciation of the consideration which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given to the comments which we made with respect to the proposed directive to the Office of Strategic Services and my satisfaction with the conclusion which has been reached.

Sincerely yours,

Milo Perkins

Executive Director

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee

x OSS
x JCS
YOWI JCS
x BEW JRD
x Coord'ing

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1942

SECRET

Mr. Elmer Davis,
Director, Office of
War Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Davis:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to express their appreciation of the consideration that you have given to their proposed directive to the Office of Strategic Services. The comments contained in your letters of December 15 and December 22 have been carefully considered, and it is believed that the directive as now written will insure that the Office of Strategic Services will not infringe in any way on the functions of the Office of War Information, as indicated in the President's Executive Order of June 13, 1942.

As finally approved, the directive to the Office of Strategic Services provides for the establishment of a Planning Committee for psychological warfare and for the establishment of an Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from the Office of War Information, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-American affairs, and the Treasury Department.

The directive provides that this Planning Committee will limit its activities with reference to propaganda to recommendations concerning the results desired in each psychological warfare plan which they submit to the Chiefs of Staff for approval. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the plan, they will inform you of the propaganda aims included in the plan and request that you plan and execute them.

INFORMATION COPY

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you designate a member to serve on the Advisory Committee of the O.S.S. Planning Committee, whose function will be to give advice concerning the propaganda results which would be desirable in any psychological warfare plan which may be under consideration.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Distribution:
Adm. Leahy
Gen. Marshall
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold
Gen. McNarney
Adm. Horne
Gen. Stratemeyer
Office of Strategic Services ✓
C.C.S Records
Comdr. McDowell
Smyback

e jm

SECRET

- 2 -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

JCS
JRD

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1942

SECRET

Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,
Commerce Department Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to express their appreciation of the consideration that you have given to their proposed directive to the Office of Strategic Services. The comments contained in your letter of December 15 have been carefully considered, and it is believed that the directive as now written will insure that the Office of Strategic Services will not infringe in any way on the functions of your office.

As finally approved, the directive provides for the establishment of a Planning Committee for psychological warfare and for the establishment of an Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from the Office of War Information, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Treasury Department.

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you designate a member to serve on the Advisory Committee of the O.S.S. Planning Committee.

Distribution:
Adm. Leahy
Gen. Marshall
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold
Gen. McNarney
Adm. Horne
Gen. Stratemeyer
Office of Strategic Services ✓
C.C.S. Records
Comdr. McDowell
Staybeck

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

ejm

INFORMATION COPY

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1942

SECRET

Mr. Milo Perkins,
Executive Director,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Perkins:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to express their appreciation of the consideration that you have given to their proposed directive to the Office of Strategic Services. The comments contained in your letter of December 16 have been carefully considered, and it is believed that the directive as now written will insure that the Office of Strategic Services will not infringe in any way on the functions of your office.

As finally approved, the directive provides for the establishment of a Planning Committee for psychological warfare and for the establishment of an Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from the Office of War Information, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Treasury Department.

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you designate a member to serve on the Advisory Committee of the O.S.S. Planning Committee.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Distribution:
Adm. Leahy
Gen. Marshall
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold
Gen. McNarney
Adm. Horne
Gen. Stratemeyer
Office of Strategic Services
C.C.S. Records
Comdr. McDowell
Stayback

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS



SECRET

INFORMATION COPY

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

File

Advisory Comm. 9740
X OSS X Treasury
X State X Planning Br.
X JCS

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: State Department Representative on the Advisory Committee of O.S.S.

For your information, this office has been officially notified by the Department of State that Mr. Michael J. McDermott, Chief of the Division of Current Information, has been designated as the representative of the Department of State on the Advisory Committee of the Office of Strategic Services.

John R. Deane

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Advisory Committee
X OSS X JCS
X State X Treasury

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 31, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Mr. Harry D. White has been designated as the Treasury representative to serve with the planning group set up in the Office of Strategic Services. I presume that you will communicate with him and give him the necessary details.

Sincerely yours,

John R. Deane
John R. Deane,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

JCS
JHD

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1942.

SECRET

Mr. Michael J. McDermott,
Chief, Division of Current Information,
State Department,
Room 132½ State Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McDermott:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved a new directive to the Office of Strategic Services, which abolishes the old Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and its advisory committee.

The Chiefs of Staff have asked me to inform you of this and at the same time express their appreciation of the services you have rendered as a member of the advisory committee.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Distribution:
Office of Strategic Services ✓
CCS Records
Comdr. McDowell
Stayback

Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Edgar W. Mowrer, OWI
Mr. Wallace K. Harrison, Asst. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Cass Canfield, BEW

mf

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

JCS
JSD

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1942.

SECRET

The Honorable
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently approved a directive outlining the functions of the Office of Strategic Services. This includes a planning group which is set up to integrate psychological warfare plans with the military program. The planning group is to have an advisory committee made up of representatives from the civilian war agencies concerned, and you are cordially invited to designate a representative of the Treasury Department to serve as a member of this committee.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed)

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Distribution:
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Office of Strategic Services ✓
CCS Records
Comdr. McDowell
Secretary

SECRET

mrf

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

JCS
JMO

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1942.

SECRET

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

At their meeting on Tuesday, December 22d, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a new directive concerning the functions of the Office of Strategic Services. The new directive abolishes the old Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and establishes a planning committee in the Office of Strategic Services, which will prepare plans for psychological warfare with a view to integrating such activities with the military program.

It is believed that the new directive is sufficiently definite as to the functions of the Office of Strategic Services as to insure that it will not infringe on the activities of the State Department. As a further safeguard in this respect the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that the State Department appoint a representative on the newly-created planning committee of the Office of Strategic Services. If this is agreeable to you it is requested that you inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to whom you wish to serve as your representative.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed)

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Distribution:
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Office of Strategic Services
CCS Records
Comdr. McDowell
Staybach

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

OSS Form 1159c
Rev. 4/7/44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WEEKLY REPORT - MOTOR VEHICLES

License No. _____

Car _____

Speedometer Reading _____

Last date:

Oil Changed _____

Greased _____

Assigned to:

_____

21817)

Condition of

Oil _____

Battery _____

Body _____

Motor _____

Tires _____

Brakes _____

Anti-freeze _____

Water _____

Week Ending _____

Expenditures for Week:

Gasoline $ _____

Oil _____

Grease _____

Misc. Repairs _____

Accessories _____

TOTAL $ _____

REMARKS: _____

_____

_____

Signed _____

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters, Theater of Operations

Date: 10 Oct. 1942

GENERAL ORDER

NUMBER 3

(In the event that it becomes necessary to institute Military Government in any or all of the regions of North Africa, the following instructions will govern the establishment of Military tribunals.)

Military Tribunals.

Implementing the military government proclaimed and established by such proclamations and ordinances as have been issued by me, military tribunals will be established and administered in accordance with the following policies:

1. General:

a. Military necessity: 1st consideration is prosecution of war to successful termination. For every measure act ask question whether it will forward or hinder its accomplishment. Administration subordinate to military necessities of operations, security, supply, transportation and housing of troops.

b. Welfare of those under military control. Just, humane and mild as practicable - guided by principles of justice, honor and humanity. Object in waging war is to obtain favorable and enduring peace.

2. Kinds and composition:

a. 3 kinds: Military Commissions, Superior Provost Courts, and Inferior Provost Courts.

b. Military Commissions - not less than 5 officers (law member, trial judge advocate, defense counsel - one or more assistant trial judge advocates and counsel

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

c. Superior Provost Courts - one officer of field grade unless none such available.

d. Inferior Provost Courts - one officer.

e. Appointment of military tribunals in areas occupied by British Army will be in accordance and compliance with American normal procedure.

3. BY WHOM APPOINTED:

a. Military Commissions - by appropriate special order by Task Force Commander, or Commanding Officer of units used as organs of military government, where said power has been so delegated to them by the C.C. T.O.

b. Military governors and Civil Affairs Officers may appoint Superior Provost Courts and Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective areas as may be properly brought before them.

c. Commanding officers of tactical units used as organs of military government may appoint Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective governmental jurisdiction as may be properly brought before them if that authority is delegated to them by the Military Governor. If but a single officer is on duty in a tactical unit used as an organ of military administration, or a single officer on duty in connection with civil affairs in a county or like similar territorial subdivision, such officer shall constitute an Inferior Court. Ref. Sec. V, Basic FM 27-5, 1940. Shall be appointed by special order as if appointing a summary court-martial.

4. JURISDICTION:

a. Over persons. All persons within controlled territories except those having diplomatic immunity and those subject to military or naval law of U.S. or nation. Persons subject to military law tried by court-martial.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

b. Over offenses: All acts or omissions made crimes or offenses by laws of country occupied, offenses against laws of war, violations of proclamations, ordinances, regulations or orders promulgated by [illegible] T.O. or subordinates within scope of authority. If courts of country under control are open and functioning satisfactorily, should be permitted to try [illegible] charges with offenses against laws that country not involving U.S. and allies. C.Gs of Task Forces, or a subordinate under delegated power in civil affairs, [illegible] withdraw any case or class of cases from a [illegible] of controlled country and direct they be dropped or [illegible] by military tribunal. Such power should be [illegible] with respect to any prosecution inimical [illegible] of U.S. and allies. Each military tribunal [illegible] jurisdiction over such charges only as may [illegible] to it for trial by officer appointing it [illegible] except matters within jurisdiction of Inferior P[illegible] If officer authorized to appoint Inferior Provo[illegible] shall consider charges deserving of more severe punishment than can be imposed by court to which he may [illegible] them, he will forward to higher authority, recommend reference to higher tribunal. An officer who is [illegible] Inferior Provost Court because he is the only o[illegible] present may try such charges as he or others may [illegible] or may forward them to higher authority.

5. BAIL:

a. As soon as practicable, Task F.C. or subordinate such power delegated in civil affairs, will [illegible] order announcing cases and conditions fo[illegible] Matter of discretion and not of right.

6. PROCEDURE:

a. Military Commissions: Same as general courts martial except as obviously inapplicable.

b. Provost Courts: Same - except in Inf.P.Courts written charges need be filed.

c. Counsel. Every defendant entitled as right, own selection and own expense. Military counsel prov[illegible] only before military commissions.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

titled as a matter of right to counsel of his own selection and at his own expense, but military counsel will be provided only before military commissions.

d. Attendance of witnesses.

(1) Military witnesses: -- The attendance of military witnesses will be obtained as in the case of military witnesses before courts martial.

(2) Civilian witnesses: -- Military tribunals are authorized to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses whose testimony they may think needed or desirable. If necessary, they may require the assistance of the local civilian authorities or request that of the military police or of any appropriate commanding officer. Fees and allowances will be paid as follows: By requisition on voucher issued on the local civil treasurer or Fiscal Officer of the territory under control by the President of the Military Commission or, if in a Provost Court, by the Provost Court Officer. Payment shall be at the prevailing rate in the locality concerned.

e. Translation: -- If the defendant and his counsel, if any, understand and speak English, the proceedings will be conducted in that language and no interpreter will be necessary. If the personnel of the military tribunal have sufficient knowledge of that language, the proceedings may be conducted in the language of the territory under control. If neither of these conditions exists, an interpreter will be employed who will take care that defendant, his counsel, and the personnel of the tribunal are fully informed as to the entire proceedings. Fees and allowances will be paid by requisition or voucher, on the civil treasurer or financial officer of the territory under control, issued by the President of the Military Commission, or if in a Provost Court, by the Provost Court officer. Payment will be at the rate of _____ per day.

f. Previous convictions: -- A military tribunal may consider, after a finding of guilty and before imposition of sentence, evidence of previous convictions and sentences by either military tribunals or civil courts; provided that evidence of conviction of an offense legally punishable by imprisonment for more than one year (whether in fact so punished or not) shall be admissable without regard to the date of commission of such offense, but evidence of conviction of an offense not so punishable shall be admitted only if the offense was committed within one year next preceding the commission of any offense of which the defendant shall have been convicted at the trial then in progress.

7. SENTENCES:

a. (1) Military Commissions: -- A military commission may impose any lawful and appropriate sentence, including death or life imprisonment.

(2) Superior Provost Courts: -- The maximum sentence which a Superior Provost Court may [redacted] imprisonment at hard labor for 24 months and a fine of 50,000 francs.

(3) [redacted] The maximum sentence which an Inferior Provost Court may [redacted] at hard labor for 90 days and a fine of [redacted]

[redacted] should be stated in round [redacted] territory.

[redacted] nt is appropriate and its [redacted] superior provost court, in lieu [redacted] ment, may sentence a defendant [redacted] ntrol.

[redacted] ent shall be convicted of wrongful sale [redacted] of any article or articles or the wrongful operation of a place of business for the sale of such in-

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

- Padlocking: -- If a defendant shall be twice convicted of the [illegible] or gift of intoxicating liquor or a habit-forming drug (including opium) at a certain place, or twice convicted of other violations of regulations or orders with respect to the sale of intoxicating liquors at one place, or once convicted of the operation of a house of prostitution, at which any member of the armed forces of the United States or its ally, contracted a venereal disease, a military tribunal may, in addition to any other lawful punishment, order that such place be vacated and closed for a fixed time.

c. Place and manner of confinement: -- The appointing authority of a Military Commission, Superior Provost Court, or Inferior Provost Court will issue orders as to the place of confinement of persons sentenced by such tribunals to imprisonment, as to the labor to be required of them, and as to other details of their confinement. Unless military necessity (paragraph 1 a.,) the termination of the occupation or other cogent reasons require their removal, persons serving sentences imposed by military tribunals should be confined within the territory under control.

8. RECORDS:

a. (1). Charges will be preferred by a person subject to military law on a printed "Charge Sheet" (Appendix 1,) except in Inferior Provost Courts. If that form is not available in print, it may be typed or written longhand, or the charge sheet in use in the Army (W.D., A.G.O. Form Number 115) may be used, disregarding such parts as are obviously inapplicable and making such additions as are necessary. No oath to the charges is necessary. Charges will be referred by appropriate appointing authorities to suitable tribunals.

(2) Inferior Provost Courts will keep in triplicate a case record file, showing the charge, date of charge, date of trial, plea, findings, sentence and if confined, place of confinement. If a fine, the amount of the fine; if a fine and confinement, the amount of the fine and the length of the confinement will be shown. Final action of appointing officer on review (if any,) the date entries were made, and the signature of the Provost Court Officer, two copies being forwarded to the appointing officer.

b. The records of trials by Superior Provost Courts will be kept on the back of the charge sheet. Inferior courts will keep a case record book.

c. Military commissions will keep a separate record of the trial of each case in form as nearly as practicable like that of a general court martial.

9. DISPOSITION OF [illegible]

[illegible] sales of confiscated property, and [illegible] be paid without any deduction [illegible] United States Forces.

10. [illegible]

[illegible] a military commission [illegible] officer approved by [illegible]

[illegible] Provost Court shall be executed [illegible] authority. Nevertheless, [illegible] examined by the officer who [illegible] his successor, and such officer [illegible] approve or vacate, in [illegible] commute, remit, or [illegible] may restore the accused to [illegible] sentence [illegible] sentence.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

b. Final review. -- Every record of trial by Military Commission and one copy of every record of trial by Provost Court shall be forwarded by the officer who appointed the tribunal or his successor, after he shall have examined it, to the officer in charge of Civil Affairs/Military Government of the Task Forces, where it shall be examined in the legal department of that office. The chief of that department shall submit through the officer in charge of Civil Affairs to the Commanding General, such recommendations, if any, as may be appropriate with respect thereto. No sentence of death or sentence to serve more than 5 years, or a fine exceeding $50,000 shall be carried into execution until it shall have been confirmed by the Commanding General of the Theatre of Operations, when the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as approving authority, no additional confirmation by him is necessary. The Commanding General of Operations, or of a Task Force, shall have power to disapprove or vacate, in whole or in part, any finding of guilty made by any military tribunal appointed by him; to mitigate, commute, remit, or vacate any sentence, in whole or in part, imposed by a tribunal appointed by him, and he may restore the accused to all rights affected by the findings and sentence. He may direct that the records of trial of Inferior Provost Courts be forwarded to some other officer or officers, in those headquarters of which they are a part, to receive such review as has been above directed, and he may delegate his powers with respect to the findings and sentences of such courts to such officer or officers.

By command of Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

T. J. DAVIS
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

CHARGE SHEET

Note: If this sheet does not contain sufficient spaces for the list of witnesses, charges, and specifications, remarks, or other entries, additional sheets may be added and securely attached.

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters, Theater of Operations

_____ (Place)

_____ (Date)

Name of defendant _____
(Last name followed by first and middle names)

Occupation _____ Address _____

Age _____ Sex _____ Marital Status _____ Number of minor

Children or dependents other than wife _____

Witnesses _____
(State names and addresses and whether for prosecution or defense)

List articles or documents to be introduced in evidence, and state where each may be found _____

_____

Previous convictions attached _____
(Number)

Information as to restraint of accused _____
(State whether or not in confinement, and if so, since what date)

Headquarters)
Office of Civil Affairs) _____
(Name of command or office)

_____ (Place) _____ (Date)

The charges on the reverse side of this sheet are referred for trial to:

_____
(Grade, name, and organization)

_____
(Trial judge advocate of military commission, superior or inferior provost court) (Place)

By _____
(Command or [illegible] of officer referring charges)

[illegible]

_____
[illegible] and organization) Adjutant

[illegible] officer refer[illegible] trial has no adjutant or so desires, [illegible] in the order of [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Gen. Order
D...

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
[illegible]

[illegible] Theater [illegible]

October 1[illegible], 19[illegible]

GENERAL ORDER NO. 4

POLITICAL DIRECTIVE FOR TORCH

I. Information.

A. Initial purpose -- prevent control of F.N.A. from falling into the hands of enemy and secure good will and cooperation of the people. The President will issue a proclamation to be dropped over Algiers, Oran and Casablanca at dawn on D-Day -- American flag and President's picture.

B. Expected that all government and civil service officials and employees who are trustworthy will remain on duty.

C. The Civil Affairs Section of headquarters will attach to each task and assault force a Civil Affairs Section and technical advisers on military government and administration. They must be prepared to supervise, when necessary, local government.

D. Each task force or assault force commander will be furnished with 5,000 copies of Proclamations 1 and 2 and Ordinance Regulations 1 and 2 in French and Arabic.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

E. (1) Proclamation 1 and Ordinance 1 have been drawn up for distribution if we are received as friends or there is mere token resistance.

(2) Proclamation 2 and Ordinance 2 if there is open and prolonged hostility and resistance.

(3) Task force commanders will exercise their judgment in deciding the type of opposition.

II. Type of Military Control.

A. Every effort made consistent with mission to win over support and cooperation of the French, both civilian and military.

III. Relations with Civilian Authorities.

A. Principle is that regardless of resistance the French are friendly and are to be maintained in their government.

B. Agreed between U. S. and British that civil administration of controlled territory under American control.

C. Parleys and negotiations conducted by U. S. officers with assistance of political officer attached to each force. This does not prohibit direct dealings by British and French officials on claims, requisitions, etc., on which policies have been previously determined.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

IV. Political Plan.

A. In the assault stage the idea of American command kept to the front.

B. Murphy is United States representative and will function as Chief Civil Administrator in North Africa. Before operations he will arrange for taking over authority throughout French North Africa when operations begin by Frenchmen who are friendly. He is authorized to give Frenchmen that he trusts certain assurances, which include equipment for the French troops that come over to our side, money to meet additional expenses, and guaranty of salaries allowances, death benefits and pensions.

C. Believed that a part of French army and French air force will welcome arrival of American force, but naval force will resist.

D. (1) French agents who will assist the initial assault need rifles and ammunition; these will be carried by task force.

(2) Distributionof these rests upon the task force commander on advice of Murphy.

E. (1) Murphy will be represented by Deputy Civil Administrators, --

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

With the Eastern Assault Force: John Knox

With the Center Task Force: Leland Bounds

With the Western Task Force: Frederick Culbert

(2) These Deputy Administrators will accompany each force from its point of embarkation and upon landing will endeavor to establish immediate contact as follows:

(a) Eastern Assault Force: With Murphy at Algiers, or if that impossible with Cole, American Consul, or Vice Consul Boyd. Mr. Knox will communicate with these, or if failing, directly with Mr. Omato, Governor General of Algieria, and he will request convocation of Generals Juin, Koeltz (19th Army Corps), and Mast (friendly - Algiers Division, Vice Admiral Fenard (friendly - Permanent General Secretary of North Africa), and General Mendigaul, Commander of French Air Force in North Africa. Allied representatives will be Murphy, General Ryder, Cole and Knox.

(b) Center Task Force: Mr. Knight, American consular control officer or upon Boujara, Prefect of Oran, to request an urgent convocation of General Hypolite (Oran Division), Colonel Jousse (Chief of Staff - friendly) and the senior naval officer and

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

senior air commander. Allied representatives now will be Major General Fredendall, Messrs. Rounds and Knight.

(c) Western Task Force: With Mr. Russell, Consul General at Casablanca, Vice Consuls Reid and Knight, or with General Bethouard and Vice Admiral Michelier at Casablanca, or, depending upon circumstances, Resident General Nogues, General Lascroux and General La Macolle, Commanding Air Morocco, at Rabat. Allied representation here - General Patton, Messrs. Russell and Culbert.

(3) Fourth Administrator Springs, Vice Consul at Tunis, will be available at Algiers to be attached to General Anderson's staff and accompany the advance northward.

F. Upon agreement for cessation of firing within the area, the Commanding General will present his proclamations and ordinances defining his authority in civil affairs.

V. French Forces Offering to Fight on Our Side.

A. (1) Problem a military one; task force commander must not dampen enthusiasm and emphasis placed on refusal of U. S. to be responsible for Frenchmen shooting

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Frenchmen. French should keep out of initial operations; when these concluded, they will be supplied with arms.

(2) Officer commanding the unit might be invited to join the force commander's headquarters.

B. When military necessity requires the disarming of a unit, it should be done by the commander.

VI. Direct Propaganda.

A. Direct responsibility of Commanding General and will not be delegated.

B. Leaflets main medium; strong broadcasting station to be in operation from the United Kingdom. Broadcasting resources of U. S. and United Kingdom directed to secure the flanks. Broadcasting teams will accompany the task force to run the Algiers, Oran and Rabat stations.

C. Wireless communication between Murphy and the commander in chief at Gibraltar and between Murphy and the task force commanders when operations begin.

VII. Power of Arrest Over French or Natives.

This to be done before properly constituted military tribunal which exercise proper discretion. Ordinary enforcement of laws left to local civilian authorities.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

VIII. Authority and Methods to Requisition Buildings.

A. Land and buildings owned by individuals will be obtained by agreement between agents of U. S. and its allied forces and individual or agent of property desired to be occupied.

B. If cannot make satisfactory arrangement, inform Civil Affairs Officer, who will make requisition with proper authorities. Payment in cash or vouchers payable in cash. Price, fair market value.

IX. Authority and Methods for Local Purchase.

Task force commanders will create local purchase boards. Procurement of civilian personnel or equipment required by military will be responsibility of arm of service concerned.

X. Labor.

A. Civil Affairs force will handle this.

B. (1) Commissaries for sale of goods to civilian labor will be established as task force commander may direct. (2) Not to exceed 30 days supplies to 5,000 persons, following rates will be furnished for civilian labor consumption:

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Tea	.03 pounds	per individual per day
Rice	.15 pounds	" " " "
Sugar	.03 pounds	" " " "
Cotton	.083 yards	" " " "

C. (1) Only persons having badges and pay books are entitled to purchase; until goods are in sufficient supply only civil labor working directly under the military can purchase. At a later stage, local shops or commissaries will be supplied.

(2) For supervision of local labor local employment exchanges.

(3) All necessary details will be fixed in on engagement later.

(4) Natives must wear in conspicuous position a disc with initial letters of unit and identity number.

(5) Quartermaster, Army of U. S., will provide necessary employment record books or cards.

(6) Local rates of pay will be in accordance with current rates.

(7) Price of all supplies in North Africa which come from America will be determined in case of retail distributors by Quartermaster, Army of U. S.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

XI. Terms for Cessation of Hostilities.

Task and assault force commanders will be furnished alternate drafts. First draft is in event of slight or token resistance, second for prolonged resistance. Task commander determines what shall be done and what modifications, if any, will be made in draft.

XII. Claims.

Command Claims Officer for each U. S. task force who will investigate all claims for damages, personal and property. Personal claims service will be assigned where they can be best handled.

XIII. American Liaison Officers.

American army officers will be attached to General Anderson's and General Clark's staffs prior to embarkation from United Kingdom. They will act as liaison between British forces and French authorities.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

...tion. Allied representatives to this conference ... Major General Ryder, U.S.A., ... Murphy, if available, Messrs. Cole and Hoge, and such other American personnel as the Assault Force Commander may direct.

...nior Task Force: with Mr. Knight, American Consular Control Officer, or failing this, will call directly upon ... Boujard, Prefect of the Department of Oran, to request an urgent convocation of General Mathieu (Oran Division), Colonel Jousse (Chief of Staff - friendly), and the Senior Naval Officer, and Senior Air Commander, Commanding, for the purpose of agreeing upon terms for cessation of hostile action. Allied representatives at this conference will be Major General Fredendall, U.S.A., Messrs. Hounds and Knight, and such other American personnel as the Task Force Commander may direct.

...e) ...t ...ask Force: ...ith Mr. Russell, Consul General at Casablanca, Vice Consuls Reed and Knight, or failing this, will call directly upon General Bethouard, (Casablanca Division), and Vice Admiral Michelier, (now "Admiral Sud") at Casablanca, or alternately depending upon circumstances, on Resident-General Noguès, General Laseroux, Commanding, and General La Haoulle, (Commanding Air Morocco), at Rabat to request a general convocation for the purpose of agreeing upon terms for cessation of hostile action. Allied representation at this conference will be Major General Patton, U.S.A., Messrs. Russell, Culbert, and such other American personnel as the Task Force commander may direct.

(3) ... fourth Administrator, Mr. L. M. Springs, the American Vice-Consul at Tunis, will be available at Algiers to be attached to General Anderson's staff and accompany the advance eastwards. This officer will be familiar with Tunisia and Eastern Algeria. A representative of the Office of Strategic Services, with knowledge of Western Algeria will also be available at Algiers to be attached to General Anderson's staff.

f. Upon agreement for the cessation of hostilities within the area, the Commanding General will present to the authorities his Proclamations and Ordinances which define the policy in respect to local civil affairs, and the relationship of the local civil authorities to the Allied military authorities. (It is suggested that the Civil Affairs Officer of each Task or Assault force be included in the initial contact).

5. FRENCH FORCES OFFERING TO FIGHT ...

...(1) The problem ... be a military one, but it will be necessary ... the Task Force Commander, be not of ... and discourage our friends.

...

Government ... of the United States ... on the ... and ... training ... to join us, re- ... They can be assured ... will be supplied ... with arms ... French territory ... of helping ...

...(2) ... the unit might be ... to join ... a liaison capacity, ... be trans- ... troop ... ions, ... emplacements, etc. ... with ... posed in command to keep ... the ... under the Mind ... of

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] in all areas is a direct responsibility of the [illegible], Allied Force, and will not be delegated to subordinate commanders.

b. In regard to French North Africa itself, leaflets will be [illegible] in the initial stages, but a strong broadcasting station will also be in operation from the United Kingdom. The whole force of the broadcasting resources of the United States and the United Kingdom will be directed to secure the flanks of the operation by suitable broadcasts to the areas concerned. Broadcasting teams will accompany the Task Forces in order to run the Algiers, Oran and Rabat stations as soon as they have been seized. The capture of these sevices and their operation under American direction for the further range of military operations, should provide valuable aid in terminating such resistance as there may be." There is reason to believe that a portion of the existing press and information service in the area will be favorable to the Allied cause.

c. Arrangements have been made for wireless communication between Mr. Murphy and the Commander-in-Chief at Gibraltar, and between Mr. Murphy and the Task Force commanders when operations begin. Mr. Murphy will thus be able to give last minute information on the state of affairs on shore, on the extent to which he has been able to secure in advance, the collaboration of individual leaders or units, and on the chances of success of the subversive operations laid on.

7. POWER OF ARREST OVER FRENCH OR NATIVES:

French, or natives of the occupied territory, are subject to arrest confinement and subsequent trial before a properly constituted military tribunal for offenses committed against the United States and its supporting allies, or against their regulations of military administration, or against their personnel. Due discretion will be used in the exercise of this authority. The ordinary enforcement of existing civil and criminal laws and regulations, will be left to the local civil authorities.

8. AUTHORITY AND METHODS TO REQUISITION BUILDINGS:

a. Land and buildings owned by individuals, which are required by the military, will be obtained by agreement between agents of the United States and its allied forces, and individuals, owners, or agents of the owners of the property, land buildings or services desired to be occupied or utilized by the military forces.

b. In the event that satisfactory mutual agreements between the owners, and representatives of the controlling forces, cannot be made, the local purchase board [illegible] in charge thereof, will so inform the Civil Affairs Officer [illegible] Force concerned, who will make requisition upon the proper civil [illegible] the requisite lands or buildings for the military [illegible] in cash, or in vouchers payable in cash [illegible] Price paid will be at a fair [illegible]

9. [illegible]

[illegible] boards to co- [illegible] services, supplies [illegible] of civil [illegible] be the responsibility [illegible] co-ordinated [illegible]

[illegible] Civil Affairs officer [illegible] Task Force in the initial [illegible] with the local government and employment [illegible] Deputy Civil Administrator of the [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] as determined by the Task Force Commander, will [illegible] civilian labor consumption:

[illegible]	.03 lbs.	per individual per day.
[illegible]	.15 lbs.	" " " " "
[illegible]	.03 lbs.	" " " " "
Cotton cloth	.08 yds.	" " " " "

(Ref. AG 400-3, Administrative Instructions, AFHQ 12-9-[illegible])

c. (1) Only those persons having badges and pay books or cards are entitled to the privilege of purchasing the supplies and food made available by the occupying force. Until goods are in sufficient supply only civil labor working directly under the military, will be able to purchase goods at these commissaries. At a later stage local shops and commissaries will be supplied and facilities given to the civilians in Government offices and works to purchase goods.

(2) Authority appointed to supervise local labor will contact the American Consul General at Algeria, who will put them in touch with the local employment exchanges. The United States Consul General will put them in touch with the representatives at Mateen, Penrith and Fever. The same procedure will hold good for Oran and Casablanca.

(3) All necessary details, especially the personal description will be filled in on engagement of civilian labor. The services by whom a civilian is paid will be held responsible that his book is complete in every detail.

(4) Natives must wear in a conspicuous position, a disc with the initial letters of their unit or service and their identity number stamped on it.

(5) The Quartermaster, Army of the United States, will provide the necessary employment record books, or cards, and identification badges for use by the civilians employed by the military forces.

(6) Local rates of pay given to civilians engaged will be as far as possible, in accordance with the current rates of pay. All such engagements with rates of pay will at once be reported to the head of the service concerned. Nominal rolls on which the following particulars of each employee will be recorded by the service concerned:

Name
Grade
Date of Entry
Rate of Pay
Date of [illegible]
Particu[illegible] compensation
[illegible]

Native labor in [illegible] ely. Skilled labor should in [illegible] classified by a qualified offi[illegible]

[illegible] rice through [illegible] retail distributors [illegible] Army of the United States.

(Further details [illegible] ly).

12. [illegible]

[illegible] furnished with [illegible] of terms [illegible] hostile action for pre- [illegible] French delegates, at the conference suggested in [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] and prolonged. The decision as to which [illegible] for the Task or Assault Force Commander. [illegible] as to how far the drafts may be modified in minor [illegible] discussion with the French delegates.

[illegible] Claims Service under the general direction and supervision of [illegible] Claims Officer, has been established for each United States Task [illegible] Assault Force. It will be the function of this Service to receive and investigate all claims for damages submitted by the civilian inhabitants of [illegible] territory, on account of property damage or personal injuries caused [illegible], negligently, or unlawfully by United States troops, (except [illegible] done to property which shall have been rented or requisitioned for [illegible] of the United States Army). The personnel of the Claims Service will be assigned by the Command Claims Officer to such locations as will permit the expeditious handling of claims, and any claims which may be submitted in the first instance to the Commanding Officers of the United States Army [illegible] should be forwarded without delay to the nearest officer of the Claims Service or to the Command Claims Officer for investigation and further action. [illegible] Claims Commission, usually consisting of the Command Claims Officer and the [illegible] two senior officers of the Claims Service, will serve with each United States Task and Assault Force and will be empowered to approve and to make payment of meritorious claims which do not exceed $1,000 in amount. Claims for damages arising out of activities of British troops will be investigated by personnel of the British Claims Commission and, if meritorious, will be paid by that Commission. If there is doubt as to whether the damage involved in a particular claim was caused by British or by United States troops, the question of responsibility will be resolved by the British and United States Claims Commissions following a consultation with respect to the matter.

13. [illegible] OFFICERS:

[illegible] American Army Officers will be attached to General Anderson's and General J. C. [illegible] Clark's staffs, prior to the embarkation from the United Kingdom, of their respective forces. These officers will act in a liaison capacity, between the British Forces and the French authorities in French North Africa, and will recive instructions from their above respective commanders. They will remain in this capacity, with their respective headquarters until relieved by orders from this headquarters.

By command Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

[illegible] B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

[illegible] DAVIS,
[illegible], AGD, Adjutant General.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters, T of O
12 Oct 1942

GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER 5

(NOTE: Manner in which Civil affairs section can serve commander. Intended as guide)

1. PURPOSE

Assist commander carrying out policies of CG. Maintain for CG civil governments, Territories FNA as soon as military control secure d. Maintain existing form government in territories under control. Retain civil governments and officials and employees in present positions, so far as consistent with military mission and policy of CG. To supplant personnel not in accord with war aims of U. S and Ally, if local personnel, or with military personnel in event there is hostile action.

2. GENERAL POLICY

a (1) The military control in accordance with treaties Hague conventions and Geneva conferences.

(2) Respect and strict observation of all state and property rights of neutral nations within territory.

(3) Person and property rights of neutral citizens to be respected so long as neutrals. Violate none of the rules regarding neutrals as stipulated in Hague and Geneva treaties, U.S. and Ally.

b. Agreed by U.S. and British that civil administration shall be entirely American controlled. The CG Allied force assumes that responsibility. Civil affairs staff composed entirely of American Personnel.

c. Policy of CG-- principles of civil administration to be uniform in all territories so completely centralized.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

d. CG to coordinate and control civil administration FNA. To be rperesented and assited by task force commanders. Civil affairs personnel to assist commander.

3. Military Governors

a. CG will be military Governor.

b. Senior general officers in each area to be Military Governors that area.

c. If situation warrants military governors of any area may subdivide area and appoint deputies.

4. CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS

a. Will be members of staff of CG and task force and sub-task force commanders. Will be advisors on matters of civil affairs administration.

b. Civil Affairs Officers on Staff of CG will be chief Civil Affairs officer for controlled territory FNA and will be responsible for implementing policies and directives of CG on civil affairs matters.

5. TASK AND ASSIGNMENT FOR [illegible] COMMANDERS

As military governors in respective areas may institute local policies not in conflict with policies higher authority.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES

a. Prosecution of war to successful termination. Administration to be just, humane and mild as practicable. Welfare of local population.

b. Plan must be flexible and suited to the people, the country, the time and tactical and tactical situation to which applied.

c. Plans will be adopted with view to reducing to minimum

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

number of personnel from armed forces employed in administration.

7. PROCLAMATION AND ORDNANCES

a. Two types--printed English, French and Arabic--delivered to force commander prior arrival. Proclamation One will be issued by force commanders in event control effected with little or not resistance. Proclamation Two will be issued in event of heavily armed resistance and deemed essential that stringent control necessary.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Proclamation Number 2 will be issued by the force commander if there is heavily armed resistance by the French or other armed forces, and it is deemed essential by him that a most stringent form of control be maintained.

b. For similar purposes, in similar instances, two types of ordinances or regulations, identified as Ordinances Number 1 and Number 2, and printed in English, French and Arabic, will be prepared and delivered to the force commanders prior to their arrival in the zone of action.

c. Printing of the proclamations and ordinances in languages or dialects other than English, French and Arabic, may be procured from local sources if the local situation so warrants and the need therefor is approved by the Task Force commander.

d. Proclamations and ordinances posted for information and guidance of the local population will be printed in French and Arabic, both languages on the same card or sheet. Because of the probable bad psychological effect that it may have upon the French and native inhabitants and the fact that the French and Arabic languages predominate, the publicized proclamations and ordinances will not be printed in the English language, but a sufficient quantity for distribution to American and British forces for record and interpretive purposes will be printed in that language.

e. The translation of such proclamations and ordinances into French, Arabic, or other languages or dialects as later may be deemed necessary, will be most carefully made so that the native population will be able to construe their meaning.

8. TRANSLATION:

The English text of all proclamations, ordinances, orders or other papers of official nature, printed or written in other languages will govern.

9. MILITARY DAMAGE:

a. Damage to governmental and public service installations and facilities and private property in general through military action will be kept to a minimum consistent with the success of the commander's mission.

b. Pilfering and wanton destruction of civil governmental property, public service installations, banks, communication installations and equipment is strictly prohibited.

c. The removal of any papers, documents, bonded funds, records or other installations, from any bank, survey office, tax collector's office, and/or any other revenue collecting or safekeeping institution or establishment, [redacted] by authority of the Commanding General or a Task (Assault) Force Commander, or [redacted] designated by them, is strictly prohibited.

d. All [redacted] the troops will be held and [redacted] orders of the military [redacted] officer by

10. PUBLIC SAFETY:

a. It will be the [redacted] Task force commanders to restore law, [redacted] the civil inhabitants and, to safeguard [redacted] cial institutions in their respective areas.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

b. Task Force Commanders will take all measures necessary to stop and prevent sabotage or other forms of premeditated destruction to vital civil and military installations and facilities.

c. It will be the responsibility of the Civil Affairs officer to organize, reorganize, to continue in force, or otherwise establish or re-establish, the local police or gendarmerie and fire-fighting and fire prevention forces, and thereafter to supervise the normal functioning of their routine duties.

d. It will further be the responsibility of the Civil Affairs officer to maintain law and order and the prevention of crime among the civil inhabitants of the occupied territories. He will supervise civilian police, fire departments and prisons, the traffic in liquor and narcotics, the circulation of civilians and matters of similar nature.

e. G-2 will establish censorship policies. The Civil Affairs officer co-operating and in co-ordination with that section of the General Staff, will prepare orders and regulations for the local population with respect to censorship. The responsibility for censorship within the occupied territory is that of the G-2 Section; the duty of supervising the enforcement of censorship upon the inhabitants is that of the Civil Affairs officer.

11. PUBLIC WORKS, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS:

a. All public works, utilities and communication facilities, with their civil officials and employees, will continue their normal activities.

b. The Civil Affairs officer will supervise the use of railroads, harbors, rivers, light-houses, buoys, roads, bridges, busses, trucks, street railway, gas and electric plants and systems, water works, sewerage, drainage, irrigation, forests, postal service, telegraph and telephone, radio, and other similar installations, insofar as concerns the needs of the civil population.

c. In the event of non-cooperation on the part of the civil inhabitants, or of open hostility on the part of the French, or other armed forces, to military control, the personnel required further to assist the supervision or to operate the facilities vital to the military occupation will be furnished from combat units by the military governor of the area or areas concerned.

d. The procurement of civilian personnel or equipment required by the military will be the responsibility of the arm or service concerned, acting where necessary through the services of civil affairs personnel.

12. FISCAL:

a. The Civil Affairs officer [redacted] financial affairs both governmental [redacted] territory, insofar as may be necessary.

b. The [redacted] with the exemptions [redacted] in force, with its existing [redacted] to the military administ[redacted]

c. All funds on [redacted] or agency of, banks of issue [redacted] that may hereafter be collected, received or [redacted] any governments or agencies thereof or banks of issue [redacted] funds, will be impounded by the Civil Affairs officer and placed in safe-keeping by him pending decision by higher authority as to their final disposition.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

d. The Civil Affairs officer will establish an audit of the funds referred to in c. above, and such [illegible] of the financial transactions of the civil [illegible] for the purpose of the military administration.

e. The initial rate of currency exchange in the occupied territory will be as follows:

300	Moroccan francs	=	£ One
75	Moroccan francs	=	$ One
300	Algerian francs	=	£ One
75	Algerian francs	=	$ One
1 £	B.M.A. note	=	$ 4.00
1 £	B.M.A. note	=	300 fra[illegible]
300	Bank of France francs	=	£ One
75	Bank of France francs	=	$ One

f. Local currency will be used wherever possible.

g. (1) If sufficient local currency is not available to meet all requirements, British troops will be paid with a note issued by the British Military Administration, and United States troops will be paid with a specially marked dollar issued by the United States Treasury.

(2) Other local disbursements made by British Military authorities, for which sufficient local currency is not available, will be made with the specially marked dollar.

(3) The validity of the specially marked dollar, and of the note issued by the British Military Administration will be restricted to the territory occupied by the United States and its supporting ally.

13. TAXES, FINES, ASSESSMENTS AND THE LIKE:

a. Taxes, both direct and indirect, will be collected as usual by the local and municipal officers who ordinarily perform that duty. Except as may be otherwise directed by competent military authority, all taxes normally paid to or used by the national government, will be paid by Civil officers collecting them, to the officer in charge of the Fiscal Department of the Civil Affairs Section of the staff of the Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, and will be used so far as necessary to defray the expenses of the military and civil governments of the [illegible] paid to or used by county or [illegible] and used by them for the purpose for [illegible]

b. Funds [illegible] territory, or territory [illegible] funds and expenses direct[illegible] territory by the military comma[illegible] 1934, 48 Stat. 1233), [illegible] Comp[illegible] 1765, Vol. 1, BUL. J.A.G., [illegible]

14. EDUCATION:

The edu[illegible] territory will be under [illegible] he

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[redacted] will arrange for the cessation of any subversive or other form of teaching detrimental to the feeling of good will and friendship between the inhabitants of the occupied area and the United States and its supporting ally.

15. LEGAL:

a. The Legal Department of the Civil Affairs Section will supervise all matters pertaining to civil law and administration within the controlled area, and will act as the advisory agency to the commanding general on matters affecting civil law and administration within the controlled area.

b. Supervision of military commissions, provost courts, civil courts, public prosecutors and the practice of law, the examination and the filing of their records, is the responsibility of this department.

16. MILITARY TRIBUNALS:

a. In the event that it becomes necessary to institute Military Government in North Africa, military tribunals will be established by the military governor of each controlled area. The local inhabitants will be notified of the creation of these tribunals by the publication of ordinances or by other appropriate method. The ordnances will list the offenses for which they may be tried by such tribunals, and the punishments which such tribunals may impose.

b. In general, there will be three kinds of military tribunals:

Military Commissions (Military Court (Br)),

Superior Provost Courts,

Inferior Provost Courts (Summary Court (Br)).

c. (1) Military governors may appoint military commissions to try such cases within their respective areas as may be properly brought before them.

(2) Military governors and Civil Affairs officers may appoint Superior Provost Courts and Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective areas as may be properly brought before them.

(3) Commanding officers of tactical units used as organs of military government may appoint Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective governmental jurisdiction as may be properly brought before them, if that authority is delegated to them by the Military Governor of their respective area.

(4) If but a single officer is on duty [redacted] as an organ of military administration, or if but a single officer is on duty in connection with civil affairs in a district, city or similar territorial sub-division, such officer shall constitute an Inferior Court. Reference: Section V, WD Pamphlet [redacted]

17. CLAIMS:

Claims submitted by [redacted] personal injury caused [redacted] will be referred to [redacted] staff of each Task Force [redacted] Commanding General. [redacted]

18. PUBLIC HEALTH [redacted]

a. Existing local [redacted] and sanitation will be [redacted] of the Public Health [redacted] public health supervision

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

b. The Public Safety Department and the Public Health Department of the Civil Affairs Section will co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts with the Force Surgeon, with reference to control of prostitutes and the inspection of food and beverage dispensing establishments.

19. ECONOMICS:

a. Every effort will be made to maintain the economic structure of the controlled territory unimpaired.

b. The salaries, wages and pensions, pension rights and all other benefits and emoluments of all French and native governmental, territorial, municipal and other sub-divisional districts, and regional officials and employees, and all Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, will be guaranteed by the United States of America, as long as they remain in their present positions carrying on their normal duties in a manner satisfactory to the military governor of the territory or the area occupied, and do nothing by word or deed that can in any way be construed as disrespectful to the United States or its supporting ally, or to their personnel and property.

c. Initially the wage scale prevailing at the time of assuming control, will be maintained for all civilian labor required by the military forces.

d. Initially the prevailing scale for use and hiring of service equipment, trucks, cranes, etc., by the military forces will be retained.

e. If after completion of the first phase of the occupation, it is deemed necessary by the Civil Affairs officer that a revision of wages and rates for services should be made, the latter may appoint a board consisting of representatives of the military administration and local government, and labor groups for that purpose.

f. In general, the payment for labor will be in currency, and not in commodities, nor a combination of currency and commodities.

g. (1) Commodities required for the economic stability of the territory under control, and procured by the military administration will be warehoused in custody of the Economics Department of the Civil Affairs Section, and a plan of distribution and sale to the inhabitants will be inaugurated by that department.

(2) Preference in the matter of [illegible] of needed commodities, from the stocks [illegible] a table of allowances as specified [illegible] to give those persons, [illegible] all circumstances, [illegible]

h. The [illegible] the military will [illegible] concerned.

20. PORTS: [illegible]

a. A [illegible] Commanding General may [illegible]

b. The [illegible] be known as the "Naval [illegible] by the Naval Commander, [illegible]

c. The port [illegible] United States forces will be known as [illegible] as the Commanding General may [illegible]

d. Port Commanders [illegible] over ports and [illegible] labor and over [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

The pres
and aged and infirm and all charitable institutions and organizations will be retained under the supervision of the Welfare Department of the Civil Affairs Section.

22. INITIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER:

The Civil Affairs officer of each of the areas under control will be responsible for the following:

a. Ascertaining the policy of the Task Force Commander.

b. Establishing immediate contact with the United States Deputy Civil Administrator of the controlled area.

c. Establishing immediate contact with the principal local Civil Administrative officer.

d. Informing the local Civil Administrative officer of the military governor's plan of control, and presentation to him of the Proclamation of control and administration by the United States.

e. Immediate disposition of Civil Affairs personnel.

f. Issuance and posting of proclamation and ordinances (regulations).

g. Routine duties of administrative supervision during the period the territory will be under military control.

23. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. The Public Safety Department will supervise the organization and activity of a Civil Defense unit.

b. Officers and/or enlisted men assigned to Civil Affairs Sections of subordinate units by this headquarters, will be released from such duty or re-assigned to other Civil Affairs duties by the same authority.

By command of Lieutenant General [redacted]:

[redacted]
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

[redacted]
Colonel, [redacted]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

ORDINANCES 1

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters Theater of Operations

_____, 194_

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The following ordinances are published for the guidance of all concerned. It is the desire of the Army of the United States to impose no more restrictions upon you than necessary to protect your interests and those of its forces. However, police regulations are necessary, so certain of these will be promulgated for welfare of all. Your compliance necessary to attain that object.

1. LOCAL LAWS AND ORDINANCES:

Laws, ordinances and police regulations heretofore in effect will continue except where changes required for military reasons.

2. CIRCULATION:

Persons will be permitted, subject to local laws and police regulations, to move about freely.

3. MEETINGS AND PARADES:

Will be governed by local or military regulations. No derogatory or disrespectful meetings or parades will be permitted.

4. UNIFORMS:

(a) Only members of military organizations and services can wear uniform; police, gendarmerie or those in public duties will wear their respective uniforms.

(b) Wearing of uniforms of organizations affiliated with or sympathetic to Nazis or Fascist is prohibited.

5. FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION:

The possession and use of firearms and ammunition will be subject to strict control.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

6. SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH:

Local regulations will be enforced, together with others published by American forces for protection of own or allied personnel.

7. PROSTITUTION:

Proprietors or agents of houses, or any individual prostitute, will be held strictly responsible and subject to punishment for any cases of venereal diseases contracted by members of armed forces of U. S. or its allies.

8. SCHOOLS:

Will continue to be held freely.

9. CIVIL COURTS:

All existing courts will continue [illegible].

10. CITY COUNCILS:

All will continue to function freely.

11. FLAGS, NATIONAL ANTHEMS AND UNIFORMS of countries at war or unfriendly to the U.S., its forces or allies:

As a state of war exists between U.S. [illegible], Italy and Japan and their satellites, display of their flags or singing of their anthems is prohibited.

12. COMMUNICATIONS BY MAIL, TELEGRAPH, CABLE, [illegible], PIGEON AND OTHERWISE:

(a). Forbidden to send, transmit or knowingly receive by any means information prejudicial to U.S. or its allies.

(b) All communications subject to censorship.

(c) Use of any code or other [illegible] prohibited.

(d) Interference with lawful communications by any means is forbidden.

13. WIRELESS TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT, POSSESSION OF:

Possession by any private person of any radio transmitting equipment forbidden. Any person having such equipment in his possession

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] it to the commander of the nearest unit of these forces forthwith.

14. [illegible], MAGAZINES, BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS:

a. Publication is forbidden in any newspaper, magazine, book, leaflet, poster or otherwise, of any printed, typed, or written matter which is in the interest of Germany, Italy, Japan or any state allied with them, or in aid or behalf of them, or which is hostile, detrimental or disrespectful to the United States, the nationals thereof, the members of its armed forces, its allies or their personnel, or tends to promote dissatisfaction or bad feeling with them.

b. Importation into this territory or the possession herein, of any newspaper, magazine, book or other printed, typed, or written paper containing such matter is also forbidden.

c. Every publisher or printer, and every importer of newspapers, magazines, books or other printed, typed or written matter into this territory will, before publication or importation, submit all matter in any manner relating to or touching upon the present war, or the United States, its armed forces, their supporting allies or their personnel, to the Office of Censorship of the area in which his publishing or printing office is located, or of the port or frontier station through which the importation is made, and will obtain permission for its publication or importation.

d. Submission after publication or importation: - Every publisher or printer, and every importer of newspapers, magazines, books or other printed, typed, or written matter into this territory, will immediately upon publication or importation, submit to the Office of Censorship of the area in which his office is located, or of the port or frontier station through which the importation is made, three copies of every newspaper or magazine published or imported by him. He will also submit in like manner, two copies of any book or other matter published or imported by him which in any manner relates or touches upon the present war or the United States, its forces, allies or their personnel.

e. Circulation: - Possession, sale or gift to any other person of any newspaper, magazine, book, or other printed, typed, or written paper containing such matter as is defined herein (Par. 14 a.) above, or matter published, printed, or imported in violation of this paragraph, is forbidden.

f. Penalties: - In addi[illegible] punishment which may lawfully be imposed for any violat[illegible] the officer in charge of Civil Affairs in the [illegible] publishing or printing office is located, [illegible] offending newspaper or magazine for a [illegible] case of a daily newspaper, [illegible] may close a publishing [illegible] any other punishment [illegible] or for repeated [illegible] of this area may [illegible] longer period or [illegible] for a longer [illegible]

15. MANUFACT[illegible]

a. The [illegible] implements of war, explosives [illegible] permitted, subject to existing [illegible]

b. Commerce wit[illegible] to existing laws and re[illegible] prohibited articles [illegible] in a. above.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

a. Marking or posting: - In continuance of existing regulations, the proprietor or manager of every place of business in which articles are offered for sale at retail will plainly mark every such article with its price; the proprietor or manager of every place where food or drink is offered for sale to be consumed upon the premises will display a bill of fare giving the price of each dish or beverage, or inclusive prices for meals; the proprietor or manager of every hotel, inn, or boarding or lodging house will display in its office or lobby, a list of its rooms with the price of each, and, if it serves food or drink, a bill of fare such as is required by the preceding clause; he will also post in each room the price of that room; the proprietor or manager of every theater or place of entertainment at which an admission fee is charged, will post the price of admission or a list of prices of the seats at the entrance thereof; the proprietor or driver of every taxicab or public vehicle will post in or on such vehicle and in any waiting room or office which he maintains, the prices at which it may be hired or for which it will transport persons or goods; every person offering his services or those of his employees, animals, machines, apparatus, or equipment to the public will display at his place of business a price list of the services usually performed.

b. Discrimination forbidden: - It is forbidden to charge or collect any prices other than those marked or posted as required by a. above. In particular, any discrimination in price, service, quality, or otherwise, against the United States, its forces, its allies, or their personnel, is forbidden.

17. ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES:

a. Arms and Ammunition.

(1) Who may possess:

(a) All persons engaged in legal police functions, when on duty, may carry pistols and ammunition therefor.

(b) Private watchmen and detectives whose duties require them to carry arms may do so when on duty, but only upon issue of a permit by the military police. Request for such a permit will be made by the employer of the person who it is desired shall be armed.

(c) Manufacturers of and dealers in arms and ammunition may carry on their business only [illegible] issued by the military police, and in no case will they [illegible] keep in stock more than is necessary for [illegible] only upon permit issued by the military [illegible]

(d) [illegible] of legal [illegible] to carry or possess arms, must [illegible] the nearest military police.

(2) [illegible] will persons in possession of [illegible] to carry arms pursuant [illegible] to the military police [illegible] to all persons save [illegible] guns, rifles, revolvers, [illegible] weapons, or ammunition of [illegible] will affix [illegible] or label [illegible] receipt will be given him.

b. Explosives.

(1) Who may po[illegible]

(a) Contra[illegible] occupations may do [illegible] military

(b) Manufac[illegible] may carry [illegible] only upon [illegible] police, and in

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[redacted] will they be permitted to manufacture or keep in stock more than [redacted] for their current normal needs. They may make sales only upon [redacted] by the military police.

2. Surrender of unauthorized explosives. - All persons in possession of explosives, other than those mentioned in (1) above, to whom permits have been issued, must turn in such explosives to the military police on demand, after which time it will be forbidden to all persons save those above mentioned to own, possess, or transport explosives. The persons surrendering such explosives will affix thereto a tag or label bearing his name and address and a receipt will be given him.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

ORDINANCES 2

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters Theater of Operati

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

Following ordinances published for guidance of all concerned. It is desire of military to impose no more restrictions upon you than necessary to protect your interests and those of occupying force. However, police regulations are necessary, so certain of these will be promulgated for welfare of all. Compliance with the ordinances will be strictly enforced:

1. LOCAL LAWS AND ORDINANCES:

Will continue in effect except when in conflict with regulations made necessary by military control.

2. CIRCULATION:

Persons will be permitted, subject to local laws or police regulations, to move about freely within the controlled territory. To leave controlled territory a pass from military police office required. Railroad and transportation employees cannot sell tickets to, or carry, persons without military pass outside the controlled territory.

3. MEETINGS, PARADES, SPEECHES, SONGS AND MUSIC:

Will be controlled by local ordinances and regulations. Nothing to be printed or said derogatory or disrespectful to U.S. its allies, their armies or personnel.

4. UNIFORMS:

Personnel of all armed forces, including prisoners of war, will wear their uniforms at all times. Nazi or Fascist organization, or French Legion uniforms forbidden. Police, etc. personnel continue to wear their uniforms and insignia of office.

5. FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION:

In cities, towns and villages every person having firearm or ammunition will register its identification and amount of ammunition with local police officials.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

6. NARCOTICS:

Not to be sold or given to members of controlling force, except on physician's or medical officer's prescription.

7. SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH:

Local regulations to be enforced, together with such as may be published by controlling force for your protection and that of its personnel.

8. PROSTITUTION:

Proprietors or houses strictly responsible for use of venereal disease originating on their premises among U.S. or allied armed forces. They will be responsible that their inmates be physically examined by police medical officer at least once every three days.

9. OBSERVATION OF MEETINGS AND PARADES:

Must be previously authorized by military and will be stopped by Provost Marshal if it deviates from its purpose.

10. FLAGS, NATIONAL ANTHEMS AND UNIFORMS OF GERMANY, JAPAN, ITALY OR OTHER HOSTILE TO U.S. AND ITS ALLIES:

Flag and National Anthem - As state of hostilities between U. S. and these countries display of flags or other prohibited and singing or playing of national anthems of these nations prohibited.

11. COMMUNICATION BY MAIL, TELEGRAPH, CABLE, TELEPHONE, RADIO, PIGEON AND OTHERWISE:

a. General.

(1) Forbidden communications - Forbidden to transmit or knowingly receive by any means information concerning American or allied forces, their location, numbers, morale, arms, equipment, or movements, or identity of unit. Same for information hostile, detrimental or disrespectful to U.S., its forces and allied forces, their personnel, or the military administration. If innocently received must be reported forthwith to military police. Forbidden to communicate, directly or indirectly, with Germans, Italians, Japanese, or other hostile or unfriendly government, or any of its armed forces, or territory under its control.

(2) Censorship - All communications, by what ever means transmitted,

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] by the controlling forces.

[illegible] - The use in any communication, by whatever means [illegible] or any other device concealing the true meaning [illegible] forbidden.

[illegible] Injury to means of communication - Any stealing, embezzling, destruction of, or injury to:

(a) Mail, postoffices, mail boxes, trucks, bags, or other postal equipment;

(b) Telegraph wires or cables, insulators, apparatus, or messages;

(c) Telephone instruments, switchboards, conduits, cables, wires, insulators or apparatus, or;

(d) Radio and wireless transmitting apparatus;

or interference with lawful communication by any of the above means, will be punished by military tribunal.

b. Mail.

(1) Address of sender - The sender of every letter or article by mail must place his name and address thereon.

(2) Private transmission of letters, or written messages forbidden - Except within the city or commune of origin, it is forbidden to send, carry, or receive any letter or written message outside of the mail.

c. Telegraph and cable.

(1) Censorship - No telegraph operator shall transmit any telegraph or cable message other than a message to or from the Army of the United States, its allies, the American military administration or a message solely concerned with railroad operation, until it shall have passed the censor.

(2) Private telegraph systems - The use of private telegraph systems is forbidden. All such systems must be disconnected and their receiving and sending apparatus turned over to the military police.

d. Telephone - Telephone connections may be made and conversations held without permit between any two telephones in the same city. All private telephone wires, except within the above limit, are forbidden and must be disconnected. No other telephone connection, except by members of the American and allied forces, for military purposes, will be made or conversation held, except upon the issue of a permit by the provost marshal of the city or county in which the sending exchange is located.

e. Radio-Wireless - Every person having in his possession or being in charge of any radio or wireless transmitting station or apparatus, short-wave diathermy, electric therapeutic, electric shavers, or any other electrical device capable of transmitting radio or wireless signals, will turn it over to the provost marshal of the district in which it is located, if it is portable. If it is not portable, he will notify the provost marshal of its location. Except upon permit issued by the provost marshal, the possession or use of radio, the apparatus enumerated above, is forbidden.

f. Pigeons.

(1) Use for carrying messages forbidden - The use of pigeons for the carrying of messages is forbidden.

(2) Reports - Owners or those having charge of carrier pigeons must report to the provost marshal of the district, in which their pigeons are kept, the location of their pigeon-cotes and the number and distinguishing marks of their pigeons.

(3) Pigeon-cotes must be [illegible] night.

g. Newspapers, magazines [illegible]

(1) Publication is [illegible] magazine, book, leaflet, poster, or otherwise, [illegible]

(2) Forbidden matter [illegible] any newspaper, magazine, book, leaflet, [illegible] typed or written matter which is [illegible] of [illegible] Germany, Italy, Japan, or [illegible] behalf of [illegible] United States, or which is hostile, [illegible] their nationals thereof, the [illegible] with them, [illegible], or tends to [illegible]

(3) Importation in[illegible] the possession

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] r, magazine, book, or other printed, typed, or written [illegible] matter is also forbidden.

[illegible] before publication or importation - Every [illegible] r, and every importer of newspapers, magazines, books or [illegible], or written matter into the controlled territory will, [illegible] r importation, submit all matter in any manner relating [illegible] the present war or military occupation, or the United [illegible], armed forces, or their personnel, to the provost marshal [illegible] his publishing or printing office is located, or [illegible] station through which the importation is made, or [illegible] be designated, and will obtain his permission [illegible] importation.

[illegible] after publication or importation - Every [illegible] every importer of newspapers, magazines, books, [illegible], or written matter into the controlled territory, [illegible] publication or importation, submit to the provost [illegible] which his office is located, or of the port or [illegible] the importation is made, or to such other [illegible] of every newspaper or magazine [illegible] submit in like manner three [illegible] or [illegible] him, which in [illegible] the present war or military [illegible], [illegible], or their personnel.

[illegible] - [illegible], sale or gift, or loan to any [illegible], magazine, book, or other printed, typed or [illegible] matter as is defined in [illegible] (2) above, or [illegible], or imported in violation of this paragraph.

[illegible] - In addition to any other punishment which [illegible] violation of this paragraph, the officer [illegible] in which the offending publishing or [illegible] suspend the publication of the offending newspaper [illegible] a period not in excess of one week in the case of a [illegible] issue of any other publication, or may close a [illegible] office for one week. In addition to any other punishment [illegible] be imposed, for a serious violation or for repeated vio[illegible] paragraph, the commanding general of the controlled area [illegible] the publication of a newspaper or magazine for a longer period, [illegible], or may close a publishing or printing office for a longer [illegible], or indefinitely.

12. PHOTOGRAPHS:

[illegible] Taking of photographs [illegible] taking of photographs [illegible] military installations or activities [illegible] permit issued [illegible] commanding [illegible] of the area in which the photo[illegible] to be [illegible] forbidden.

[illegible] Developing and printing of photo[illegible], knowingly, [illegible] photographic plate or film, or to [illegible] from, except [illegible] for the exposure of which a permit has been iss[illegible] who comes [illegible] of a plate [illegible] which a perm[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] is forbidden.

14. Prices.

a. Marking or posting - The proprietor, agent or manager of every place of business in which articles are offered for sale at retail, will plainly mark every article with its price. The proprietor, agent or manager of every place where food or drink is offered for sale to be consumed upon the premises will display a bill of fare, giving the price of each dish or beverage or inclusive prices for meals. The proprietor, agent, or manager of every hotel, inn, or boarding or lodging house will display in its office or lobby, a list of its rooms with the price of each, and if it serves food or drink, a bill of fare such as is required by the preceding sentence. He will also post in each room the price of that room. The proprietor, agent or manager of every theatre or place of entertainment at which an admission fee is charged, will post the price of admission or a list of prices at the seats at the entrance thereof. The proprietor, or driver of every taxicab or public vehicle will post in, or on each vehicle and in any waiting room or office which he maintains, the prices at which it may be hired or for which it will transport persons or goods. Every person offering his services or those of his employees, animals, machines, apparatus, or equipment to the public, will display at his place of business, a price list of the services usually performed.

b. Discrimination forbidden - It is forbidden to charge or collect any prices other than those marked or posted as required in a. above. In particular, any discrimination in price, service, quality, or otherwise, against the United States, its allies, their forces, or their personnel, is forbidden.

15. ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES:

a. Arms and Ammunition.

(1) Who may possess:

(a) All persons when on duty may carry pistols and ammunition therefor.

(b) Private watchmen and detectives whose duties require them to carry arms may do so when on duty, but only upon issue of a permit by the military police. Request for such a permit will be made by the employer of the person who it is desired shall be armed.

(c) Manufacturers of and dealers in arms and ammunition may carry on their business only upon permit issued by the military police, and in no case will they be permitted to manufacture or keep in stock more than is necessary for normal current needs. They may make sales only upon permit issued by the military police.

(d) Other persons who for special reasons need to carry or possess arms may do so only upon issue of a permit by the military police.

(2) Registration - The superior or employer of every person [illegible] to carry or possess arms or ammunition under (1) above, or the person himself if he has no superior or employer, will register with the military police, the description and [illegible] arm and the [illegible] kinds of ammunition in [illegible]

(3) Surrender of [illegible] all persons in possession of arms and [illegible] to carry pursuant to (1) above [illegible] to the military police on demand [illegible] all rifles, pistols, [illegible] weapon, [illegible] upon the use of any [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] thereto a tag or label bearing his name and address, and [illegible] given him.

[illegible]

(1) [illegible] may possess:

(a) Contractors, miners, and others using explosives in their [illegible] may do so only upon issue of a permit by the military police.

(b) Manufacturers of and dealers in explosives may carry on their business only upon permit issued by the military police, and in addition will be permitted to manufacture or keep in stock more than is necessary for normal current needs. They may make sales only upon permit issued by the military police.

(2) Surrender of unauthorized explosives: - All persons in possession of explosives, other than those contemplated in (1) above must turn in such explosives to the military police on demand, after which time it will be forbidden to all persons, save those above mentioned, to own, keep or transport explosives. The persons surrendering such explosives will affix thereto a tag or label bearing their names and addresses and a receipt will be given them.

16. TAXES, CONTRIBUTIONS, DUTIES AND REQUISITIONS:

a. Taxes.

(1) Collections: - Subject to the exceptions mentioned below, all taxes, contributions, imposts, or whatever nature, both direct and indirect, will be collected hereafter by the officials now performing that duty.

(2) Exemptions:

(a) Property of and transactions with the United States and its allies: - No tax, direct or indirect, will be collected upon any property of the United States and its allies, any governmental agency of the United States and its allies, or any authorized welfare organization, nor will any tax be collected upon any purchase from, sale to, or any transaction of any kind with the United States and its allies, or such an agency or organization.

(b) Property of and transactions with personnel of the United States forces and its allies: - No direct tax may be laid upon the property or income of any member of the United States forces and allied forces, but they are liable to sales and other indirect taxes, as may be in force in the occupied territory at the time of purchase.

(3) Disposition:

(a) National taxes: - Except as may be otherwise directed by competent military authority, all taxes normally paid to or used by the French National Government will be paid by civil officers collecting them, to the officer in charge of the fiscal department of the Civil Affairs Section of the staff of the commanding general of the area and will be used so far as necessary to defray the expenses of military and civil administration of the controlled territory.

(b) Any tax or [illegible] after the [illegible] specific support of any [illegible] collection will continue to be [illegible] taxes. The proceeds of the [illegible] Chief [illegible] of the area, [illegible] Law, [illegible] disposition of [illegible]

(4) Audit: - [illegible] form of the [illegible] material, and [illegible] portion [illegible] (5) Liability. [illegible] all [illegible] are in[illegible] for

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible], wrongful application, or negligent loss thereof, [illegible] negligent failure to collect taxes due, or for other [illegible] or failure of duty.

(b) Supplies: - Supplies, land, and buildings owned by [illegible] services needed by the United States and allied forces, [illegible] be obtained by agreement between the appropriate officers [illegible] United States and allied forces, and the owners or persons whose [illegible] are desired. Payment will be made at once in cash or in vouchers payable in cash by a finance officer of the Army of the United States or [illegible].

(c) Requisitions:

1. Occasion: - Requisitions of supplies, land, buildings, or services will be made only if the normal method of procurement [illegible] fails to produce what is needed by the United States, promptly, in sufficient quantity, and at a fair price.

2. By whom made: - Requisitions will be made only [illegible] the authority of the commanding general of the area.

3. To whom directed: - Requisitions will be made upon the mayor, or other appropriate civil authority if practicable, but may be made upon individuals in case of necessity.

4. What may be requisitioned: - Supplies, vehicles, animals, land, buildings, or anything else, or the services of persons may be requisitioned if needed by the Army of the United States.

5. Payment: - Payment will be made at once in cash or in vouchers payable in cash by a disbursing officer of the Army of the United States. Prices will be the fair market value, to be fixed by agreement, if possible, otherwise by the appropriate military authorities.

6. Punishment for non-compliance: - Any person who fails to comply with a requisition or who conceals or disposes of articles in order to avoid compliance, will be punished as a military tribunal may direct.

17. BILLETING:

a. Occasion: - Quarters for officers and men and shelter for animals needed by the Army of the United States and allied forces will, when practicable, be obtained in public buildings or in private buildings or houses by agreement with the owners or occupants. Only when adequate and convenient accommodations cannot be thus obtained promptly at a fair price, will resort be had to billeting.

b. By whom demanded: - Demand will be made for billets only upon the authority of the commanding general of the area.

c. To whom demand addressed: - Demand for billets will be made upon the mayor or other appropriate civil authority, if practicable, but may be made upon owners or tenants of the property needed in case of necessity.

d. What may be demanded: - Rooms for officers, enlisted men, and other personnel, with suitable furniture, beds, bedding, [illegible] and the use of bathing and toilet accommodations, and water may be [illegible]. Garage and garage facilities, stabling, bedding, fodder and water for animals may also be demanded.

e. Payment: - [illegible] in cash or in vouchers payable in cash by [illegible] of the United States or allied forces. [illegible] will be made through the mayor or other appropriate [illegible] be the fair market [illegible] of the accom[illegible] by agreement, if possible, [illegible] by the appr[illegible]

f. Punishment for [illegible] who fails to comply [illegible] demand for billets [illegible] military tribunal may [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

It is forbidden and will subject the offender to ... t, as a military tribunal may direct, to:

a. ... t, strike, rob, or kill any member of the armed forces of ... tates or allied forces.

b. ... it rape upon any nurse or other woman serving in or accompany- ... forces of the United States or allied forces.

c. Steal, embezzle, sell, purchase, receive in pawn, wrongfully have ... damage, or destroy any property of the United States, and ... or of any person belonging to the United States or allied forces.

d. Disobey or fail to obey a proclamation, ordinance, or order of the commanding general of the controlled territory, or the findings of any military tribunal.

e. Make a false statement under oath, to any military tribunal; or a false or fraudulent statement, whether under oath or not, to any member of the United States or allied forces on any matter of official business or concern; to make a false, fraudulent or exaggerated claim against the United States or allied forces, or to forge or alter any identity card, pass, permit, receipt, certificate, voucher, check, or other like paper issued by or addressed to the American military authorities, or allied forces, or with which they have any official concern.

f. Damage railroads, roads, rivers, or other highways, or to interfere with their operation or with travel or commerce upon them, or to steal, embezzle, or wrongfully have in one's possession, property belonging or pertaining to them; to damage or interfere with the operation of water works or water supply, electric light and power plants or transmission lines, gas works, or the like; or to steal, embezzle, or wrongfully have in one's possession property belonging or pertaining to them.

g. Escape from confinement imposed by the United States, or allied forces, or the military administration.

h. Act as a spy; to violate any of the laws of war; to do any act hostile to the United States or its allies, or in aid of the armed forces of any axis or Axis controlled state; to aid a prisoner of war, or prisoner of the military administration, or prisoner of the United States or allied forces, to escape, or to assist or conceal him after escaping; to assist or advise any member of the United States, or allied forces, to desert, mutiny, surrender, serve as a spy, do anything contrary to his duty, or fail to perform his duty; or to offer or give a bribe to any such member.

i. Attempt to do any of the things above mentioned, or to advise, assist, or procure anyone else to do or attempt to do any of them.

j. A mayor or other notable ... of a town, village, district, or other community ... as representing the members of the said community ... for which the members of the community are presumed ... and in the case of his being found guilty of ... and on collective responsib... imposed on such a ... may be

k. Military ... are authorized ...

(1) ... known, believ... proclamation, ... arsonal. ...

(2) ... committed, ... violation of any ... authority, written ...

(3) Enter ... ... active, ... property ... into ... written ...

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] MILITARY TRIBUNALS:

a. Kinds: - There will be three kinds of military tribunals:

(1) Military Commissions, consisting of not less than five officers.

(2) Superior Provost Courts, consisting of one officer.

(3) Inferior Provost Courts, consisting of one officer.

b. Jurisdiction:

(1) Over persons: - The military tribunals herein enumerated shall have jurisdiction over all persons within the occupied territories except those having diplomatic immunity and those subject to the military or naval law of the United States or of countries allied or associated with the United States. Persons in the armed forces of the United States and allied forces charged with offenses will be tried by court-martial.

(2) Over offenses: - The military tribunals herein enumerated have jurisdiction over all acts or omissions made crimes or offenses by the laws of the country occupied, over offenses against the laws of war, and over violations of the proclamations, ordinances, regulations, or orders promulgated by the Commanding General, Theater of Operations, or by any of his subordinates within the scope of his authority. However, if the courts of the country under control are open and functioning satisfactorily, they should be permitted to try persons charged with offenses against the laws of that country not involving the United States and their supporting allies, their property, rights, or interests, or the person, property, or rights of a member of the controlling forces. The commanding generals of Task Forces, or if that power is delegated to him, a subordinate officer in charge of civil affairs, may withdraw any case or class of cases from a court of the controlled country and direct that it or they be dropped or tried by a military tribunal. Such power should be exercised with respect to any prosecution inimical to the interests of the United States and its ally. Each military tribunal shall have jurisdiction over such charges only as may be referred to it for trial by the officer appointing it or his successor, except matters within the jurisdiction of the Inferior Provost Courts. If the officer authorized to appoint the Inferior Provost Courts shall consider charges deserving of severer punishment than can be imposed by the court to which he may refer them, he will forward them to higher authority, recommending reference to a higher tribunal. An officer who is an Inferior Provost Court because he is the only officer present may try such charges as he or others may prefer, or may forward them to higher authority.

c. Bail: - As soon as conditions render it practicable to do so, the Task Force Commander, or if that power is delegated by him to them, subordinate commanders or officers in charge of civil affairs will issue orders announcing in what cases, under what conditions, and by what persons awaiting trial by military tribunals, may be admitted to bail or released without bail but with a summons to appear for trial. Admission to bail and release without bail but with summons are matters of discretion and not of right.

d. Procedure.

(1) Rights of defendant. Every defendant before a military tribunal is entitled to

(a) [illegible] of the charges upon which he is to

[illegible] have such lawyer defend him at

[illegible] in addition, one or more of

[illegible] the allied forces, will be detail

[illegible] Military Commission and will, if

[illegible] in obtaining him with his

(b)

[illegible] prepare his defense, if

[illegible] request is a matter for the

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

(d) Bring with him such witnesses as may be necessary, or to [illegible] at his request by the American military authorities or their allied forces.

(e) Testify in his own behalf at his trial, but he is not required to do so, and his failure to testify will not create any presumption of guilt against him.

(f) Have the proceedings at the trial translated for his benefit if he is unable to understand them otherwise.

(2) Previous convictions: - A military tribunal may consider, after a finding of guilty and before imposition of sentence, evidence of previous convictions and sentences by either military tribunals or civil courts; provided, that evidence of conviction of an offense legally punishable by imprisonment for more than one year (whether in fact so punished or not) shall be admissible without regard to the date of commission of such offense, but evidence of conviction of an offense not so punishable, shall be admitted only if the offense was committed within one year next preceding the commission of any offense of which the defendant shall have been convicted at the trial then in progress.

e. Sentences.

(1) (a) Military Commissions: - A Military Commission may impose any lawful and appropriate sentence, including life imprisonment or death.

(b) Superior Provost Courts: - The maximum sentence which a Superior Provost Court may impose is confinement at hard labor for 3 years, a fine of 50,000 francs, or both.

(c) Inferior Provost Courts: - The maximum sentence which an Inferior Provost Court may impose is confinement at hard labor for 3 months, a fine of 5,000 francs, or both.

(2) (a) Expulsion: - A Military Commission or Superior Provost Court, in lieu of or in addition to any other lawful punishment, may sentence a defendant to expulsion from controlled territory.

(b) Confiscation: - If a defendant shall be convicted of wrongful sale, purchase, use, or possession of any article or articles, or of the wrongful operation of a place of business for the sale of such articles, a military tribunal, in lieu of, or in addition to any other lawful punishment, may decree the forfeiture to the United States, of such articles, or the stock thereof in his possession or place of business.

(c) Padlocking: - If a defendant shall be twice convicted of the wrongful sale or gift of into[illegible] liquors, or a habit-forming [illegible] (including marijuana) at a [illegible] place, or twice convicted of other violations of regulations or or[illegible] with respect to the sale of intoxicating liquors at one place, or [illegible] convicted of the operation of a house of prostitution, at which house a member of the armed forces of the United States, or its allies, contracts or contracted a venereal disease, a Military Tribunal, in addition to any other lawful punishment, may order that such place be vacated and closed for a [illegible]

(3) Table of maximum punishments: [illegible] opposite each offense listed in the [illegible] limit of punishment [illegible] listed, and [illegible] Offenses not [illegible] offenses [illegible] according [illegible] the law[illegible] tribunal, [illegible] any o[illegible] tribunal [illegible] impose [illegible] any [illegible] finite term, or an[illegible] consider that cour[illegible] for all [illegible] a part of [illegible] francs for each month of [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] francs fine [illegible] impose [illegible] in the alternat[illegible] a fine

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible] who cannot or will not pay it, may serve in lieu there- [illegible] of confinement, computed upon the same basis. Confinement will [illegible] labor.

Paragraph of these ordinances	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor		
		Years	Months	Days
1a (1)	Failure to possess identity card . . .	- - -	3	- -
1a (2)	Issue of false identity card	3	- - -	- -
1a (2)	Issue, through negligence, of incorrect identity card	- - -	6	- -
1a (3)	Failure to report change of name, or residence, marital condition, or occupation	- - -	1	- -
1b	Failure to post correct list of occupants	- - -	2	- -
1c	For harboring aliens, or persons unidentified	- - -	6	- -
2	Travel without pass	- - -	3	- -
2b	Sale of ticket to or transportation of passenger without proper pass	- - -	6	- -
3a (1)	Organizing, promoting, presiding or acting as secretary or other officer at an unauthorized meeting or parade .	1	- - -	- -
3a (5)	Attendance at an unauthorized meeting or parade	- - -	6	- -
3a	Uttering speech or words, making gestures, singing songs, playing music, acting in a play, or exhibiting a picture, banner, or placard hostile to the United States, its armed forces, or any member thereof, or the military administration	5	- - -	- -
3a	Same acts expressing [illegible] the United States, [illegible] or any [illegible] tary [illegible]	- -	6	- -
	Disp[illegible] color[illegible] natio[illegible]	- -	3	- -
	Fail[illegible] to [illegible]	1	- - -	- -
	Wearing [illegible] orized per[illegible]	- -	3	- -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor		
		Years	Months	Days
5 (2)	To send, transmit, or knowingly to receive any communication giving any information concerning the American forces or its supporting ally forces, the United States, its armed forces, their personnel, or military administration	--	Death	--
5a (1)	Failure to report receipt of such a communication	5	--	--
5a (1)	To send, transmit, or knowingly to receive any other communication detrimental to the United States, its armed forces, or supporting ally forces, their personnel, or the military administration	1	--	--
5a (1)	Failure to report receipt of such a communication	--	3	--
5a (1)	To send, transmit, or knowingly to receive any communication disrespectful to the United States, its personnel, or the military administration	--	6	--
5a (1)	Failure to report receipt of such a message	--	1	--
5a (1)	Communication with the Axis governments, their armed forces, or the territory under their control	--	Death	--
5a (3)	Use of a code, cipher, or other device in a communication, concealing the true meaning of the message	--	--	15
5a (3)	Use in a communication of a code or other device concealing the meaning	3	--	--
5a (4)	Interference with communication by mail, telegraph, telephone, or radio: destruction, larceny, or embezzlement of the mail; destruction of telegraph, telephone, or radio apparatus, or cutting wires or cables	--	Death	--
5a (4)	Other offenses [illegible]	[illegible]		
5b (1)	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	--
5b (2)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5c	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5d	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5e (1)	Possession or [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Offense	Confinement at hard labor		
	Years	Months	Day
[illegible] of forbidden private tele- [illegible]	1	- -	- -
To send or knowingly to receive a forbidden telephone message	- -	6	- -
[illegible] unauthorized telephone connection by operator, or permitting unauthorized connection	1	- -	5 -
Possession or use of unauthorized radio station or apparatus	- -	Death	- -
Use of pigeon for carrying messages	1	- -	- -
Failure to report carrier pigeons or to keep their cotes open	- -	6	- -
Publication, importation, circulation, or possession of printed or typed, or written matter in the interest of the national governments of Germany, Italy, Japan, their armed forces, or in aid or behalf of them or hostile to the United States	- -	Death	- -
Publication, importation, circulation, or possession of printed typed, or written matter detrimental or disrespectful to the United States, its armed forces, or personnel, or tending to promote dissatisfaction or bad feeling with them, or which has not been submitted as required	3	- -	- -
Taking photographs outdoors without permit	1	- -	- -
Knowingly to develop or print a photograph taken out of doors	1	- -	- -
Failure of person to report the developing of a plate or film exposed out of doors	1	- -	- -
Commerce, direct or [illegible] with the unoccupied part of [illegible]	5	- -	- -
Failure to [illegible]	- -	2	- -
[illegible]	- -	6	- -
[illegible]	10	- -	- -
Sale of [illegible] explosives	5	- -	- -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Paragraph of Phase Ordinances	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor: Years	Months	Days
10a (2)	Failure to register description and number of arms or ammunition lawfully possessed	- - -	1	- -
10a (3) & 10b (2)	Wrongful possession of arms, ammunition or explosives	5	- - -	- -
11a and c	Wrongful manufacture, sale or gift of habit-forming drugs (including marijuana)	5	- - -	- -
11a	Wrongful sale or gift of alcoholic liquors (other than light wine or beer)	- - -	6	- -
11b	Sale or gift of light wine or beer at an unpermitted hour	- - -	1	- -
11c	Wrongful manufacture or sale at wholesale of alcoholic liquor (other than light wine or beer)	2	- - -	- -
12	Violation of laws, regulations, or orders with respect to sanitation and public health	2	- - -	- -
13	Illicit sexual intercourse with any member of the United States armed forces by a woman suffering from a venereal disease in an infectious stage, or solicitation of such intercourse by a woman so infected	- - -	6	- -
13	Operating a house of prostitution at which any member of the armed forces of the United States contracts a venereal disease	2	- - -	- -
14a (2)	Wrongful collection of a tax upon property of the United States, any agency, any welfare organization, or upon any purchase from, sale to, or transaction with the United States, or such agencies or organizations, or upon the property or income of any member of the armed forces of the United States . . .	1	- - -	- -
14a (5)	Larceny, embezzlement, wrongful application, or negli[illegible] funds -			
	Of a [illegible]	- -	6	- -
	Of [illegible]	[illegible]	- - -	- -
	Of [illegible]	[illegible]	- - -	- -
[illegible]a (5)	Failure [illegible] other [illegible] duty [illegible]	5	- - -	- -
[illegible]	Failure [illegible] butions or [illegible] of duty [illegible]	2	- - -	- -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor		
		Years	Months	Days
	...e or refusal to comply with a ...quisition, concealment, or disposition of articles to avoid compliance	5	- -	- -
	...ure or refusal to comply with a ...demand for billets	2	- -	- -
	Killing any member of the armed forces of the United States, or its supporting allies, with malice aforethought . . .	- - -	Death	
	...wrongful killing of any member of the armed forces of the United States, or its ally, under other circumstances	10	- -	- -
	...wrongful stealing of property from the person of a member of the armed forces of the United States or its ally forces, by violence or by intimidation	10	- -	- -
	Wrongful assault upon any member of the armed forces of the United States, its ally forces, with malice aforethought and with intent to kill	20	- -	- -
	Assault upon any nurse or other woman serving in or accompanying the armed forces of the United States or its ally forces, with intent to rape	20	- -	- -
16a	Assault upon any member of the armed forces of the United States, or its allies, with intent to commit any other serious offense	10	- -	- -
16	Assault upon any member of the armed forces of the United States, or its ally, with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon, instrument or thing	5	- -	- -
16a	Assault upon any member of the armed forces of the United States, with intent to do bodily harm	1	- -	- -
17	Any hostile or threatening act or gesture toward any member of the armed forces of the United States . . .	- - -	3	- -
17a	Striking any member of the United ...	- - -	6	- -
18	Rape by ... ing in ... of the ...	- - -	Death	
19	Stealing ... receipt ... of, or ... perty ... son ...	- - -	- -	- -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor		
		Years	Months	Days
	nited States, or its ally -			
	of a value of 1,000 francs or less . .	1	- -	- -
	of a value of 2,500 francs or less, and more than 1,000 francs . . .	2	- -	- -
	Of a value more than 2,500 francs . .	- -	Death	- -
16d	Disobedience of or failure to obey a proclamation, ordinance, or order of the commanding general, or of any of his subordinates, or of any military tribunal, not otherwise specified . .	5	- -	- -
16e	False statement under oath before a military tribunal concerning a material matter	5	- -	- -
16e	Any other false or fraudulent statement to any member of the United States' armed forces on any matter of official business or concern . . .	3	- -	- -
16e	Submission of a false, fraudulent, or exaggerated claim against the United States, or its ally; forgery or alteration of any receipt, voucher, check or other like paper issued by or addressed to the American or its allied military authorities, or with which they have any official concern -			
	When the amount involved is 1,000 francs or less	- -	- -	- -
	When the amount involved is 2,500 francs or less, and more than 1,000 francs	- -	- -	- -
	When the amount involved is more than 2,500 francs	- -	- -	- -
16g	Forgery or alteration of an identity card, permit, pass or other similar paper issued by or addressed to the American military authorities or their ally, or with which they have any official concern	- -	- -	- -
16f	Damage to railroads, roads, canals, rivers, or other highways, or interference with their operation or with traffic upon them; [redacted]	- -	- -	- -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

[illegible]	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor: Years	Months	Days
[illegible]	United States, or its ally -			
	Of a value of 1,000 francs or less . .	1	- - -	- -
	Of a value of 2,500 francs or less, and more than 1,000 francs	2	- - -	- -
	Of a value more than 2,500 francs . .	- - -	Death	- -
16d	Disobedience of or failure to obey a proclamation, ordinance, or order of the commanding general, or of any of his subordinates, or of any military tribunal, not otherwise specified . .	5	- - -	- -
16e	False statement under oath before a military tribunal concerning a material matter	5	- - -	- -
16e	Any other false or fraudulent statement to any member of the United States' armed forces on any matter of official business or concern . . .	3	- - -	- -
16e	Submission of a false, fraudulent, or exaggerated claim against the United States, or its ally; forgery or alteration of any receipt, voucher, check or other like paper issued by or addressed to the American or its allied military authorities, or with which they have any official concern -			
	When the amount involved is 1,000 francs or less	- - -	6	- -
	When the amount involved is 2,500 francs or less, and more than 1,000 francs	1	- - -	- -
	When the amount involved is more than 2,500 francs	5	- - -	- -
16e	Forgery or alteration of an identity card, permit, pass or other similar paper issued by or addressed to the American military authorities or their ally, or with which they have any official concern	[illegible]	- - -	- -
16f	Damage to railroads, roads, canals, rivers, or other highways, or interference with their operation or with travel or commerce upon them; damage [illegible] with the [illegible] or per[illegible]			
	Of a [illegible]	- - -	6	- -
	Of a value [illegible] and more [illegible]	1	- - -	- -
	Of a value more [illegible]	5	- - -	- -

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

	Offense	Confinement at Hard Labor: Years	Months	Days
	[illegible] from confinement imposed by the [illegible] forces of the United States or [illegible] military administration	1	- - -	- - -
	[illegible] as a spy; to violate any of the [illegible] of war; to do any act hostile to the [illegible] States or in aid of the armed [illegible] of Germany, Italy, Japan, or any [illegible] hostile to the United States or its allies; to aid a prisoner of war of the military administration or the armed forces of the United States or its ally to escape or to assist or to conceal him after escaping; to assist or advise any member of the United States or its ally, armed forces to desert, mutiny, surrender, or to serve as a spy	- - -	Death	- - -
16h	Assisting or advising any member of the United States armed forces to do any other act contrary to his duty or to fail to perform his duty, or offering or giving him a bribe	5	- - -	- - -
16i	Attempt to do any of the things above enumerated; or advising, assisting, or procuring another to attempt to do so.	One-half the penalty for the principal offense; and if that is death, 20 years.		
16i	Advising, assisting, or procuring the commission of any of the above offenses	Same as principal offense.		

f. Approval, confirmation and review. - No sentence of a Military Commission shall be carried into effect until it shall have been approved by the officer appointing the commission or his successor. No sentence of death shall be carried into execution until it shall have been confirmed by the Commanding General, Theater of Operations. The sentence of a Provost Court shall be executed forthwith without awaiting action by higher authority, but all records of trials by military tribunals will be examined at the headquarters of the officer who appointed the tribunal and (except the record of Inferior Provost Courts), at the headquarters of the Commanding General, Theater of Operations, with a view to the correction of any irregularity or injustice [illegible]

2. [illegible]

[illegible] submitted [illegible] or [illegible] injuries, [illegible] by [illegible] will be referr[illegible] represented [illegible] staff of each [illegible] of the [illegible] General, Theater [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]WER
[illegible] S. Army
[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

No. 1

PROCLAMATION

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters of Theatre of Operations

_____, 1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

In keeping with the ancient and traditional friendship of the Government and people of the United States of America, for French North Africa and its people, the American forces have landed in your country. We come among you as friends, not as conquerors. We want you to receive us as friends.

Our purpose, as the President of the United States of America has proclaimed, is to protect your country from invasion by our common enemies, and to maintain your authority and to secure to your country and its people, the enjoyment of an orderly government, of its choice.

When conditions permit and the necessity for our presence shall have ceased, our troops will be withdrawn.

Your religious institutions and customs will be completely respected.

Your laws and regulations will remain in force, except insofar as they may be inconsistent with a state of war and military necessities, or with the safety of our forces.

The officers and employees of your government and its administrative districts will continue their duties as usual, and co-operate with the forces of the United States, for the security of its inhabitants, and the American troops, and in the maintenance of internal order. You are urged to continue your work, to keep open your churches, mosques, temples, and schools, and to follow as far as possible, the usual habits and customs of your lives and the business of your community.

All governmental officials and employees, including police, both local and state, and all officers and men

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

of the Army, Navy and Air Corps, who cooperate with the American military authorities, will continue to receive at the same rate and in the same amounts, all salaries, pensions and benefits that they now enjoy, under the guarantee of the Government of the United States of America.

Your patriotic duty is clear; it is confidently expected that you will cooperate with the American forces and will observe such orders and regulations as your governing authorities, or I, as Commanding General of these forces may issue.

This observance is necessary to assure the safety and tranquillity of your country and yourselves.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

No. 2

PROCLAMATION

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters of Theater of Operations

_____, 1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The Army of the United States is in control of the territory of FRENCH NORTH AFRICA and is advancing farther into French North African territory. The purpose of this control is to prevent our common enemies from invading your country, and is an act necessary to the winning of the war by the United States and its allies. It is the policy of the Army of the United States, not to make war on you, the civilian population of your territory; but, on the contrary, to maintain tranquillity and order in that territory. As Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, I have therefore established military control in French North Africa. The establishment and operation of military control, by preserving order, will benefit you. It is to your interest, as well as your duty, to cooperate with and obey it.

During such control, the political ties which have hitherto bound you to the Government of Vichy, or any agency thereof, and your obligations of obedience to, and support of it, are suspended. The authority of the Army of the United States and of the military control established by it, is supreme. You must therefore obey promptly and fully, in letter and in spirit, such orders and ordinances as I, my successors as Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, and subordinate military authorities may issue from time to time. In particular, you must obey the directions of military policemen and personnel on civil affairs duty, who wear a purple arm band bearing the letters "CA". You must refrain from any act or word of hostility or disrespect to the controlling forces.

Your laws and regulations in force at the time of our taking control will remain in force, except insofar as they conflict with a state of war, or with the rights and safety of the controlling forces, or as they may be changed by me or my successors. The executive and judicial officers

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

of your government and of its regions, counties and cities, towns and villages, will continue the performance of their duties as usual, subject to supervision and direction by personnel under command of the Army of the United States on civil affairs duty. The officers and employees of the railroads, steamboat lines, bus and truck lines, street railways, electric light and power plants and transmission lines, post offices, telephones, telegraphs, cables, radio stations, waterworks, gas works, and other public utilities within the controlled territory, must continue in the performance of their duties.

You who obey the directions given in this Proclamation and in other orders and ordinances, have nothing to fear from the Army of the United States, and you will be protected by them in your persons, property, family rights, religion, and in the exercise of your peaceful occupations. You who fail to render such obedience or who commit crimes or offenses will be severely punished.

You will continue your usual occupations; your churches, mosques, temples, and schools will remain open.

Ordinances will be issued setting forth in detail what is required of you, and what it is forbidden for you to do.

Your religious rights and institutions will be respected.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100130003-7